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ABSTRACT
NATURE, FEMINISM, AND FLOURISHING:
HUMAN NATURE AND THE FEMINIST
ETHICS OF FLOURISHING

Celeste D. Harvey
Marquette University, 2016

This dissertation examines the viability of a feminist ethic of flourishing. The
possibility of a eudaimonist, or flourishing-based, ethic adapted for the needs of feminist
ethics and politics has recently been raised by a number of feminist moral philosophers.
However, in these discussions, the degree to which an ethic of flourishing requires a
substantive conception of human nature has not been adequately addressed. Flourishingbased ethical theories appear to require a substantive account of the kind of thing whose
flourishing is to be promoted, while contemporary academic feminism is characterized by
a strong suspicion toward claims about human nature.
Chapter one situates this problem in the current literature and reframes feminist
anti-essentialist objections to nature claims. Chapter two analyzes three historically
influential exemplars of the ethics of flourishing: Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. Employing
the analytic categories developed in chapter two, chapters three through five assess the
work of Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and Lisa Tessman for their adequacy to
serve as the basis of a feminist ethic of flourishing. I argue that each has something of
value to offer and yet each is problematic when it comes to how they appeal (or fail to
appeal) to human nature.
The central argument of this dissertation is that, properly understood, a theory of
human nature can be a critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing. As such,
feminist moral philosophers who would condemn oppression, gender-based
subordination, and other injustices by appealing to an ideal of flourishing that is being
denied or cut off, would benefit from greater attention to the assumptions about human
nature that such theories of flourishing entail. On the view defended here, a normative
conception of human nature is a necessary methodological element of a flourishing-based
ethical theory that illuminates the reasons one has in support of a particular vision of
flourishing. While I leave open the question of how such a conception of human nature
could be objectively justified, this dissertation argues that a theory of human nature can
serve as a normative resource for feminist moral criticism within a flourishing-based
ethical framework.
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CHAPTER 1

FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF FLOURISHING

1. Status of the Question: Feminist Moral Philosophy, the Ethics of Flourishing, and
Human Nature
A number of feminist moral philosophers have, in recent years, appealed to
flourishing-based ethical frameworks as the basis for a feminist moral analysis and
critique of oppression and injustice. By “flourishing-based ethical framework,” I mean
any moral perspective that either takes the flourishing or well-being of the agent as the
goal of ethics and starting point of moral reflection (as the ancient eudaimonists do), or
uses the notion of flourishing or well-being as a standard from which to criticize or
endorse specific practices, norms, rules or forms of life.1 We might also describe such a
moral perspective as an “ethic of flourishing.” I’ll use the phrases “flourishing-based
ethical perspective” and “ethic of flourishing” interchangeably.2 Feminist philosophers in
this vein include Lisa Tessman, Nancy Snow, Martha Nussbaum, Ruth Groenhout, and

1

For reasons I explain later, I’m setting to the side what could be considered a form of flourishing-based
ethic: welfare, hedonic, or desire/preference-satisfaction based forms of consequentialism. These are not
the kind of flourishing-based ethic I am interested in here, and they do not capture what the feminists I
reference below are attempting to revive for feminist purposes.
2
Is an ethic of flourishing a “moral theory”? Some philosophers have reserved the term “moral theory” for
theories with a highly specific form and structure. For a good discussion of this, see Margaret Urban
Walker, Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007). See also, Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an
insightful discussion of whether or not any of the ancient ethical theories count as “moral theories” in this
technical sense, see the introduction to Julia Annas's The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993). An ethic of flourishing (and the ethics of Aristotle in particular) has been attractive
to some philosophers (feminist and otherwise) as an instance of “anti-theory.” I am agnostic regarding
these debates. This dissertation indirectly raises meta-ethical questions about moral theory, what a moral
theory is, what a moral theory is supposed to be, and whether what I refer to as an “ethic of flourishing”
counts. I will sometimes refer to flourishing-based accounts as “moral theories,” or to philosophers offering
flourishing-based accounts as “moral theorists,” because doing so is less cumbersome than trying to work
my way around that phrase, but I do not intend this in a technical sense. For the purposes of this
dissertation, I leave all these questions open and put them to the side in what follows.

2
Chris Cuomo.3 Rosalind Hursthouse is another recent philosopher to have developed a
normative perspective centered on the end of human flourishing, and though not working
explicitly as a feminist, her work is relevant in this regard since she clearly wants her
perspective to be consistent with feminist principles.4
Lisa Tessman, Nancy Snow, and Rosalind Hursthouse each draw on the tradition
of Aristotelian virtue ethics and, in the course of so doing, have advanced various forms
of Aristotelian eudaimonism.5 Martha Nussbaum’s well-known ‘capabilities approach’
has drawn quite freely on the Aristotelian tradition, but her normative perspective is
equally influenced by Marx and the enlightenment tradition of human rights and human
dignity. For Nussbaum, human rights are best grounded in a notion of human dignity,
which she sees as being realized in and through the exercise of human capabilities that
enable human flourishing.6 Ruth Groenhout has advanced a form of care ethics centered
on the notion of flourishing, and she is explicit that human flourishing is connected to the
full development of human capacities and the perfection of human nature.7 Both
Groenhout and Nussbaum can be thought of as giving objective well-being theories of
flourishing in which an account of human nature and the development of certain
tendencies of human nature are central. For this reason, one might say they offer
3

Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005); Nancy Snow, “Virtue and Flourishing,” Journal of Social Philosophy 39, no. 2 (2008);
Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,”
Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992); Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species
Membership (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Ruth Groenhout,
Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethics of Care (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004);
Chris Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing (New York: Routledge,
1998).
4
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics.
5
Tessman, Burdened Virtues; Nancy Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” in Feminist Moral
Philosophy, ed. Samantha Brennan (Calgary, Alberta, CA: University of Calgary Press, 2002); Hursthouse,
On Virtue Ethics.
6
Nussbaum, “Human Functioning”; Women and Human Development; Frontiers of Justice.
7
Groenhout, Connected Lives, 1-7, 21.
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‘perfectionist’ theories of flourishing.8 In a quite different tradition of normative ethics,
Chris Cuomo has developed a feminist ecological ethic of flourishing and has done so
explicitly with the goal of “establishing a basis for rejecting oppression.”9
The central problem this dissertation seeks to address is the tension created by the
fact that the most well-known ethics of flourishing—Aristotle’s—relies quite explicitly
on an account of human nature, and contemporary feminists generally turn to Aristotle
when putting forward their own flourishing-based ethical frameworks. But appealing to
human nature is problematic for a number of reasons within feminist moral philosophy,
and the degree to which a flourishing-based ethic is either possible or desirable
independent of an account of human nature has not been systematically addressed by
feminist scholars seeking to retrieve a flourishing-based ethic.
Nancy Snow and Ruth Groenhout recognize both the need an ethic of flourishing
has for an account of human nature and the problem such a need presents for feminists,
but neither addresses the problem in depth.10 Martha Nussbaum has argued that a
conception of a universally shared human nature is important for feminist ethics and
politics over and against post-modern feminist objections to essentialist definitions of
human nature,11 but she has not addressed the epistemological problems I identify here as
constituting a central source of feminist resistance to appeals to human nature. This

8

For treatments of Nussbaum as a perfectionist, see Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996); see also Kimberly Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). In my estimation, the label of “perfectionism” is in some
ways misleading when applied to Nussbaum since her normative proposal is limited to support for
capabilities and not actual functionings. In addition, “perfectionism” implies that the ideal goal is perfect
functioning, whereas for Nussbaum, the ideal is positive freedom to function.
9
Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities. Cited in Sarah Hoagland, “Engaged Moral Agency,”
Ethics and the Environment 4, no. 1 (1999): 91.
10
Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” 46-47; Groenhout, Connected Lives, chaps. 1-2, see esp.
pp. 7-14.
11
Nussbaum, “Human Functioning.”

4
leaves her approach open to these epistemological objections.12 Finally, Lisa Tessman
represents a quite different position on the spectrum of feminists who have adopted an
ethic of flourishing. While the rest give at least a nod to the need for a conception of
human nature, Tessman advocates for a flourishing-based ethic but seems to reject as
spurious any attempt to support that account through an appeal to human nature.13
To recap, some feminists working with an ethic of flourishing, such as Snow and
Groenhout, recognize that human nature, although problematic from a feminist
perspective, is important (maybe because inescapable). Others, such as Nussbaum, argue
that feminists need to endorse an account of human nature in order to advance and defend
feminist aims, but they do not address a major source of feminist skepticism toward the
appeal to human nature.14 Finally, feminist philosophers like Tessman appeal to an ethic
of flourishing but do not address the problem human nature presents for a feminist ethic
of flourishing.
Feminist philosophers hold a complex and multi-directional skepticism toward
appeals to human nature. They have as many reasons to question its relevance as any
other moral philosopher, but their skepticism is also rooted in the history of feminist
theory and criticism itself. To address these objections, I give an analysis of this history
12

I discuss this below, but I see these epistemological objections as being raised by Alison Jaggar,
“Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum's Method of Justifying the Capabilities,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2006); Susan Moller Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and Gender: What Counts,
Who's Heard?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003); and Brooke Ackerly, Political Theory and
Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
13
Her position is somewhat more complicated in Burdened Virtues, but when arguing that moral facts and
practices should be understood as a product of political contestation, Tessman says, “If on the other hand
moral facts are taken to be true or false independent of actual, situated human practices—whether
descending from God or existing in a noumenal realm accessible through pure reason or even determined
by the telos of humans as a natural kind—then the political struggle over ethical values degenerates into a
contest to show who has gotten the independently existing moral facts right.” Lisa Tessman, ed. Feminist
Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer,
2009), xv.
14
For another author who, like Nussbaum, argues that feminists need to endorse an account of human
nature, cf. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values.
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and argue that, rather than eschew reliance on human nature, taking this history seriously
means giving greater attention to the various ways human nature can function within
normative moral theory and to how it can sustain our ethical thought. This dissertation
aims to take the history of feminist criticism seriously and thereby respond to these
objections.

2. The Ethics of Flourishing
This dissertation seeks to defend the thesis that a theory of human nature is
indispensable in a flourishing-based ethical theory and, furthermore, that it can be a
critical resource for feminist moral philosophers employing an ethic of flourishing.
Rather than try to avoid this controversial subject, we need to give much more attention
to our vision of human nature, how it sustains our ethical thought and how it can function
normatively within a flourishing-based ethical theory. Theories of human nature are
regarded by many feminist philosophers as a principal theoretical source of women’s
oppression—a far cry from a critical resource for defending a feminist analysis of
oppression and positive vision of flourishing. Human nature can be a critical resource
insofar as it can help articulate the available reasons in support of a feminist vision of full
human flourishing. Beyond that, human nature is an important self-critical tool that can
help us reflect on and clarify our own ethical outlook, especially in testing those elements
of our ethical perspective which we suspect rest on mere convention and have little or no
backing when we take a wider perspective.
Some of the deepest insecurities of Western feminists pertain to a legacy of
Western cultural imperialism—a history of those with the power to do so imposing
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culturally specific Western values as universally normative. Conscious that we (Western
feminists) continue to hold disproportionate power—including the power to articulate and
defend our own positions in the academy and, in certain cases, impose our moral vision
through influence on policy-making—these insecurities have fostered a paralyzing form
of moral relativism in certain feminist quarters.15 Nevertheless, many feminist activists,
political theorists, and moral philosophers continue to critique practices and norms they
see as harmful to women and articulate these critiques in such a way that their validity
extends beyond concurrent personal preferences shaped by liberal cultural values, mere
cultural convention, or—possibly worse—our own power to advance them. A
flourishing-based ethical perspective provides a way forward in this regard.

2.1 What Is a Flourishing-Based Ethical Perspective?
A flourishing-based ethic is, first and foremost, a distinctive stance on the nature
of moral justification. It asserts that moral justification, in the final instance, hinges on
the connection (of the act, rule, virtue, institution or practice) to human flourishing. An
ethical theory based on an account of flourishing can accept the intuitive significance of
norms and rules for human life, but when we ask why we ought to follow this rule or that
norm, the reasons offered will make reference to some significant form of human
flourishing these rules promote or protect. Hence, moral justification within a flourishingbased framework is a matter of conducing to or being constitutive of human flourishing.
To simply say that the end of a flourishing-based ethic is ‘human flourishing’
elides an important distinction: Is the scope of concern universal? Is the flourishing of

15

I’m thinking here of instances such as the one retold by Martha Nussbaum in the introduction to Women
and Human Development.
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every human being at issue? Or is it my flourishing as a human being that is at issue? The
ancient eudaimonists deal with this question in different ways. Aristotle gives an account
of the concern we have for the good of our friends as a part of our own good, but is
apparently uncompelled by the ideal of concern for humanity as such. The Stoics, on the
other hand, motivate ethical concern for others by starting from the point of the agent’s
concern for her own flourishing and then widening the scope of the agent’s motives by
showing how her own well-being is connected to that of others.16 It is a matter of debate
whether this kind of argument can motivate universal human concern. Likewise it is a
matter of debate whether, using such a strategy, one can motivate distinctively ‘moral’
concern—non-instrumental concern for the other for their own sake.
Another strategy for motivating universal moral concern is that employed by
Martha Nussbaum, who appeals to the notion of equal human dignity and argues on that
basis that the object of concern—‘human flourishing’—must be universal in scope. This
solution presents a motivational obstacle since it seems the agent could be unmoved by
the appeal to the dignity of others. (Flourishing-based ethical theories are not alone in
facing this challenge to give an account of the motive to universal moral concern.
Deontological and utilitarian moral theories face a parallel challenge to explain the source
of motivation to universal human concern or to justify a more limited scope of moral
concern.)
However this question is answered, I take it to be the responsibility of particular
flourishing-based accounts to resolve. Whether a theory has the resources to account for
and justify universal moral concern is an open and an important question. This will not be
the focus of my concern here, but it is the responsibility of each flourishing-based ethic to
16

Annas, The Morality of Happiness, see esp. Section III, “The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others.”
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show how such a high moral demand is justified and how it can be motivated, and this is
one basis for distinction between the various accounts.
Another relevant question: What is meant by “flourishing”? Etymologically, this
word connotes the flowering of a tree or plant, and it can be applied to all biological
organisms insofar as they exhibit health and vigor. Someone might object that to specify
the end of ethics and the object of human action as flourishing is overly restrictive and
reductionistic; the good of human life cannot be reduced to health and/or good biological
functioning. To base moral judgments on this standard alone is therefore inadequate
because there are many other values relevant to human life and many other goods at
which human beings aim.
Some philosophers who have adopted a flourishing-based ethic do indeed restrict
their concept of flourishing in such a way as to identify it with healthy functioning. This
is Groenhout’s concept of flourishing, for instance, and though Hursthouse has a
somewhat expanded notion of what health is for social animals, arguably healthy
functioning as gauged by biologists and ethologists is the primary referent of flourishing
for Hursthouse. Others take a more expansive view of flourishing and identify it with
some objective state of well-being that can include not only physical, but social,
emotional, and spiritual well-being. For instance, Snow and Nussbaum both include
discussions of these realms of human life in their analysis of what makes for flourishing.
For my purposes, I leave the specification of what ‘flourishing’ entails open.
Though the word has an etymological connection to the idea of healthy functioning, I do
not constrain it to that. I will assume here that it can signify a much more expansive
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concept of the human good, and that what it signifies is a matter for each theory to
specify.
While there are many issues—including the specifics of flourishing and the scope
of moral concern—that remain to be specified by particular accounts, flourishing-based
ethics can in general be described as consequentialist (as opposed to proceduralist)
because they are outcome-oriented.17 That being said, the outcome that matters is the
flourishing of a whole life as opposed to the outcome of some smaller, artificially
demarcated time-slice or particular act.
Flourishing-based ethics involve a distinctive theory of moral motivation. Unlike
many of the modern moral theories, flourishing-based ethics assume it is appropriate for
the agent to strive for her own flourishing, and that the agent’s desire to live a good,
meaningful, healthy, successful, happy—in short—‘flourishing’ life is an appropriate
motive for both the moral philosopher and the agent herself to call upon in the course of
practical reasoning.18 Flourishing-based ethics entail a distinctive answer to what
Christine Korsgaard calls “the question of normativity.”
The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral
agent who must actually do what morality says. When you want to know
what a philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must place yourself in
the position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim.
You then ask the philosopher: must I really do this? Why must I do it?
And his answer is his answer to the normative question.19
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An ethic of flourishing offers us an answer to the question “How should I live?”
Let us take Aristotle as a paradigm of the ethics of flourishing. Aristotle’s answer to this
question is, roughly, “You should live the life of virtue.” But virtue is difficult and
taxing. In addition to being difficult to acquire, the virtues can make our lives harder in
some ways, since once we have become sensitive to the requirements of justice,
generosity, friendship, honesty, and so on, it is not so easy to do what we want in the
moment and live how we want. Given these difficulties, an agent may wonder, “Why
should I cultivate the virtues?” Aristotle’s answer (again, roughly) will be “Because you
cannot flourish if you do not; you cannot live a successful, worthwhile or truly good life
if you do not.” This, then, is his response to the normative question. (And he might go on
to say something like, “Yes, I recognize that the virtues will sometimes interfere with the
satisfaction of your desires—especially as they are right now—but despite how things
look from here, a truly good life will depend upon the virtues.”)
A theory of human nature becomes a crucial resource for any ethic of flourishing
when responding to the normative question. While the normative question is answered by
an appeal to the good of flourishing, in order to articulate the reasons one cannot truly
live well without doing as the theory prescribes, the theory will need recourse to an
account of what it is about me and the kind of thing I am that makes this good for me. If I
accept the account I am given about the kind of thing I am and why this is good for me, I
also acquire a set of reasons to do what I am being asked to do—even if it is difficult or
painful—because I see that it is, in another sense, good for me.
One of the central claims of this dissertation is that a robustly evaluative
conception of human nature is indispensable for an adequately normative ethic of
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flourishing. By “adequately normative,” I mean the theory must be able to answer the
normativity question. It must be able to give the agent to whom it is addressed reason to
act or live as the theory prescribes. What I will call ‘teleological’ conceptions of human
nature can do this because they articulate certain ways of being human as worthy of our
pursuit, because “fulfilling,” or “healthy” or “dignified” and these ways of being human
are made intelligible as good when contrasted with the response that results from their
absence, which is “frustrating” or “stunting” or “alienating” (all of these can be opposed
to “fulfilling”) or “damaging” or “unhealthy” (as opposed to “healthy”) or
“dehumanizing” (as opposed to “dignified”). These theories are then able to articulate
what is good for the agent in living this way.
There is another way a theory of human nature provides reasons to agents who
wonder if they really must do what they are being told they must do (and so responds to
the normative question). An ethic of flourishing will articulate ideals of human life. The
higher the aspiration, the more important it is to be able to show that, while high, these
ideals are still realistic possibilities. So, let us assume the Possibility Thesis (P) as a
limiting condition on any theory of flourishing.
P: If a theory of flourishing prescribes that which is beyond what human
beings are (generally) capable of, then it is disqualified as a universal
moral ideal.
This restricting assumption is based on the broadly accepted principle that “ought
implies can.” This means that what a theory prescribes must, in general, be possible for
beings such as we are. But what is, in general, possible for human beings is neither
obvious nor straightforward. This is (in part) what debates about human nature are
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about.20 Because an ethic of flourishing cannot avoid making some assumptions about
what is possible and what is (generally speaking) not, an ethic of flourishing will not be
able to avoid some theory of human nature, thereby taking a stance on what is possible
and what are the limits of human nature.
Once these stances (on what is good for us and what is possible) are made
articulate, they also provide an agent with reasons to act and live as the theory prescribes.
In this way, a theory of human nature affects the normativity of an ethic of flourishing
because it affects one’s judgments as to the reasonableness of the ideals of the ethic.
From the first-person perspective, if one judges the ideals of the ethic as unreasonable,
given what human beings are like, the theory will lose its reason-giving force for that
person.21
Because of this, a theory of human nature is important for answering the
normativity question whether or not what I will call ‘the objectivity question’ has been
settled. The objectivity question is, in short: Is it true? This is a fundamental question. If
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there is no reason to think the theory of human nature relied upon by an ethic of
flourishing is true, there will be little motive to live by the ideals it sets. There must be
some reason for thinking this account is true. However, whether this can be demonstrated
“objectively” or not and what would be required to do so—given the complex character
of claims about human nature—is difficult to say.
In the chapters to follow, I will argue that a feminist ethic of flourishing needs a
theory of human nature of a particular kind, and that the benefit of embracing such an
account of human nature is that it provides resources for analyzing and articulating the
harm of oppression. But, as I argue, a theory of human nature serves as a resource
primarily in response to the normativity question. I have little to say about the objectivity
question. If the benefit to be derived from a theory of human nature was that it gave
feminists grounds for the claim that their conception of flourishing was “objectively
valid” given these facts about human nature, then the objectivity of the account of human
nature would need to be the central concern. This, it seems to me, is the role most
philosophers expect a theory of human nature to play. The expectation is that human
nature will enter the theory as the objective ground upon which normative moral
judgments can be justified. Louise Antony, whose position I will say more about in
chapter two, articulates compelling reasons for thinking that—as it is standardly
understood—appealing to a theory of human nature to demonstrate the objective validity
of normative moral judgments is a non-starter. Setting the question of objectivity aside, I
will argue that a theory of human nature is, for other reasons, indispensable to an ethic of
flourishing.
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In the next section, I outline the features of a flourishing-based ethic that make it
particularly attractive as a resource for feminist moral philosophy.

2.2 The Attractions of a Flourishing-Based Ethic for Feminist Moral Philosophy
An ethic of flourishing can incorporate many elements that make it attractive for
feminist ethics and politics. Flourishing can name the kind of life for women that feminist
moral philosophy envisions and feminist politics seeks to realize. Implicit in any moral or
political critique is a vision of the good that is not being realized, and, in at least a general
way, flourishing names the good envisioned for human life. An ethic of flourishing can
make this positive vision explicit, and in doing so make clear the ground for criticism of
the harms suffered by women in contexts of injustice and oppression.
A connected benefit of a flourishing-based ethical framework is that it provides an
intuitively obvious place for an account of oppression. The notion of oppression does not
have to be “tacked on” to the theory; it can have a central and significant place in the
moral framework. A flourishing-based ethical framework provides resources for
articulating the harm of oppression as we articulate what flourishing is and how
oppression interferes with the agent’s flourishing. Nancy Snow connects these ideas
when she discusses oppression.
Oppression is personal and political. It takes many forms. It excludes
persons from full and equal participation in public life, imposes economic
burdens and restrictions, curtails personal choices, stunts growth and the
development of talents and abilities, and, perhaps worst of all, is
psychologically internalized so that victims of oppression lose a healthy
sense of self. In short, it forecloses possibilities for human flourishing.22
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And Lisa Tessman argues that the concept of flourishing is significant in that it
allows feminists to “portray oppression as a set of barriers to flourishing and think about
political resistance as a way of eradicating these barriers and enabling flourishing.”23 If
flourishing is taken as the goal, oppression can signify the systematic barriers to
flourishing that exist for certain kinds of people—sexist oppression being that which
interferes with the flourishing of women by virtue of their being women.
Finally, Lisa Tessman argues that an ethic of flourishing “assumes that the pursuit
of flourishing—qualified in certain ways and especially by the requirement that one
develop and maintain the virtues—is morally praiseworthy.”24 From the perspective of
moral psychology, this is a powerful starting point from which to resist oppression, which
often maintains itself by co-opting the agent herself into believing that her well-being is
insignificant and that the pursuit of her own well-being is morally inappropriate.
Feminism embodies a fundamental commitment to the moral worth and well-being of
women, and a flourishing-based ethic puts the agent’s pursuit of well-being center stage.
Before I go on to discuss the problem that an appeal to human nature presents for
feminist moral philosophy, I would like to pause to say something about why, in the
context of this dissertation, I am using the language of a feminist “ethic of flourishing”
rather than of a feminist eudaimonism. Flourishing-based ethics are often referred to as
“eudaimonistic,” and almost all of the feminists discussed above who are working with
what I call a flourishing-based ethical perspective use the term “eudaimonism” to
describe their own position and discuss this subject matter.25 They do so, I believe,
because they are generally working out of a Neo-Aristotelian framework, and Aristotle
23
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was a eudaimonist. But the eudaimonist framework that Aristotle employed was a highly
developed ethical theory, and modern philosophers are not, for the most part, adopting an
entire eudaimonist ethical theory, but select elements of it.
Eudaimonism as a theoretical alternative to the modern moral theories of
consequentialism and deontology has been relatively neglected, not only by feminists, but
by moral philosophers more generally, and there is no standard characterization of what
eudaimonism as a theoretical stance in contemporary moral philosophy entails. As a
result, different philosophers adopt different elements of the classical eudaimonist
framework and therefore define eudaimonism in different ways. Many contemporary
philosophers who discuss eudaimonism are working from within a Neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethical framework and will define eudaimonism in virtue ethical terms.26 Some
have identified eudaimonism with either the necessity of virtue thesis or the even stronger
sufficiency of virtue thesis.27 In contrast to both of these, William Prior defines
eudaimonism as a thesis on the nature of moral value, that “the fundamental intrinsic
value in ethics is the human good.”28 Philippa Foot, a very influential figure in this
conversation, holds that eudaimonism is the view that “humanity’s good can bethought of
as happiness, and yet in such a way that combining it with wickedness is a priori ruled
out.”29 In contrast to Foot, William Nelson, following Julia Annas, takes eudaimonistic
moral theory to be not a conceptual thesis in ethics, but a commitment to a certain
starting point for ethical reflection. For Annas and Nelson, ethical reflection in a
26
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eudaimonist framework begins with the first-person question: “How should I live?”30
Limited as this survey of the contemporary discussion of eudaimonism is, I think it shows
with sufficient clarity that there is, as of yet, no consensus in the literature on how
eudaimonism should be characterized.
For all the ancient moral theorists, ‘eudaimonia’ names the agent’s final end in
life.31 For Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, ‘eudaimonia,’ which we
translate as “happiness,” “well-being,” or “flourishing,” was recognized as the agent’s
ultimate (final) end, and the purpose of ethical theory was to refine and articulate the
content of this goal to help the reflective individual live a life that could genuinely be
regarded as ‘eudaimon.’ Philosophy’s role in this was to help the individual think
critically in order to weed out the merely conventional beliefs about eudaimonia and
thereby give the agent the benefit of rational conviction regarding the way of life he or
she was choosing to live.32
The most developed study of the structure of ancient eudaimonist ethical theories
is Julia Annas’ work, The Morality of Happiness. In that work and subsequent articles,33
Annas articulates and analyzes the central features of ancient eudaimonist moral theories.
I will note here only those features that make eudaimonism (as the ancients understood it)
difficult for contemporary persons.
One of the key elements of ancient eudaimonism, on Annas’ view, is dependence
on a theory of human nature. Human nature entered into all ancient eudaimonisms, albeit
30
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in different ways, but contemporary philosophers hoping to rehabilitate eudaimonism for
contemporary moral philosophy—feminist or not—have not explored the implications of
this fact. The pre-theoretical understanding of the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘happiness’ that
modern persons (philosophers included) hold also presents a problem. Virtue and
happiness are the central notions of ancient ethics, but they meant importantly different
things to ancient persons. It is not clear, in Annas’ mind at least, that ancient
eudaimonism can be rehabilitated using the language of virtue and happiness, at least in
part because the terms for us are rigid and do not admit of much redefining. Even if we
could define the words technically in the context of a philosophically sophisticated
eudaimonist theory, it would change the nature of eudaimonist ethics, which began for
the ancients with pre-reflective common-sense notions, the desire for eudaimonia, and the
conviction that the ‘virtuous’ person is an excellent person.
While contemporary philosophers are certainly free to develop a eudaimonistic
ethical theory the ancients would not recognize, I think it best to reserve this term for
theories that are at least roughly of the form and structure observed by the ancients. If we
do not, we risk moving too quickly to the conclusion that eudaimonism is a non-starter
for contemporary moral philosophy.34 For all of these reasons, I regard it as unwise to
equate a flourishing-based ethic with eudaimonism. Eudaimonism, on my view, is rather
better understood as one distinct form of a flourishing-based ethic. In On Virtue Ethics,
Rosalind Hursthouse has made significant strides in this regard, making eudaimonism a
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full-fledged, recognizable alternative to the dominant modern moral theories, but I take it
to be an open question what commitments contemporary eudaimonism will entail. If the
eudaimonist perspective continues to elicit interest, there will undoubtedly be many
contemporary eudaimonisms, just as there were many ancient eudaimonisms. In keeping
with this conviction, eudaimonism as I will use it here refers to one form of flourishingbased ethics, one that takes eudaimonia (however understood) to be the goal of ethics and
the starting point of ethical reflection, but can be developed from there in a number of
ways depending on how the relationship between nature and reason is understood, the
weight one gives to what Aristotle calls “external goods,” and one’s intuitions
surrounding issues of moral luck.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will lay out the problem human nature presents
for a feminist ethic of flourishing given the history of feminist scholarship and criticism
on this topic. I will offer a distinctive interpretation of the history and the problem it
raises and suggest how I think this problem ought to be understood. For the purposes of
this dissertation, this will establish the parameters of the problem of human nature for a
feminist ethic of flourishing.

2.3 The Feminist Critique of Appeals to Human Nature
Feminist philosophers have repeatedly challenged moral and political theories that
make appeal to the purportedly universal facts of human nature. They have built a robust
critique of the history of Western philosophy that points out the ways that conceptions of
human nature and “woman’s nature” have been used to deny women full moral standing
and equal political rights or otherwise de-value concerns and tasks associated with
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women.35 Feminists have repeatedly revealed philosophical conceptions of human nature
as male-biased. This has especially affected philosophical accounts of the uniquely
human capacities, such as reason and moral agency. Feminists have argued that these
male-biased theories function to sustain and legitimate hierarchical relationships between
the sexes as well as women’s exclusion from significant forms of political participation.
In this way, feminist theorists have made a strong case that philosophical theory—
specifically our philosophical conception of human nature—has been a significant source
of women’s subordination and oppression.
The examples are too numerous to mention them all, but allow me to outline a
few exemplary cases where feminists have charged purportedly universal theories of
human nature with male bias. Nancy Tuana calls attention to the fact that Aristotle
regarded woman as a “misbegotten man.” He argued that her insufficient powers of
reason made her unfit to govern herself and that she must, therefore, be governed by
someone with the appropriate powers of reason—namely, a man.36

35

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About
Women and Men (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives
on Difference and Equality (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1991); Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, The Woman That
Never Evolved (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Mary Broidy Mahowald, Philosophy of
Woman: Classical to Current Concepts (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978); Andrea Nye, Feminist Theory and
the Philosophies of Man (New York: Routledge, 1988); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Nancy Tuana, The Less Noble Sex: Scientific,
Religious, and Philosophical Conceptions of Woman's Nature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1993).
36
Aristotle regards woman as a “misbegotten man” not only because she is missing a significant external
member, but because her capacity for reason appears to him to be impaired. He offers a pseudo-scientific
hypothesis that this is because, lacking sufficient heat at conception, the female embryo failed to fully
inscribe the human form. In general, the cause of women’s inferiority, smaller physical size, impaired
reason, and subsequent character flaws are—according to Aristotle—due to this lack of heat. Whether there
is a cause of her insufficient heat or whether insufficient heat is constitutive of what it is to be female,
Aristotle does not say. But because the principle of “heat” is what “concocts” the bodily matter and enables
it to develop completely (i.e., attain its own form of perfection), the degree of heat an organism possesses is
directly correlated to the degree of perfection it is able to attain. And it is because woman is possessed of an
inferior reason that she cannot rule herself and must instead be ruled by another both in the polis and in
private life. Tuana, The Less Noble Sex, 18-19.

21
Genevieve Lloyd argues that Descartes’ ideal knower is in fact a gendered
knower: “the man of reason.” Even though Descartes affirms that women and men are
equally possessed of the “natural light of reason,” because the training and exercise of
reason requires transcendence of the body and its demands (along with a certain amount
of leisure), the social situation of the ideal knower is in fact that of a man. If a woman
behaves according to her prescribed gender role, she will, as a rule, be unable to satisfy
the requirements of the ideal knower because her socially prescribed role in providing for
and attending to the bodily needs of her family and community will keep her mentally
and physical preoccupied.37
For Kant, moral agency is a matter of acting for the sake of duty, which he sees
as a matter of acting for the sake of the moral law as delivered by reason. When we act on
the basis of the deliverances of reason, we are capable of self-determination rather than
determination by the laws of causal necessity governing the empirical world. Acting on
the basis of inclination (e.g., emotional sympathy or desire) is acting in response to causal
stimuli from the empirical world, so it cannot be regarded as freely determined action.
Acting from inclination is, for that reason, incompatible with full moral agency. As Kant
would say, such action is heteronomous as opposed to autonomous. Women, who have
characteristically been associated with the emotional life and its partialities (particularly
for family, friends, and relatives), have been regarded as unable to control their emotions
and desires sufficiently to engage in dispassionate and self-determining acts of reason.
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But if women are understood to be governed by their emotions, they cannot be full moral
agents on Kant’s view.38
Rousseau, who also takes moral agency to be a matter of acting for the sake of
duty, is explicit about the implication of this view of moral agency for women. Because
women are, on his view, guided by emotion and desire in a way that interferes with the
governance of reason, Rousseau concludes that women must “never cease to be subjected
either to a man or to the judgments of men and they are never permitted to put themselves
above these judgments.”39 Philosophical reasoning like this rationalized the social and
legal subordination of women and legal practices such as coverture—the “covering” of
women under the legal identity of their husband in marriage—as well as prohibitions
against voting rights for women, not to mention innumerable everyday instances of bias
against women that passed as “common sense” about what women were capable or not
capable of doing.
A significant theme emerges from the history of feminist scholarship critiquing
the canon on this point: The problem is not simply with the philosopher’s
misunderstanding of women and their capacities, but with the conception of humanity
itself being employed. The conception has been revealed time and time again to be malebiased in its very construction. The ideal of human nature functioning in Western
philosophical theory has been biased by being implicitly a masculine ideal. Aristotle took
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the male form of being human as the ideal of humanity, and on that basis, judged that
women were defective, malformed, “misbegotten” men. Kant and Rousseau took a
characteristically masculine form of reasoning as the ideal of impartial rationality, and
therefore took characteristically feminine forms of reasoning attuned to feelings and
special relationships of dependence to be defective forms of human reasoning. The
problem feminists have identified is not just that these philosophers had mistaken views
of women’s capacities and nature (though that was often true), but that they employed
false conceptions of what it is to be a human being—conceptions that implicitly took
men’s experience or masculine modes of being as the ideal of what it is to be human.
Beyond the historical critiques feminist theorists have built, feminist philosophers
have extended the critique in ways that transform the force of the critique from a
methodological cautionary (suggesting we need to be careful that theories that purport to
be universally representative really are and do not encode gender-biased concepts) to a
methodological maxim to avoid universalizing, or “essentializing,” readings of persons or
classes of persons altogether. In what became known as the “difference critique,” white
feminists were forced to recognize that it was not only sexist male philosophers who were
susceptible to theoretical problems in representation.
In the 1960s and ’70s, cultural feminists undertook the project of attempting to
theorize woman sans sexism. The effect was a sort of transvaluation of values insofar as
cultural feminists valorized those qualities traditionally assigned to women such as
intuition, emotion, empathy, and the capacity for giving life and care. These
characteristics were taken to signify a unique and valuable feminine difference.40 These
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“feminine virtues,” all of which had at one time or another been represented as the source
of women’s (necessarily) second class status, were proposed if not as the source of
women’s superiority, then at least as the source of their equality. One of the fruits of this
emphasis on a unique and valuable feminine difference was the ethics of care.41
However, not all feminists were persuaded by the cultural feminist accounts of the
origin of women’s differences from men. For one, cultural feminism often explained
women’s differences from men in terms of female biology, especially in the capacity to
give life by bearing children. While cultural feminists valorized this capacity, some
worried it re-introduced a new form of essentialism. Having mastered the skills of
unmasking sexist forms of essentialism in the tradition, feminists in the socialconstructionist camp turned those arguments against essentialism inward and argued that
cultural feminism was reproducing another pernicious form of essentialism. Socialconstructionist feminists argued that cultural feminists who appealed to an essential
feminine nature (often understood as biological in origin) were misguided. Gender was a
social construct with a merely contingent link to the facts of biology: Sex was a matter of
biology; gender was the social significance of sex. The implication of the social
constructionist position, as many understood it, was that women’s roles and social
identities were open to intentional, progressive change, whereas cultural feminism was
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simply valorizing women’s biological determinism.42 Social constructionists saw this as
denying women freedom to choose and self-create and serving to reinforce traditional
forms of women’s subordination. In this way, social constructionist feminists took a stand
for anti-essentialist feminist theory.
The social constructionists argued by contrast that being a woman was a matter of
occupying a certain social role (e.g., potential sexual partner for men, wife, or mother) or
sharing in a certain social experience (e.g., oppression under patriarchy). Social
constructionist social and political theory emphasized commonalities among women on
the basis of their social experience of subordination under institutional patriarchy.
However, over time, even some social constructionist accounts of women’s identity and
oppression came to be seen as ultimately relying on essentialist assumptions insofar as
they implicitly took the experience of white, middle-class women as paradigmatic of
women as a class.
In the 1980s, lesbian feminists and feminists of color raised the charge of
essentialism in what became known as “the difference critique.” Therein they charged
that the “Woman” represented as the subject of social constructionist theorizing was in
fact a white, middle-class woman—a woman who ultimately reflected the social position
of the theorizers and not all women as it purported.43 And, in the same way that falsely
universal and male-biased ideals of human nature served to privilege the values, needs,
and concerns of the men doing the theorizing in the canon, so the ideals of Woman
advanced by prominent feminist thinkers of the 1960s and ’70s advanced the values,
42
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needs and concerns of the white, middle-class women responsible for that theorizing,
although this occurred under the guise of advancing concerns universal to women as
such. Alison Jaggar describes the irony inherent in the way the terms of the difference
critique paralleled the older feminist critique leveled at male-biased theories of human
nature:
The so-called “problem of difference” came to be conceived of less as a
problem between women and men than as a (cluster of) problem(s)
between women and women. Ironically, the very feminists who had
challenged men’s presumption in speaking for women now were told that
they themselves were presuming too much when they claimed to speak for
women.44
Cultural feminists argued that differences between men and women were
fundamental but did not make feminine modes of being any less valuable or any less
human.45 Black and Latina feminists saw that differences between women were equally
fundamental, and that the social positions that produced these differences must also be
recognized as equally legitimate ways of being a woman.
Through the writings of black, Latina, lesbian, and third-world feminists, many
white feminists came to recognize that in their own attempts to theorize about women in
a way that was non-sexist, they had unwittingly put forward theories that represented
what it was to be a white, heterosexual, middle-class woman. In doing so, they obscured
the lived reality and concerns of women of other races, classes, sexualities, and global
positions and implicitly privileged the lives and concerns of those women who more
closely approximated the theoretical ideal based on white women’s experience. Clearly,
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the theoretical challenge involved in articulating a theory of gender differences was not
resolved by simply including women’s perspectives or experiences in the process of
theorizing the concept of woman. Even when women’s voices were included in the
formulation of the ideal, the problem reasserted itself at a new level, in respect of class,
race, or sexuality. For those who believed they were guilty as charged, it appeared there
was some non-contingent relation between who does the representing and who gets
represented in theory. Elizabeth Spelman captured the heart of the difference critique in
her acerbic observation: “How lovely: the many turn out to be one, and the one that they
are is me.”46
Coming to terms with this led many to conclude that the problem was not simply
that the men doing the theorizing had been sexist, because white feminists theorizing
about women reproduced essentially the same problem. Margaret Walker describes this
history of feminist criticism as ultimately revealing an underlying Problem of
Representation:
[C]laims to theorize “women’s” experiences, or to represent what
“women’s” voices say have foundered on the same epistemological
challenge feminists direct at nonfeminist views. Not all women recognize
the voice or experience theorized as theirs. [. . .] Feminists have had to
struggle and negotiate over who is representing whom, why and with what
authority. Feminists continue to learn in hard ways that claims to represent
are weighty and dangerous, often not only epistemically dubious but
morally indefensible.47
Feminist theorists have identified a consistent pattern whereby, despite the
pretention to represent descriptively and universally, the theories actually reflect the form
of life and ideals of those doing the theorizing. In naming the Problem of Representation,
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feminists have identified two problems. First, in advancing philosophical accounts of
various phenomena (e.g., rational agency, autonomy, human nature), philosophers have
often passed off their normative ideals under the guise of descriptive analysis. Second,
feminists have found a predictable relationship between the ideals embedded in these
descriptions and the faces behind the ideals.
As a result of this history, postmodern feminists are not the only camp within
feminist theory to be generally skeptical of ‘essentialist’ theories that rely on
universalizing assumptions regarding the essence or nature of what it is to be a certain
kind of person—whether that is women’s essence, humanity’s in general, or that of some
other class (African-American women, third-world women, etc.). Though postmodern
feminists frequently voice such opposition and concern, the skepticism is seeded much
more broadly within feminist theory because of the history of feminist theory itself. 48
The feminist debates over essentialism suggest several take-aways: First,
independent of one’s philosophical stance on the epistemological/metaphysical issue of
realism vs. anti-realism, one’s theory of gender difference and account of the concept of
woman could be fraught with problems of representation. Metaphysically anti-realist
48
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positions, such as social-constructionism, have proven just as susceptible to the problem
of representation as realist positions, whether metaphysical or biological. Socialconstructionism doesn’t render one immune to these philosophical problems.
As a case in point, some social constructionist, anti-essentialist feminists tried to
respond to the problems of overly broad theoretical generalizations about ‘women’ by
giving greater attention to the differences between various kinds of women based on
social, economic, and racial location. Rather than speaking of ‘Woman,’ they argued one
ought to speak of specific kinds of women, i.e., Anglo-American lesbian women, black
heterosexual women, and working-class Latina women, etc. While this solution strove to
remedy over-hasty generalizations about women, women’s needs, and women’s
oppression, it was not clearly an anti-essentialist solution, since, by sub-dividing the
subject of feminist discourse into multiple identities, it seemed to presuppose that each
new category was possessed of “its own unique interior composition or metaphysical
core.”49 Thus this new “solution” to the problem of essentializing discourses about
women seemed to be itself another form of essentialism. As Diana Fuss wrote of these
avowedly constructionist strategies, “essentialism is essential to social
constructionism.”50 Even the self-consciously social constructionist analysis of highly
specific categories was open to the charge of essentializing.
Theoretical problems of representation have not been clearly distinguished from
issues of metaphysics in the literature analyzing and criticizing essentialism. I believe it is
best to set aside the question of what metaphysics underlies our theoretical representation
and focus on the theoretical issue. Because the problems criticized as “essentialism”
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arose in theories that were avowedly constructionist as well as in those that were realist,
there is good reason to think that the problem is not, at root, a metaphysical one. I believe
the heart of the problem is not, fundamentally, one of bad essentialist metaphysics, but a
problem of theoretical representation.
However, if metaphysical essentialism is not what is at stake in the feminist
debates over essentialism, then why have so many theorists drawn the conclusion that the
problem was precisely with lingering vestiges of metaphysical essentialism? In part, this
seems to have happened because anti-essentialist critics frequently framed their critiques
as a matter of unmasking the covertly metaphysical essence underlying the so-called
“essentialist” analysis. However, I agree with Cressida Heyes’s assessment that in much
of the literature,
The insinuation that metaphysical essentialism is at stake . . . serves a
rhetorical function within feminist theory, allowing the work of certain
authors to be dismissed on the basis of more sweeping criticisms than
should properly be allowed. Because metaphysical essentialism is an
untenable position for almost all feminists with regard to gender, eliding
the distinction between this form of essentialism and others gives false
weight to charges of “essentialism”. . . . 51
What has often been at issue is a kind of methodological essentialism—how we
should represent diverse subjects as the subject of ethical and political theory—but this
has often been obscured by critiques that draw their force from the implication that
metaphysical essentialism is at stake. Other legitimate philosophical reasons for adopting
a metaphysically anti-realist position exist, but the feminist critique of essentialism as
politically dangerous and exclusionary do not speak either for or against metaphysical
realism or anti-realism about essences or natures—whether women’s, humanity’s, or that
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of any other group. While concern over essentialism has quite often signified a legitimate
and important political concern about social exclusion and the dangers of oppression
consequent upon such exclusion, it equally often obscured the solution to this problem by
associating these pernicious effects with bad metaphysics. Given that even “good” (i.e.,
social constructionist) metaphysics are susceptible to problems of representation and
didn’t solve the problem, eliminating “bad” metaphysics cannot be the proper solution.
Second, anti-essentialism presented a number of theoretical and political
challenges of its own. Alison Stone has outlined the way anti-essentialism called into
question both feminist social critique and feminist activism directed at political change.
Women constitute the subject of feminist social criticism, but anti-essentialism “cast
doubt on the project of conceptualizing women as a group.”52 Furthermore, without the
presumption of a shared group identity, feminist politics was in danger because women
could not “be expected to mobilize around any concern at their common situation, or
around any shared political identity or allegiance.”53
Recognizing the implications of anti-essentialism for feminist social criticism and
political activism, some anti-essentialist theorists responded by adopting ‘strategic
essentialism,’ which rejects essentialism as a true description of social reality. Rather, it
accepts the necessity of essentializing claims in politics and advocates for anti-essentialist
feminists to “continue to act as if essentialism were true, so as to encourage a shared
identification among women that enables them to engage in collective action.”54 At the
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extreme, strategic essentialists suggest essentialism is necessary as a political strategy,
even though it is false and justified purely by its political efficacy. Strategic essentialism
as a solution to the theoretical crisis in anti-essentialist feminist theory is not very
convincing. As Alison Stone argues, there is little reason to think an effective political
strategy for resisting women’s oppression can be built on the basis of a fiction. If women
do not exist as a unified group, then there is little reason to think that acting as if they did
would be effective at combatting the challenges women as a group supposedly face.
Alternatively, strategic essentialists may maintain that essentialism is
descriptively false, but women’s social experience is structured by social institutions that
operate as if essentialism were true. So, despite being false, it can be politically effective
to act as if women share a homogeneous social experience. But this analysis faces a
problem: It must either accept that women’s social experience is diverse or that there is
something essentially common due not to their being women but rather to their all being
treated as women by basic social institutions. Stone argues that this form of strategic
essentialism is fundamentally unstable because it attempts
to resuscitate essentialism by arguing that it can take a merely political and
non-descriptive form. But . . . one cannot defend essentialism on strategic
grounds without first showing that there is a homogenous set of
essentialist assumptions that exerts a coherent influence on women’s
social experience—which amounts to defending essentialism on
descriptive grounds (as well).55
Stone’s criticisms are compelling. As a response to the problems that antiessentialism created for feminist politics and social criticism, strategic essentialism is not
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a very satisfying solution.56 I concur with the concern of “anti-anti-essentialists”57 that
feminist theory cannot suffice without some level of universalizing discourse or—what
amounts to the same thing—essentializing. The counsel to avoid universalizing
discourses was tantamount to advocating that feminists quit the practice of engaging in
social criticism on behalf of women, and stop trying to organize women around political
issues relevant to their lives.
While the heated debates over essentialism have subsided, it is not clear that the
theoretical question of how to represent the subject of feminist discourse was ever
satisfactorily resolved, and questions about how to engage in responsible representation
in social and political theory remain. In the following chapters, I will argue that an
evaluative conception of human nature is theoretically indispensable in a flourishingbased moral theory. My position might be understood as a form of self-conscious
essentialism, but at this juncture, I believe the important questions at stake are really
about responsible representation, not whether or not one’s theory is essentializing. The
analytical usefulness of that term has been spent. Responsible representation is advanced
through transparency about the nature and function of theoretical representations of the
subject of moral and political theory—whether it be women or human beings as such.
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An added benefit of moving the discussion away from essentialism toward
methodological issues of theoretical representation is that it shifts the emphasis of the
problem away from the ambiguities inherent in the debate over essentialism. This debate
was sometimes over forms of representation and sometimes a proxy for metaphysical
debate on the part of theorists intent on rooting out the last vestiges of a languishing but
live inheritance from a philosophical worldview premised on an ontology of substance.58
Rather than revealing a metaphysical problem, the anti-essentialist debates are
better understood as revealing the theoretical problem of representation. As witnessed by
the essentialist/anti-essentialist debate, feminist theory is shaped by a fundamental moral
concern about the power theoretical representations of the subject in ethical and political
theory have to affect people’s lives—whether those representations are of women or
human beings. Feminists have demonstrated persistent concern over the ways theoretical
assumptions about the nature of the subject affect the lives of the most socially
marginalized or powerless, and they have developed a growing insight that the realities of
these kinds of lives tend to be obscured by mainstream moral and political theory. Still,
theory is impossible without some level of abstract theoretical representation of the
subject. Thus, assuming feminists are not required to abstain from giving theoretical
attention to the social and political realities of human life, the important question cannot
be whether but how those engaged in theoretical work should represent the subject of
ethical and political theory and how it can be done in a morally responsible way.59
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If this analysis is correct, then the appropriate questions regarding the reliance of
a flourishing-based ethic on a conception of human nature will address the nature and
methodology appropriate to theoretical representation of human nature; how
representations of various types function theoretically; and how these representations can
be put to liberatory purposes that help realize a more just world for all.
Whether ‘human nature’ is a substance in a metaphysically robust sense or a
philosophical construct, I will leave to the side. Some think realism is the only way to
make sense of truth claims in any arena. For my purposes here, I will assume the debate
is still out on that question. I do not think we can do without a conception of human
nature in ethics and politics, but it is not up to us to determine what human nature is.
While this rules out certain positions, neither of these assumptions presupposes an answer
to the question of whether we need recourse to a form of moral realism (where facts
about human nature would count as moral facts) or whether some sort of constructivism
is sufficient (in which case, the moral facts about human nature would be understood as
constructs).
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3. Outline of the Chapters
The central argument of this dissertation is that human nature can be a critical
resource for feminist moral philosophy functioning within a flourishing-based
framework. The first point to be established is that flourishing-based ethical theories need
an account of human nature. To be adequately normative, a flourishing-based ethical
theory needs a robustly normative account of human nature. Feminist moral philosophers
might wonder why they ought to bother with articulating and explicating their conception
of human nature, given the difficulty and controversy involved in such an endeavor. I
make a positive case for including reflection on human nature as a constituent aspect of
our reflection on the nature of human flourishing by showing what is missing in
approaches that try to evade such considerations. (I do this especially in chapters two,
four and five.) I argue that a feminist ethic of flourishing (such as that provided by Lisa
Tessman) can be strengthened by including a space for reflection on human nature. In the
course of the argument, I advance an account of the proper relationship between human
nature claims and an ethic of flourishing. This is articulated in the final chapter.
The first task is to understand more clearly how conceptions of human nature can
function to inform a flourishing-based ethical theory. This will be the topic of chapter
two, for human nature can be brought to bear on a flourishing-based ethical theory in
multiple ways, and these are importantly related to the way nature in general is
understood. As such, in chapter two I proceed by taking a step back from the question of
the representation of human nature and ask about the representation of nature in general,
drawing a distinction between a ‘substantive conception of human nature’ and a
‘conception of nature in general’ that underlies a conception of human nature.
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I argue that there are vastly different ways of representing nature in general, some
of which are non-starters for ethical argument. I look at the way the concept of nature in
general functions in the thought of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. Marx and Aristotle are
especially significant sources of inspiration for many feminists currently working with an
ethic of flourishing. Hume, in contrast, is not a major source of inspiration for the ethics
of flourishing, but he operates with the same conception of nature as those who are
suspicious of appeals to nature. Louise Antony’s arguments against making appeal to
nature in ethics provide a particularly clear view of the problems that arise when one
assumes a Humean view of nature in general.60 As a result, it is important to look at the
way nature is conceived on the Humean model and the challenges this presents to
thinking that human nature might be relevant to ethics.
Following the historical analysis in chapter two, I turn to three contemporary
figures working with a flourishing-based ethic: Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum,
and Lisa Tessman. The goal is to assess these contemporary ethics of flourishing in order
to develop a sound basis for a feminist ethic of flourishing.
In chapter three, I examine the flourishing-based virtue ethics of Rosalind
Hursthouse. I begin here because Hursthouse has done the most of the three to make
explicit and defend the normative function of the appeal to nature in a flourishing-based
ethic. As such, the discussion of Hursthouse serves as an introduction to what I take to be
some of the major issues and potential confusions surrounding what the appeal to nature
can properly be expected to provide and what it should not be expected to provide. For
Hursthouse, the appeal to human nature is not a matter of justifying right action, but of
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supporting the characterization of flourishing we use to identify the virtues appropriate to
human life.
As I am interested in the methodological function of the appeal to human nature,
Hursthouse’s discussion of the argumentative limitation of the appeal to nature in ethics
is instructive. Following John McDowell—but responding to a challenge framed by
Bernard Williams—Hursthouse stakes out the position that human nature is relevant, not
as a non-ethical foundation, but as part of an overall evaluative outlook on life, one piece
of which is our view of human nature. She rejects the notion that the appeal to nature is
intended to silence the moral skeptic or provide an absolute foundation for ethics. She
instead argues that the appeal to human nature can offer rational support for one’s views
regarding flourishing and the virtues, despite the fact that it doesn’t provide conclusive
evidence “from a neutral point of view” (i.e., from the view of one with no particular
ethical commitments).61 Likewise, I’ll suggest that the appeal to human nature cannot be
expected to silence the “moral sexist,” but it can give rational support for feminist views
of flourishing.
I argue that while Hursthouse situates the appeal to human nature appropriately
within a flourishing-based ethic and so gives the right methodological role to a theory of
human nature, the substantive conception of human nature she endorses is not really
strong enough for feminist purposes. For instance, on the assumption that both
hierarchical and egalitarian gender relations are consistent with stable and functional
forms of human sociality, on her view as it stands, it seems impossible to account for why
a social collective characterized by gender equality would be morally superior to one
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strongly characterized by gender hierarchy. A feminist ethic of flourishing that follows
Hursthouse’s lead will need a “thicker” account of the proper ends of human nature.
In chapter four, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is the subject of
discussion. In her thought, we see the influence of both Aristotle and Marx. The tradition
of Marxist thinking with the most evident influence in Nussbaum’s writing is that which
appeals to the value of full human development to marshal an ethical critique of systems
that stunt or inhibit this value. Nussbaum’s account of human flourishing is implicit in
the list of human capabilities she argues deserve protection as constitutive of a dignified
human life. This chapter brings together the two major themes of the dissertation:
feminist objections to human nature claims stemming from the problem of representation,
and concern for the proper methodological role of appeals to human nature in a
flourishing-based framework. I will argue that Nussbaum’s account of human nature is
substantive enough to defend the liberal vision of flourishing to which she is committed,
but she is ambiguous about the status of her appeal to nature. Thus, at times, she
misrepresents the role of the appeal to nature.
In chapter five, I turn to Lisa Tessman’s work in Burdened Virtues. Tessman
offers a significantly different flourishing-based ethical framework from Nussbaum’s and
Hursthouse’s. Tessman’s explicit aim is to use a eudaimonist moral theory to analyze the
moral harms inflicted by oppression. Her method is unorthodox in that she resists arguing
for a full account of flourishing. Instead, she appeals to the vision of flourishing she finds
implicit in the projects of political resistance carried on by communities of activists
committed to resisting oppression. In Tessman’s account, human nature plays quite a
limited role. Her goal appears to be to avoid controversial questions of human nature, but

40
I argue that embracing the conception of human nature that is already implicit in her
account of the burdened virtues would bolster her case that the ‘burdened virtues’
constitute a moral harm of oppression. In this way, I argue that a theory of human nature
can be a critical resource for analyzing and defending an account of the harm of
oppression.
In the sixth and final chapter, I review the ground covered in the body of the
dissertation and elaborate on the proper role human nature has in a flourishing-based
ethical theory. I focus especially on the limitations of an appeal to human nature and
suggest that the theories of human nature informing an ethic of flourishing may profitably
be understood as “essentially contested.” While I discuss this possibility briefly, an indepth study of the topic will have to wait for another time.
Before I conclude this chapter, I need to address some relevant issues and
questions that I will not be able to deal with in any depth in the context of this
dissertation, and I want to conclude with a short excursus on feminist moral philosophy
and how this dissertation can be situated within the field of feminist moral philosophy.

4. Boundaries of the Study
I cannot take up any of the general philosophical objections to a flourishing-based
ethical theory here. There are important philosophical objections to flourishing-based
ethical frameworks as moral theories at all on the grounds that they are “egoistic” and
cannot account for the especially stringent nature of a moral obligation. These objections
owe especially to Kant,62 though others feel similarly.63 I limit myself to the unique
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concerns that arise from the feminist project of appropriating this moral framework.
These objections stem from the history of feminist critiques of essentialism and are
related to the problem of representation as laid out here.
While I examine a variety of flourishing-based ethics, I do not address the
possibility of a “subjectivist” ethic of flourishing, that is, a theory which defines
flourishing by reference to desire-satisfaction or preference-satisfaction. This decision
means that I exclude from the parameters of this discussion a whole school of thought
about flourishing, a school sometimes referred to as the “subjective welfare approach” to
flourishing. At least on the face of it, subjective welfarists seek to give an account of
flourishing relatively independent of human nature. However, desire- and preferencesatisfaction-based accounts of flourishing seem to face an insurmountable objection with
regard to the problem of preference adaptation. This is particularly problematic in regards
to oppression, since oppression tends to systematically limit the scope of one’s life
possibilities. Whether the problem of preference adaptation is decisive against
preference-based accounts is a subject of intense debate that I do not have time or space
to consider here.

5. Coda: Feminist Moral Philosophy
Feminist moral philosophy has developed significant critiques of the standardbearing ethical and political theories of the Western philosophical tradition, showing how
they suffer from gender and other bias. Following a period of intense scrutiny and
63
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criticism, feminist philosophers have also re-envisioned and recast these theories in ways
that make them more amenable to feminist purposes and less susceptible to these
criticisms.64 This project sits in the space created by the flowering of feminist theory as
both critique and reformulation, and it aims to carry this tradition forward in rethinking
flourishing-based ethics for feminist purposes.
This dissertation is a work in feminist ethics, or perhaps, since “feminist ethics” is
still so often identified with the ethics of care or as a subset of applied ethics, it would be
better to call it a work in feminist moral philosophy. It takes up an age-old question
within moral philosophy—the relationship between human nature and ethics—and
examines that question in light of the theoretical concerns articulated within feminist
theory. Of the study of feminist ethics, Margaret Walker has said:
“[F]eminist ethics” is more like Kantian, Aristotelian, or utilitarian ethics
than it is like, say, environmental ethics or biomedical ethics. It is not a
subject matter but a method of approach with certain prior convictions
about human agency, knowledge and society. I see feminist ethics as one
such approach within moral philosophy conceived as the continuing
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project of exploring the form and content of answers to the question “how
shall we live?”65
I concur. Feminist ethics is more like Kantian, Aristotelian or utilitarian ethics
than environmental ethics or biomedical ethics. Like those ethical theories, it requires
certain assumptions as starting points—assumptions that have traditionally been
discussed in terms of ‘human nature.’ For a variety of reasons (some of which are
addressed above), some feminist theorists have been reluctant to commit themselves to a
robust conception of human nature.66 Feminist moral philosophers have the same
philosophical reasons as any other moral philosopher to be skeptical of appeals to human
nature, but they also have a distinct set of reasons arising out the history of feminist
theory itself. I cannot defend against the other reasons philosophers have wished to avoid
reliance on claims about human nature. My goal here is to address what I see as
distinctively feminist objections to appeals to human nature within ethics. As such, I will
limit myself to the concerns I understand to arise out of the history of feminist inquiry
and debate outlined in this chapter, culminating in the questions and concerns that I will
call, following Margaret Walker, the Problem of Representation.
Careful articulation and examination of the grounds upon which feminist moral
philosophy can defend its claims regarding the oppression of women is important because
feminists must ultimately rely on ethical arguments to defend the rightness of their
practical and political goals. Amy Baehr notes that “One weakness of much feminist
political theory is that it does not directly address the question of its normative
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foundation.”67 This dissertation seeks to provide resources for the remedy of that problem
by advancing the conversation among feminists about the possible normative resources
available in an articulated conception of human nature. That being said, “foundations”
might not be the right word here because I do not ultimately see human nature as the
objective ground, or foundation, from which ethics can be derived. Human nature on my
view is, rather, more like a resource from which we draw. Like many of our natural
resources, it must be used carefully. It can be abused, misused, and put to use in
detrimental ways. It can also be neglected to the point of becoming a wasteland—so
neglected that it no longer has the power to nourish what it once sustained. But if used
with care, stewarded as we steward the land, human nature is a conceptual resource that
can nourish our thought, providing us with a moral source from which to draw inspiration
and grounds upon which we can articulate a vision of a good human life.
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CHAPTER 2

NATURE AND FLOURISHING IN THE THOUGHT OF ARISTOTLE, HUME, AND
MARX

1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I gave the outlines of a problem in contemporary feminist
moral philosophy: In the process of re-appropriating the ethics of flourishing, there has
not been sufficient attention paid to the degree to which such an ethical framework
implies or depends upon a robust theory of human nature. I also argued that although the
essentialism/anti-essentialism debate in feminist theory is often taken as a debate
delimiting the bounds of acceptable feminist metaphysics, it may be more usefully
understood as pointing out certain problems of theoretical representation. If the problem
is a lack of transparency about the status of claims about human nature, the solution I
propose is transparency about the status of our claims about human nature.
This chapter examines Aristotle, Hume, and Marx for their significance as
exponents of a flourishing-based ethic. My concerns in this chapter are methodological:
What function does a conception of human nature play in articulating and justifying
normative moral claims within a flourishing-based ethic? In order to focus on
methodological questions, I distinguish the substantive conception of human nature—that
is the particular content of the account of human nature—from the conception of nature
in general. I’ll explain this distinction more fully below, but what emerges from this
analysis is a distinction between different ways of representing nature in general, either as
teleological (Aristotle and the early Marx) or as empirical (Hume and the later Marx). I
conclude that a teleological conception of nature in general provides a flourishing-based
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ethic with a source of normativity that is unavailable given an empirical conception of
nature in general, but the teleological conception is much more epistemologically
contentious than the empirical conception, and it does not “ground” (i.e., provide an
objective justification in a value neutral realm independent of the ethical theory) the
normative claims of the theory in the way it is sometimes expected that claims about
human nature will. As we will see in the course of examining the normative moral
criticisms leveled by Hume and Marx, the normative force of their claims implicitly relies
upon a teleological conception of human nature.
In “ ‘Human Nature’ and Its Role in Feminist Theory,” Louise Antony argues that
“feminist theory needs an appeal to a universal human nature in order to articulate and
defend its critical claims about the damage done to women under patriarchy, and also to
ground its vision of equitable and sustaining human relationships.”1 Notions of ‘damage’
and ‘harm’ presuppose a positive conception of what flourishing is and what is good for
human beings. If it is the flourishing of human beings as such that is morally relevant,
then positive conceptions of what it is to be human and to flourish as a human being are
important for providing a standard by which to criticize treatment that cuts off or denies
this possibility to women. Two years later, in her article “Nature and Norms,” Antony
reverses her position, and in the course of criticizing Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach, argues that the attempt to ground ethics in human nature is misguided and
doomed to fail. In this later article, Antony maintains, “The fact—if it is one—that such
human universals as exist are due to our nature as human beings is itself of no ethical
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importance.”2 Antony reasons as follows: Persuasive arguments from nature will
represent what is “true by nature” as “a matter of simple observation or an
uncontroversial finding from a neutral science,” and this entails a conception of nature
that is modally and normatively flat where nature signifies either what is “independent of
human agency” or “statistically normal” or even “part of our genetic endowment.”3 But,
Antony points out, if the appeal to nature is to be rhetorically effective in ethical
argument, the notion of nature at work must somehow also preserve the normative import
that the term ‘nature’ carries, and these two goals are at cross purposes.4
I agree with Antony’s analysis of the problem with appeals to a normatively flat
concept of nature. Without additional premises, the recognition that certain human
universals exist that are a function of our genetic endowment or are statistically normal is
of no ethical importance. These universals must be seen as good or bad according to
some standard of evaluation if they are to be understood as ethically significant.
However, there may still be an important role for appeals to nature in ethics. Rather than
reject the use of the concept of nature in ethical argument, I think we ought to reject
Antony’s first assumption—that the conception of nature we need in order to “ground”
feminist ethics is an “empirical”—or, as she puts it, “normatively flat”—conception of
nature. Antony’s concern is that only empirical conceptions of human nature will
ultimately be persuasive in ethical argument. The reasons an appeal to human nature can
provide may not be able to persuade convinced members of “the opposition” (whoever
that is), but there are few arguments that can do that, and the reasons a theory of human
nature can be used to articulate may be important, even if they cannot decisively sway
2
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opinion. One of the upshots of this chapter is that a feminist ethic of flourishing need not
accept Antony’s first assumption, and, instead, feminist ethicists working to develop an
ethic of flourishing ought to begin by assuming that a conception of human nature that is
relevant to the ethics of flourishing will be an evaluative one with normative significance
by virtue of the fact that it draws qualitative distinctions between possible ends of human
life. What I identify as a ‘teleological concept of nature in general’ does precisely this.
Teleological conceptions of human nature will not be uncontroversial, but these
evaluative interpretations of human life are inescapable in a flourishing-based ethic, and
acknowledging them allows us to be articulate about an important set of reasons we have
to endorse a particular vision of flourishing.
Throughout this chapter, I’ll refer to conceptions of nature that aspire to be purely
descriptive the way Antony describes as “empirical” conceptions of nature. Their
“purity” as descriptive can be gauged by the degree to which they avoid invoking
evaluative or normatively-loaded concepts. Thus, the “empirical” and “purely
descriptive” will be, by definition, opposed to the evaluative and normative.5 If
judgments about human nature are to be relevant to ethics—and, in particular, if they are
5
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to be relevant to a flourishing-based feminist ethic—they will need to be formed by a set
of evaluations. These evaluations come in the form of judgments that discriminate
between proper and improper ends of human life, and, consequently, make possible a set
of discriminations regarding a host of other things in human life, primary among them
being human needs and desires. I’ll refer to accounts of human nature that encode such
evaluative judgments as ‘teleological’ because they are based on a set of judgments that
draw distinctions of worth between possible ends of human life.
The body of this chapter offers a schematized survey of the way three different
conceptions of human nature have functioned to inform three historically prominent
flourishing-based ethical theories: those of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. The goal here will
be to begin building the categories that will be used later on in the dissertation to discuss
and evaluate the thought of Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and Lisa Tessman.
While Aristotle is a natural figure to focus attention on in this regard, I have chosen to
focus on Hume and Marx because they offer forms of a flourishing-based ethic which are
substantially different from Aristotle’s, so they can show how a flourishing-based ethic
might take a different form from that of classical eudaimonism, modeled by Aristotle.6
My attention will be devoted especially to the role human nature plays in supporting their
visions of flourishing and the moral critiques they can legitimately defend in light of that
conception of human nature. Aristotle, Hume, and Marx offer distinctive approaches to
this question and are illustrative of influential ways of understanding the significance of
human nature for a flourishing-based ethic. While I will ground my discussion in the
6
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writings of these three figures and note as I go along some of the more important
interpretive controversies, I cannot take up in any serious way the complicated matters of
historical interpretation surrounding each figure—of which there are many. Instead, I
suggest we understand them as “ideal types.” As such, each of these figures will serve as
representatives of how a distinctive way of thinking about human nature might inform a
flourishing-based ethical theory.
After laying out the basic outline of each figure’s theory of human nature, I will
give a short analysis, the goal of which will be to identify the substantive conception of
human nature and the general concept of nature that undergird their ethical thought.
What I am here calling a “substantive conception of human nature” would, within the
wider philosophical discourse, probably be thought of simply as the content of the
philosopher’s theory of human nature. However, in order to get clarity in this
conversation, we need a way to distinguish the content of their account of human nature
from the way they conceive of nature in general, which, in the wider philosophical
discourse, would likewise be thought of as part of the philosopher’s theory of human
nature.
By “general concept of nature,” I don’t mean their view of the environment or
their ecology. Rather, I am referring to what Aristotle would call an “essence.” I favor the
phrase “general concept of nature” because “essence” so connotes what Aristotle meant
by that term that it pollutes our attempt to understand alternative ways of thinking about
natures. To the extent Marx thinks essences exist, they are not Aristotle’s essences, and
Hume definitely does not accept the real existence of Aristotelian essences. But both
Marx and Hume have a general concept of nature that undergirds and informs how they
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think about human nature—or so I will argue. Hence it is with the singular aim of
conceptual clarity that I suggest thinking in terms of a substantive conception of human
nature, and distinguishing this from the general concept of nature. The way I draw this
distinction, it should be possible, in principle, to identify both of these aspects within any
philosophical theory of human nature. In principle, any theory of human nature will have
both a substantive conception of human nature and a general concept of nature that
undergirds and shapes thinking about human nature and its significance for moral
philosophy.
In the conclusion of this chapter, I summarize the main functional differences—
not between these figures’ substantive conceptions of nature, but between their
competing general concepts of nature. This chapter has two goals: First, through an
analysis of Aristotle, Marx, and Hume, to formulate a set of categories that can be used to
evaluate the role a theory of human nature is playing within an ethic of flourishing. These
will then be used to evaluate contemporary versions of the ethics of flourishing in later
chapters. The second goal is to motivate the case for a teleological conception of human
nature in a flourishing-based ethical theory. This chapter argues that a teleological
conception of human nature is indispensable for an adequately normative theory of
flourishing.

2. Aristotle
Ethical reflection, on Aristotle’s understanding of it, begins with a very general
question: “How should I live?” What we all want in life, ultimately, says Aristotle, is
eudaimonia, and the question is really how to attain this. Eudaimonia is commonly
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translated either as “happiness,” “well-being” or “flourishing.” Happiness is, for a
number of reasons, the better English translation, but in saying this, we must bear in mind
that eudaimonia is best thought of as a concept that expresses something like “true
happiness.”7 For Aristotle, the purpose of both politics and ethics is to make genuinely
good, happy lives possible, and “political science” is the field of study devoted to
acquiring knowledge of how we ought to live in order to attain this goal.8
True happiness for human beings, according to Aristotle, can only be found in the
life of virtue. He argues for this conclusion by appealing to human nature—to the ergon
(the characteristic activity or “function”) of a human being. Thus, in his argument for the
human function, as in several other places, nature enters into Aristotle’s arguments as a
normative concept, where what is “natural” is understood as providing a standard for
human life. We can say that ethical argument involves an “appeal to nature,” when one
7
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argues that because some aim or practice is natural for us, we should act in accordance
with it, and this is how Aristotle often argues.9
While there are important instances in which Aristotle appeals to nature as a norm
in ethical argument, interestingly, Aristotle’s ethical writings do not uniformly appeal to
what is “natural” as a standard for human behavior. Sometimes Aristotle takes nature as
something that needs shaping and further development to be improved.10 In this sense,
nature is not functioning as a standard. This suggests there are two different senses of
nature in Aristotle’s thought. In what follows, I review select texts that illuminate these
two different senses of nature. That there are two senses of nature in Aristotle’s ethical
writings is well-recognized by Aristotle scholars. There is less consensus on how these
two senses—once distinguished—are to be related, but the broad outlines of the
differences are clear. My own understanding is heavily informed by the work of Julia
Annas and Fred Miller, and I follow Annas in using the terms ‘mere nature’ and ‘nature
proper’ to distinguish between the two senses of nature we find at work in Aristotle’s
thought.11
For our purposes here, what is most important is the concept of nature proper,
which sets the stage for an understanding of a teleological conception of nature in
general. As we will see, the ethical appeal to nature is an appeal to nature proper and not
to mere nature. There are a number of philosophical and exegetical difficulties that arise
when we begin to interpret Aristotle as employing two different senses of nature in
9
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ethical argument. My purpose is not to resolve these difficulties, but rather to highlight
that nature proper is distinct from mere nature (whether Aristotle himself understood
them to be distinct or not) and that Aristotle’s appeal to nature in ethical argument is an
appeal to nature proper. Nature proper provides an evaluative understanding of our
nature. It encodes judgments about the proper development of our form of life and what
is good for us. While it purports to be a true description of the way things are, it clearly
involves taking an interpretive lens on the human condition. When nature enters into
Aristotle’s ethical writings as an ideal that sets a norm for human life—and not simply as
a starting point we can improve upon or as a constraint we must accommodate in some
way or other or—it is nature proper to which Aristotle is appealing rather than mere
nature.
In the terminology of this study, nature proper expresses a teleological conception
of nature in general. A teleological concept of nature in general is important because it
distinguishes which outcomes of human life are “fulfillments” and which are not, and
thereby what our genuine needs are and which desires we ought to endorse in the pursuit
of flourishing. If nature is going to enter into a flourishing-based ethic as a normative
concept that is more than a directiveless constraint we must accept and accommodate (in
some way or other), I take it that it will have to be something like Aristotle’s concept of
nature proper and not mere nature that is entailed. The following discussion is devoted to
clarifying the distinction between these two senses of nature.
The validity of taking nature as a normative standard against which to judge
human practices and goals depends entirely on what is meant by “natural.” Therefore, in
order to evaluate the role nature plays in Aristotle’s ethical arguments, we must first
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consider how Aristotle uses the term and clarify the meaning of “nature” as it appears
when Aristotle invokes it as a norm. If by “natural” Aristotle simply means what happens
usually and for the most part—or what is statistically “normal” or common—Aristotle’s
appeal to nature will be open to devastating objections because, unfortunately, many
things in human life that are usual and common are evidently unjust. In that case, on
moral grounds, we should reject Aristotle’s appeal to nature in ethical argument as an
untrustworthy source of guidance for ethical goals and aims. Despite Aristotle’s
identification of nature with what happens “always or for the most part” in the Physics,12
there are good reasons to believe that when Aristotle appeals to nature as a standard for
human aims and action, he is not simply taking what is natural to be what is ‘usual,’
‘statistically normal,’ or ‘commonly the case.’ As I will argue, the concept of nature in
Aristotle’s thought provides a stronger basis for normative moral claims because it names
what is good for the thing in question, encoding a distinction between what happens in
the course of life (even quite typically or predictably), and what would be ideal for the
realization and full flowering of a thing’s potential. Naming what is ‘natural’ in this sense
also names what is good for the thing. But even if, in the course of ethical argument,
Aristotle himself mistakenly conflates the normative sense of nature with what happens
always or for the most part,13 the normative concept of nature in Aristotle does not
depend on this conflation.
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2.1 Two Senses of Nature: Mere Nature and Nature Proper
As a number of scholars have observed, and this brief discussion has already
highlighted, there are two quite different senses of nature at work in Aristotle’s
philosophical thought.14 In what follows, I will show, exegetically, the basis for the claim
that there are two distinct senses of nature in Aristotle, but let me say in brief the main
differences between these two senses. Following Annas, I think we can best understand
these two different senses of nature as corresponding to two different functions for the
concept. In one sense, Aristotle uses ‘nature’ to refer to the material starting points of
human life. Nature is thought of as providing the “raw materials” of human life in terms
of inclinations, aversions, powers, potentials, and limitations. These starting points can be
developed or stifled, but even in those cases where we cannot change them, they can
often be accommodated in a number of different ways. Constructing the best kind of life
out of what nature offers depends on giving these raw materials the proper treatment. I’ll
call nature in this sense ‘mere nature.’ In another sense, Aristotle uses ‘nature’ to refer to
the end of a complete process of development in those things which possess an internal
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principle of development. The nature of a thing, according to Aristotle, is shown through
the proper actualization of its innate potentials, and thus ‘nature’ indicates an ideal: a
state of complete and proper development, consistent with a thing’s flourishing. I’ll call
nature in this sense, ‘nature proper.’15
While I believe that drawing this distinction has value for Aristotle scholarship, it
also has a wider significance because this feature of Aristotle’s thought is taken up—and
the puzzles it creates are replicated—in Aristotelian moral philosophy more broadly. This
distinction between mere nature and nature proper is transmuted and transmitted with the
Aristotelian tradition, such that something similar can be found even in contemporary
Aristotelians. The Aristotelian starting point on human nature is that human beings are
rational animals. Rationality is definitive of our nature, and Aristotelians take reason and
the use of reason to be “natural” for us. Yet, when it comes to ethics and normative
questions, a distinction will be drawn between the authority of our nature and the
authority of reason. For example, John McDowell challenges the idea that nature can
have any normative authority over rational beings. In McDowell’s thinking, reason is
authoritative for rational animals, not nature.16 However, by Aristotelian lights, reason is
the definitive mark of human nature. The ambiguity in the concept of nature allows
reason to be both “natural” and at the same time an authority independent of our nature.17

15

Cf. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 142-158.
McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism.”
17
Micah Lott, “Why Be a Good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human
Nature,” Philosophia 42 (2014).
16

58
2.1.1 Mere Nature
Aristotle’s use nature leaves conceptual space for the judgment that there are
things that are ‘natural’ and yet in need of improvement, which is to say, they are not
good. Even though (as I will discuss below) there is a normative sense of nature in
Aristotle, the simple identification of a characteristic or quality as ‘natural’ does not
automatically imply that it is therefore good. We can call the aspects of our constitution
in need of improvement, aspects of ‘mere nature.’
We can find references to nature in the sense of mere nature in Aristotle’s
discussion of the conditions of moral praise and blame and in the distinction he makes
between natural and full virtue.18
Aristotle clearly recognizes that certain aspects of human constitution obtain
independent of human choice and agency, and he attributes some of these to nature.19
Aristotle opposes what is natural, or ‘by nature,’ to what is voluntary and ‘up to us.’
While we are properly held responsible for things that are up to us, we are not morally
responsible for things that are due to nature. Thus, Aristotle observes that
we never censure someone if nature causes his ugliness; but if his lack of
training causes it, we do censure him. The same is true for weakness or
maiming; for everyone would pity someone, not reproach him, if he were
blind by nature or because of a disease or wound, but would censure him
if his heavy drinking or some other form of intemperance made him
blind.20
This suggests that Aristotle regards that which is ‘by nature’ as both involuntary
and intractable. What is due to nature is not only not a product of human choice—

18

This is not intended as an exhaustive catalogue of references to mere nature, just a few exemplary
instances.
19
Only some of what is independent of human choice is attributed to nature; some is considered due to
chance. Aristotle, Phys. 196b10-16; 199b19-26.
20
Aristotle, EN 1114a23-31.

59
Aristotle implies that what is due to nature is impervious to change through voluntary
action, which is why we are not morally responsible for what is due to nature.
Appealing to the same principles, Aristotle elsewhere reasons that since the
virtues can be brought about through habituation, we are right to hold one another
responsible for their acquisition, and the virtues, therefore, cannot be regarded as a
product of nature.
[I]t is clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us naturally. For
if something is by nature in one condition, habituation cannot bring it into
another condition. A stone, for instance, by nature moves downwards, and
habituation could not make it move upwards, not even if you threw it up
ten thousand times to habituate it; nor could habituation make fire move
downwards, or bring anything that is by nature in one condition into
another condition.21
Again, Aristotle implies that nature is an intractable principle. Things due to
nature are not open to being made otherwise through human agency. Thus, he cites the
stone which, even if it is thrown up into the air a thousand times, falls back to earth. In
contrast, he thinks the virtues can be developed through intentional human action, and
thus Aristotle reasons that they are not due to nature.
Aristotle thinks (quite reasonably) that some aspects of human constitution are
outside our power to control by voluntary acts of choice,22 and he attributes these aspects
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Through the development of modern technology, many aspects of what is due to nature that would have
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many diseases and disabling conditions (such as blindness or cleft palate) would have been completely
beyond the power of people in Aristotle’s day to change, but they are now within our power to change and
remedy. I do not take the fact that technology has narrowed the bounds of what is intractable in nature to
discount the validity of Aristotle’s general point. First, there are still some things due to nature that we
cannot change, but must simply accept and do our best to accommodate. Second, even in cases where
technology gives us the power to change things formerly intractable, producing change via technology does
not make the individual any more morally responsible for what is due to nature. For example, take the
person blind from birth who can now be given sight through surgery. Even if a person can now choose to
have blindness corrected through surgery, the person is neither blameworthy for having been blind, nor
would she be praiseworthy for no longer being blind. She might be praiseworthy for overcoming her fear of
the surgery, or for having taken other voluntary steps to make the surgery possible, but the philosophical
22

60
of our constitution to nature. Where nature is intractable, Aristotle sees nature as a
limiting force in human life and a constraint on rational action. We are not morally
responsible for what belongs to mere nature, but if we hope to flourish, we must
accommodate it as best we are able—sometimes simply bearing with it23—since it is not
amenable to being made otherwise.
But Aristotle does not always assume that what is natural is intractable.
Sometimes, Aristotle uses nature to indicate aspects of our given constitution that are
what they are independent of human choice, but they are malleable, and Aristotle regards
it as up to us what we do with what nature has provided. So Aristotle will say there are
“three things that make men [sic] good and excellent; these are nature, habit and
reason.”24 He explains the inclusion of nature by saying, “In the first place, everyone
must be born a man [sic] and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain
character, both of body and soul.”25 This suggests that nature is a pre-condition of virtue
because nature provides the faculties and capacities needed for developing the virtues.
However, even though possessing the right material constitution—for example, being
rational, being sensitive to pleasure and pain, and honor and shame—is a pre-condition
for developing the virtues, Aristotle regards the virtues themselves as principally a
point remains valid. I’ll discuss the relevance of ‘force’ below, but the surgery is like a permanent
application of force to the functioning of the eye. For the individual, receiving surgery is not voluntary in
the way that would make it praiseworthy or blameworthy. What technology really does change is the status
of our moral responsibility vis-à-vis others we can help by making technology available. But the difference
is that here technology puts helping into the realm of the voluntary where it used to be beyond our power to
help.
23
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product of proper habituation and the development of reason, not a product of nature.26
Nature may provide the materials, but reason and habituation provide the proper guidance
so that the malleable elements in our nature develop in the right sorts of ways, which is to
say, ways that accord with virtue.
Perhaps the clearest and most instructive example of this malleable element of
nature in Aristotle’s ethical writings is the case of natural virtue. In considering how we
acquire virtue, Aristotle observes that some people are apparently born possessing the
virtues. For instance, some are said to be naturally courageous, while others exhibit a
natural generosity. He calls these states “natural virtues.” However, he denies that the
states of character essential for happiness are acquired by nature. Possessing natural
virtue is not what makes for the best kind of life. Because it lacks the necessary
understanding, natural virtue may, in certain circumstances, actually be harmful and
contrary to happiness.27 Natural virtue is not, therefore, the norm of character, but rather
simply a disposition we are born with that is susceptible to development in various
directions.
While certain people possess natural virtue from birth, ‘full virtue,’ by contrast,
requires a firm basis in good habits and teaching. Full virtue depends upon habituation to
cultivate one’s sense of pleasure and pain at the right sorts of things,28 as well as practical
wisdom, which only comes about with experience and the development of reason.29
Happiness and success in life depend on the acquisition of prudence and full virtue.30 We
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may be born with certain ‘natural’ traits which are qualitatively similar to the virtues, but
despite being ‘natural,’ Aristotle does not take them to be the norm of virtuous character
or the controlling feature of happiness. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle comments that
there are “two marks by which we define the natural—it is either that which is found with
us as soon as we are born, or that which comes to us if growth is allowed to proceed
regularly.”31 Natural virtue is natural in the first sense—being something certain people
are just born with—but it is not rigid or intractable. These dispositions are malleable and
can be developed into full virtue if formed in the right ways.
The picture we have so far of Aristotle’s thinking about the role of human nature
is this: Nature is a set of “raw materials” out of which we must build our life. Some of
these are intractable and must simply be accommodated. (Depending on what it is, there
may be multiple ways of accommodating our nature.) Others are more malleable, but
need the proper shaping by reason and habit to become excellent and contribute to the
best kind of life. Nature in this respect is subject neither to praise nor blame, but it might
be in need of improvement. We can call nature in this sense ‘mere nature.’ It simply
names the starting points of human life. Aristotle does not take nature in the sense of
mere nature to be establishing normative standards for human conduct or development.
As Julia Annas observes, mere nature “is what we start from, but hardly serves as an
ethical guide of any kind.”32 It seems to be Aristotle’s position that the normative
standard for how we ought to deal with the raw materials provided by our nature is a
matter for reason to determine, since “nature on its own can be developed either for the
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better or for the worse, so that it is up to humans to make use of their reason to control
their nature by means of habit.”33
If we think about human nature as providing the raw materials of human life, we
can use an instructive analogy to art to make sense of the ways in which nature can
function both as a limit, or constraint, on rational action and, at the same time, a set of
potentials susceptible to development in different directions. In every art, the media of
the art—whether sound, paint on a canvas, stone, or a found object— both holds potential
and sets limits on possibilities for creative expression. Success depends on understanding
and working within these limits, and on working with, rather than against, the potentials
internal to the media. This can involve playing creatively with its boundaries, and great
artists often push the boundaries beyond what was formerly conceived to be possible.
When we think of human nature as providing the raw materials of human life—as
Aristotle does when considering aspects of mere nature—it is reasonable to think that
success in life, too, depends (not only on this, but at a minimum) on doing what is in
one’s power to make the best out of “what nature has provided,” and this depends on
development of the potentials of one’s nature as well as a healthy respect for the limits of
what is possible.
One possible concern with using mere nature as a category for ethical analysis is
that it will obscure individuality and difference in human life. However, there is no
reason that accepting mere nature as a category of philosophical and ethical analysis
needs to be opposed to common-sense facts of individuality and difference. Thinking
about mere nature and what this entails can serve (at least) two very different purposes.
First, it can be done as a matter of private reflection. In order to gain personal insight, one
33
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might ask about one’s own basic dispositions and tendencies, asking which are
experienced as entrenched and intractable and which might be molded differently in order
to better cope with the world (e.g., a quick temper, a too-tender spirit, a physical
disability, etc.). Either way, though, it is essential to first identify the “starting points”—
one’s basic dispositions and orientations. What is a ‘given’ part of mere nature for one
individual might be quite different from that of another.34
However, for the purposes of setting public policy with the aim of making
flourishing lives widely available, one’s assumptions about mere nature are going to need
to be generalizations that hold true for the most part, even if not universally. At this level
some differences will almost certainly be obscured, but I don’t regard this as a decisive
objection against the use of mere nature as a category for analysis. Law and public policy
must be generalizable and hold good for the majority of cases, so one must have a
generalizable account of what can be expected of people and what must simply be
accommodated. This is what mere nature expresses.35
Returning to the discussion of Aristotle, in one sense—the sense we have called
‘mere nature’—nature is simply the raw materials of human life. But Aristotle has
another sense of nature, according to which what is ‘natural’ for us is what is good for us.
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Nature in the sense of nature proper shows up in Aristotle’s famous function argument
and in his argument that the polis is the natural form of human association.

2.1.2 Nature Proper
Traditionally, Aristotle’s “human function argument” has been interpreted as
involving an appeal to the proper development of human nature, arguing that a good
human being is one who acts to achieve the end proper to her nature.36 Aristotle identifies
the “natural end” for a human being as the excellent use of reason, i.e., the virtues.
Similarly, Aristotle argues that the polis is the natural form of human association, the
implication clearly being that the polis is best because it is natural.37 Aristotle thus holds
that both virtue and life in the polis are “natural” for us, but by this he does not mean that
virtue and life in the polis are the starting points of human life that we need to improve
upon. He clearly means that virtue and life in the polis are ideal for human beings.
Nature, in this stronger sense, expresses what is ideal for human life.
Julia Annas argues that the model for understanding this stronger sense of nature,
which Aristotle then extends to ethical argument, is provided by his analysis of nature in
Physics II. There, Aristotle distinguishes between different types of causes, and he
distinguishes the products of nature from the products of art by the fact that the products
of nature have an internal principle of changing and not changing: “Nature is a kind of
principle and cause of changing and not changing in the thing whose nature it primarily
is, in its own right and not accidentally.”38 The products of art, on the other hand, “have
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no innate impulse to change.”39 Rather, any changes we observe are brought about by a
principle external to the thing itself. Aristotle goes on to identify the nature of particular
things with this internal principle of development that tends toward the final end or
completed form proper to a thing of that kind. Reasoning that the nature of a thing is
known best by identifying the end-point of this process, Aristotle argues that, “Nature is
an end (telos), since what we say the nature of each this is, is what it is when its cominginto-being is completed.”40
Regarding Aristotle’s distinction between the products of nature and the products
of art, Annas observes that “The obvious antithesis to nature so understood is force;
forced movement is brought about by other things impinging on a thing in such a way as
to overrule the internal sources of change which operate in this thing itself. Aristotle’s
Physics puts to extensive use this idea of the fundamental contrast between natural and
forced behavior.”41 Indeed, we see this contrast between natural and forced behavior
show up again when Aristotle distinguishes nature from chance. Some of Aristotle’s
interlocutors apparently wanted to attribute those things that come about independent of
human agency in the natural world simply to chance and not to nature as a distinct
principle. Aristotle acknowledges that chance is a possible cause in addition to nature and
art,42 but insists that nature is a principle distinct from chance. According to Aristotle, we
know this is true because what happens by nature comes about in the same way “always
or for the most part,”43 and when nature is the cause “always the tendency in each is
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towards the same end, if there is no impediment,”44 but this is never true of chance. What
happens by chance is random.45 Aristotle defends the thesis that nature is an internally
directed principle of change that—absent interference and external force—will operate
toward an end: the complete or ‘perfect’ form of a thing of a given kind. He invokes it in
order to contrast nature with both art and chance.46
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In explicating Aristotle’s ethical appeal to nature as an appeal to what is ‘natural’ as defined in the
Physics, I believe that Annas places too much emphasis on the idea that nature is a principle that operates
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Furthermore, the full formula is “usually and for the most part, so long as there is no interference,” and this
mitigates against the idea that for Aristotle, what is ‘natural’ in the Physics II sense of nature is to be
identified with what happens normally, statistically speaking. What this means for our interpretation of
Aristotle’s ethical arguments involving nature proper is that, when Aristotle extends the Physics II notion
of nature to ethical argument, he is not simply appealing to what is usually or commonly the case in human
life as a standard for what should be.
Annas interprets Aristotle’s arguments in Politics I that the polis and slavery are natural social
institutions to be, essentially, based on the idea that these social institutions are natural because they arise
usually and for the most part in human life. She believes that because of their ubiquity, Aristotle has a hard
time resisting the thought that they are natural and therefore appropriate and justified. Aristotle may be
relying, as Annas claims, on the supposition that given the ubiquity of these institutions in Greek life, they
must have some basis in human nature, but his arguments clearly invoke the idea that these arrangements
are for the best because they make the best kind of life possible. Annas recognizes that Aristotle’s argument
against “unnatural” ways of making money entails an appeal to an ideal of what is best, which is in open
conflict with common economic practice. In Pol. I, Aristotle is actually arguing against the common and
usual way of making money. He regards what was, as a matter of fact, quite common and usual to be
“unnatural,” and so Annas argues that this makes the money-making argument distinct from the other two
arguments in Pol. I. Despite the fact that slavery and the polis were commonplace and Aristotle’s economic
ideal was not, I think there is more continuity between the three arguments than Annas recognizes, and all
three arguments involve an appeal to Aristotle’s own conception of what is best, given human nature.
Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 146-158; See also “Ethical Arguments from Nature.”
While I agree with Annas that ‘nature proper’ should be understood via the Physics II analysis of
nature, I think the Physics account of nature is thoroughly normative, and judgments about what is natural
must be made in light of a judgment about what ought to happen and the course that development ought to
take. Aristotle thinks that what ought to happen usually will if nothing interferes. Aristotle’s appeal to
nature, then, is not simply an appeal to what happens usually or commonly, statistically speaking. Aristotle
assumes that if natural processes unfold as they ought to without interference, then they will culminate in
the natural end of the thing in question, which is the best state for the thing to be in (Phys. 194a28-33).
While this account of nature is certainly open to objections (and I discuss some of the difficulties in the text
below), it is not open to the one important and devastating objection mentioned at the outset of this chapter,
which is that if the appeal to nature is simply an appeal to what is usual or common, it is an intrinsically
unreliable guide to ethical aims and objectives, since what is usual or common in human life is not
infrequently also unjust.
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More than anything else, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature is defined by his
insistence that the nature of a thing should be identified not with the efficient cause nor
with the matter of the thing, but with the form and the telos—the final endpoint of the
process of change. Aristotle argues that “what each thing is when fully developed, we call
its nature,”47 and “a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality
than when it exists potentially.”48 Thus, the fully realized form is the true nature of the
thing, and, according to Aristotle, “nature is the end or that for the sake of which. For if a
thing undergoes a continuous change toward some end, that last stage is actually that for
the sake of which.”49 In saying this, he does not mean that whatever comes last,
temporally speaking, is the end. Rather, only “that which is best” can “claim to be an
end.”50 Thus, the “natural” process of development, understood in light of Physics II, is
the one that leads to the fully actualized, ideal form of the thing in question. Aristotle
conceives of nature as operating regularly to bring about the thing’s “natural end” (in
classical terms, the “perfection” of its natural capacities), but nature can only be expected
to operate this way given a crucial caveat: only if there is no impediment or external
inference. His concept of an “impediment” or “external interference” is whatever
prevents the thing from realizing its full form and perfected state of being—whatever is
ideal for it. Thus, the account of a thing’s natural ends is thoroughly normative, informed
by a conception of what the ideal would be for this kind of thing given the proper inputs
and absent interfering forces.
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In light of his account of nature as an internal principle of change oriented toward
an end, which is not simply the last point in a temporal sequence of events, but that which
is best for a thing of this kind, the sense in which the excellent use of reason is natural
and, because it is natural, understood to express a standard for human life can be made
clear.
Aristotle argues that human beings are rational animals, living beings whose
defining characteristic is their capacity for rational activity. It is reason that distinguishes
a human form of life from other forms of life—such as that of plants and non-human
animals—and it is the use of reason that elevates human life, making it fine and noble
and capable of participation in the divine.51 To be human is to live a life defined by this
capacity, and a good human being is one who exercises this capacity well, or
“virtuously.” Aristotle famously argues this by appealing to the idea that human beings
have an ergon, or characteristic function, so just as we say of other things with a
characteristic function that the excellent performance of that function makes for a good
thing of its kind, so it is with the human being. A pen is good if it writes and writes well.
Likewise, eyes are good if they see and see well. And a flute player is good if she plays
the flute well. In each of these cases, the thing in question has a characteristic activity,
and it is the excellent performance of this activity that guides our judgment. The object
might be useful for other purposes or the person may have other roles, but a pen’s
goodness is judged based on how well it writes, not on how well it holds back my long
hair or slices through packaging tape. In the role of a flute player, a person is good if she
plays the flute well. Aristotle identifies the human function—the characteristic human
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activity—with the activity of reason and concludes that a good human being is one who
exercises his or her reason virtuously.52
Because rationality is, for Aristotle, the form and essence of the human being, the
appeal to rational activity as the human function constitutes an appeal to human nature.
Aristotle argues that the human natural end is realized in the life of virtue, which is an ongoing activity and not a static state, and that the attainment of this end constitutes human
fulfillment—our “perfection” in the actualization of our nature.53 Given Aristotle’s
account of human nature as essentially rational, Aristotle argues that virtue is the final
end of a being with a rational nature: “The human good proves to be activity of the soul
in accord with virtue.”54
Understood in light of Book II of the Physics, Aristotle’s claim in the
Nicomachean Ethics that reason is the function of the human being and the good human
being is one who uses reason well clearly implies that full virtue is “natural” not because
52
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it is common or usual or inborn, but because it is the natural end of human nature. This
way of being “natural” for us is quite different from the way natural virtue was said to be
“natural” for us. The claim that full virtue is “natural” is strongly normative. It requires
taking a normative perspective on the complete process of development and
distinguishing proper contributions to development from external interferences with
development. For Aristotle, full virtue will result if development proceeds as it ought
to—if we receive the right teaching and the proper kinds of habituation and nothing
adverse interferes.
Similar to the function argument, Aristotle’s argument in Politics I that the polis
is the natural form of human association can be understood as invoking a claim about
nature proper. Fred Miller argues that Aristotle considers the polis “natural” for human
beings, not because it possesses its own internal principle of development like a
biological organism, but because it promotes the human “natural end”—the fullest state
of human development.55 According to Miller, “The polis arises out of human nature (in
the strict sense) and is also necessary for the fulfillment of human nature (in the sense of
an end).”56
There are (at least) two ways the polis qualifies as natural. First, for Aristotle, our
natural end is not bare survival, but flourishing, which is a state of “self-sufficiency.” By
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calling a person self-sufficient, Aristotle does not mean that one is capable of “going it
alone” Robinson Crusoe-style with no need of other people.57 Rather, to be self-sufficient
is to possess everything needed for a truly good life. One who is self-sufficient is
“lacking in nothing.” It is only in the polis that Aristotle thinks we achieve a life of selfsufficiency. While human beings can survive in family groups that meet our everyday
wants and can have “something more than the supply of daily needs” met in the village,
we can only achieve self-sufficiency through the wider association of the polis.58 Here we
can imagine Aristotle is thinking of the external goods necessary to get one past the point
of eking out a meager existence day to day. In the Republic, Glaucon mocks Socrates’s
first city as a city “fit for pigs.” Addressing this criticism compelled Socrates to expand
the city and introduce entirely new classes of artisans and farmers (and warriors) to
provide the “relishes” and comforts that Glaucon seemed to believe a good life for human
beings demanded.59 Like Glaucon, Aristotle thinks the good life for a human being
depends on the relishes and comforts that can only be provided through differentiation of
tasks and a widened network of cooperation for mutual benefit.
Second, the polis is an association ruled by law rather than the will of an
individual (as Aristotle imagines the family and the village are), and law is, according to
Aristotle, essential for cultivating virtues in the young and maintaining them in the
mature.60 Additionally, there is in Aristotle’s view a special class of political virtues that
can only be cultivated in a polis, where citizens take turns ruling and being ruled in turn
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in “a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible”61. If the acquisition of
external goods and political virtues are as Aristotle presents them—genuine fulfillments
of human nature and requirements of human perfection and happiness—then the polis
will be the natural form of human association because it is what promotes full human
development. As Julia Annas says, “That the state is a natural form of community, then,
amounts to the claim that it is the form of community in which people’s needs are most
fully met and their interests best ensured.”62
This discussion has been devoted to explaining and defending the claim that there
is a plural conception of nature operative in Aristotle’s moral philosophy. We’ve called
the two sides of Aristotle’s concept of nature ‘mere nature’ and ‘nature proper.’ Both
mere nature and nature proper will be significant for one’s judgments about flourishing
and how it can be achieved, but Annas describes nature proper as a “stronger” sense of
nature because, in articulating an ideal of ethical development, it carries significant
normative weight for judgments about how we ought to develop or work to accommodate
mere nature. It is nature proper, not mere nature, which guides how we ought to deal with
our limitations and deal with our potentials, but the way we understand the basic
possibilities and limitations set by mere nature has implications for what we think the full
or proper actualization of human potentials will look like. Mere nature will be important
for ethical reflection because it expresses our sense of what creatures like us are capable
of, but nature proper expresses the standard of what is good for us to do and become.
Aristotle is not explicit about the distinction between mere nature and nature
proper. It is unclear if he even sees he is using the concept in these two different ways,
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but the distinction is at the root of an ambiguity that is characteristically Aristotelian.
Aristotle and his followers will very typically oppose nature to reason and habit—nature
(in the sense of mere nature) being understood as something in need of correction and
improvement—but then, at the same time, consider the workings of human rationality
and the acquisition of habit “natural” (in the sense of nature proper) for us and normative
because it is good for us.63
Despite his own failure to recognize the concept of nature at work in his moral
philosophy as ambiguous, it seems clear that we must read into Aristotle something like
these two different senses of nature. Nature in one sense (mere nature) identifies the “raw
materials” of human life—the starting points and potentials of human development where
these potentials also set constraints on what is possible—while nature in another sense
(nature proper) names an ideal because it names the endpoint to be realized through an
appropriate process of development. In human beings, nature can name an ethical ideal
because it can name the proper development of a rational nature, which involves our
power of choice and therefore makes us subject to ethical evaluation. In extending the
concept of nature proper to ethical argument, Aristotle renders the telos of the change an
ideal of ethical development. Thus, we find in Aristotle a conceptual model for
conceiving of virtue as natural in the sense that full virtue is the ideal end of human
moral development.
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2.2 The General Concept of Nature and the Substantive Conception of Human Nature in
Aristotle
At this point I want to distinguish Aristotle’s general concept of nature (which is
not a single concept but plural) from the particularities of Aristotle’s understanding of
mere nature and nature proper. These particularities fill out the substance of his account
of human nature, which I will refer to as the ‘substantive conception of human nature,’
which is distinct from his concept of nature in general. Given the teleological structure of
nature proper, I will refer to Aristotle’s concept of nature in general as “teleological”
from this point forward.
This is a quite abstract way of conceptualizing Aristotle’s complete account of
human nature, which seamlessly weds together a conception of nature in general with
particular substantive judgments about the potentials, limitations, and ideals of human
life. But understanding the methodological function of the general concept of nature at
work in Aristotle’s flourishing-based ethic is, I believe, central to grasping how claims
about human nature can function as a source of normativity in a flourishing-based ethical
theory. (In Hume—as we will see in the next section—the concept of nature in general is
different, and this requires that Hume provide an alternative source of normativity in the
general point of view.) It might help to think of the relationship of the general concept of
nature to the substantive conception of human nature as one of form to matter. I do not
intend by these terms to invoke the technicalities of Aristotle’s doctrine of form and
matter, but simply to provide an intuitive way of picturing the distinction I am drawing.
The point is that similar conceptions of the substantive characteristics of human life—its
starting points, limits, and ideals (the “matter,” so to speak)—can be formed by different
concepts of nature in general (the “form,” so to speak). Where Aristotle’s concept of
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nature in general is teleological, Hume’s is “empirical” (I will clarify this further in the
next section). Conversely, we might have very different substantive characterizations of
human life while holding a similar set of assumptions about nature in general. What is
distinctive about Aristotle’s concept of nature in general is that, by virtue of its judgments
about nature proper, it is teleological.
It is useful to distinguish the concept of nature in general from the substantive
conception of human nature. One can imagine agreeing with Aristotle that ethical
analysis needs concepts that function as Aristotle’s concept of nature in general does—
providing an account of the starting points of human life (mere nature) as well as an
account of what would best satisfy our needs and fulfill our potentials for a full human
life (nature proper). And yet, one might nevertheless disagree with Aristotle about the
proper account of those starting points (i.e., what precisely is intractable and what is
malleable, given the right upbringing), or about the proper specification of our natural
end, and hence what our true needs and interests are. In this way, one could take from
Aristotle the general concept of nature, but revise or even substantially reject the
substantive conception of human nature he endorses.
How should we characterize Aristotle’s substantive conception of human nature?
It can rightly be characterized using the classical definition: for Aristotle, human beings
are rational animals. Rationality is the defining capacity of human life, and at the same
time, the cultivation of a rational form of life is also aspirational. To be rational expresses
an ideal of nature proper in which the full development of our rational nature issues in the
moral and intellectual virtues that order our passions and shape our lives.
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If we emphasize Aristotle’s account of the human good as found in the
Nicomachean Ethics and stemming out of the function argument, the ideal of human
flourishing that Aristotle offers is quite attractive. The moral and intellectual virtues he
articulates are (for the most part) widely accessible, and, as such, appear to be a viable
candidate for an account of human flourishing. But competing strands exist in Aristotle’s
ethical thought. In the Politics, Aristotle gives a more specific (and parochial) account of
the best kind of life for a human being. The ideal of human life depicted in the Politics is
not one which is widely available. In the Politics, the highest of human virtues are virtues
of political rule and theoretical activity, and these are tied to concrete activities and a
form of life only available to the elite.
It is important to acknowledge that Aristotle’s full account of the good life
(provided in the Politics) assumes that different kinds of persons will have different kinds
of functions, which is reflective of a general hierarchy regarding the worth of different
kinds of human beings. On Aristotle’s view, only the best kind of people will lead or be
capable of leading the best kind of life. The best kinds of people are those in whom
reason and unqualified virtue predominate, but for Aristotle, unqualified virtue belongs to
the citizen and ruler who can lead a “masculine, noble and leisured” life.64 The activities
of politics and contemplation depend on a culture that makes leisure (for some) possible,
and Aristotle seems to take this as justification enough for organizing society so that the
best kind of life will be available to those most capable of leading it (i.e., male citizens).
As such, Aristotle treats the lives of women, slaves, and free but wage-dependent artisans
as mere instruments for providing a life of leisure for free, male citizens. Aristotle’s ideal
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of a life of unqualified virtue exercised in politics and the life of philosophical
contemplation does not apply to women, slaves, or free but wage-dependent artisans, all
of whom, Aristotle argues, lack either the rational capacity or the leisure necessary to
pursue the good life.65 While Aristotle affirms that every sphere of human life contains
specific virtues,66 the best and most noble (Aristotle sometimes says “divine”) virtues are
those that employ that which is best in us to the highest degree possible. Making a life of
leisure—in which such virtues can be employed—possible for some will require that
many others supply and attend to the daily necessities of the leisure class. Given the
needs and limitations of human beings, Aristotle’s is not an ideal that could be made
widely available even in principle. He embraces the conclusion that achieving this end
necessitates a subgroup to provide the material conditions of its achievement without so
much as questioning its validity as an account of human excellence. He argues instead
that nature has made some people fit to fulfill this need.67
If we take Aristotle’s conception of human nature from the Politics and read it in
the way I have described above, then a principled commitment to the moral worth and
equal dignity of persons will lead us to reject Aristotle’s conception of the human good,
the realization of which depends on the involuntary subordination of some so that others
65
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may lead the good life. But rejecting this substantive conception of human nature and its
concomitant conception of human flourishing is consistent with taking from Aristotle a
conception of nature in general that is teleological in form.
I have already provided a general account of the outlines of Aristotle’s
teleological concept of nature in general that includes two functions for the concept of
nature, which we’ve expressed as mere nature and nature proper. Here I want to make a
few specific remarks about the normative implications of a teleological concept of nature
in general and remark on the philosophical difficulties as well as the potential
significance for a feminist ethic of flourishing.
While mere nature carries normative implications by setting constraints we must
work with and not against if we hope to flourish, the constraints established by mere
nature turn out to be relatively weak. The human species is amongst the most flexible,
inventive, and adaptive of species, and this means human beings can actualize their
unique potentials and accommodate psychological and physical needs in a wide variety of
ways. Mere nature demands accommodation, but in the human case it also makes
possible a wide variety of accommodations. Mere nature neither dictates how it should be
accommodated nor defines the ideal in terms of what is best if we hope to live well and
flourish.
Nature proper, on the other hand, identifies not merely a set of raw materials,
more or less malleable, out of which we must construct our lives, but the direction in
which the ideal development of these materials leads. Nature in the sense of nature proper
identifies not whatever happens to be the case, but the best and fullest state of
development. Aristotle will often say of things with a nature that the end is that which
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comes about usually or for the most part, as long as nothing interferes. Clearly then, what
is natural in the sense of nature proper is strongly normative. Concepts of ‘proper
development’ and ‘interference’ are strongly normative and intrinsic to judgments about
nature proper. Identifying the end of nature proper depends on identifying what the
proper process of development should be and the interfering causal factors that distort
such a process.
Nature proper thus presupposes that we can, in fact, distinguish between natural
and forced changes—between outcomes that are a product of interfering forces and
outcomes that are not. As Julia Annas notes, this is no simple task, since every outcome
is the product of some complex combination of factors, especially in human life.
Aristotle tries to draw the necessary distinction by distinguishing between internal
and external forces. Natural developments are depicted as the product of internal causes,
while external causes are forms of interference.68 But this is crude and inadequate,
particularly when it comes to human life, because so many external contributions are
absolutely indispensable for proper human development—both biologically (i.e., a
healthy environment, an adequate diet) and morally (i.e., early childhood discipline that
establishes good habits, which are the foundation of full virtue). As such, it will often be
far from clear which external causal factors should count as interference and which
should count as a properly contributing factor, the absence of which we should count as a
form of interference.69 Still, even if Aristotle’s attempt to distinguish between natural and
unnatural developments merely shifts the difficult questions to what should be considered
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an external interference and what should be considered an external but appropriate
contributor to an internally-directed process, the fundamental distinction between natural
and forced change is a valuable tool for normative critique.
For example, in The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill describes the English
woman in his day as “an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in
some directions, unnatural stimulation in others.” Women’s moral development
resembles the growth of the tree where half has been “kept in a vapor bath and the other
half in the snow.”70 Mill’s point is that, given the social context, there is no reliable way
to judge women’s true potential, nor their true nature, because we have no experience of
how women’s development would proceed absent the pervasive social forces that distort
the development of women’s (natural) capacities. His argument gains significant traction
by invoking the idea that women’s present condition is the product of highly artificial
forces. Implicit in his critique is the idea that this is not how they would be naturally if
they were free to develop absent such distorting influences.
Arguments from nature have a history of being used to support unjust status quo
arrangements, making skepticism about the appeal to nature warranted and worthy of
careful scrutiny. But appealing to nature in opposition to artifice and force can function
as a quite powerful, counter-conventional ideal—as it does in John Stuart Mill’s
argument from The Subjection of Women—even if we have little idea of the
circumstances that would be necessary for establishing any claims about the “true nature”
of the persons in question.71 Like Mill, we may often need to remain agnostic or open to
revising our claims about nature, but it is worth emphasizing that Mill’s argument
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implicitly invokes the same distinction as Aristotle’s. They share the assumption that
there is a difference between natural developments and unnatural developments, between
free and forced developments.
Returning to Aristotle, his teleological view of nature means that, for him, there is
a proper process of development for human beings as rational beings. Beyond that,
though, it is not clear that the proper process of development can be spelled out on the
basis of nature alone, at least not on the basis of mere nature. Articulations of nature
proper and what constitutes the proper ends of human nature are likely to be contested
because they depend on qualitative judgments about what is good for creatures like us.
This is itself an interpretive responsibility of reason. If we say that the proper process of
development is to be specified by reason itself, then in some sense we will acknowledge a
role for nature in determining how human life ought to be ordered. But this role will be
played by nature proper, not mere nature. If we say that the proper process of
development is to be specified by nature proper, because the development of a rational
nature implies deliberation and choice, this does not take the matter out of the realm of
human decision, as though rational nature were somehow “a foreign power, ordering our
animal nature about from outside the natural world.”72

3. Hume
For Aristotle, what is natural functions as a source of normativity insofar as nature
(what belongs to nature proper) signifies a proper end of development for beings of a
certain kind. Hume rejects Aristotle’s teleological perspective on nature in general, as
that was developed by Christian ethicists such as Augustine and Aquinas and then by the
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modern natural lawyers and Enlightenment deists. Hume especially rejects the
supernatural rendering of the human end embodied in these developments. In the thought
of David Hume, we have a powerful response to the developments that grew out of
Aristotle’s philosophy.
What Hume embraces in place of this teleological concept of nature in general is a
view of nature inspired by the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, which advanced a new ideal of understanding. This new ideal of understanding
sought to abstract from the particularities of the human perspective and from the view of
the world colored by human sensibilities, including our sense of the significance of things
for ourselves. It aimed thereby to achieve an understanding of the natural world totally
independent of the colorations of human subjectivity.73 This significance-free perspective
on nature rendered what was once the basis of a relevant moral distinction irrelevant: to
say that something is “natural” on Hume’s view will not imply any evaluative judgment
about how it ought ideally to be in light of what is good for it. I will call the conception
of nature in general that Hume substitutes for the rejected teleological view of nature in
general “empirical.”74
In place of a normative conception of human nature, Hume must provide an
alternative source for making normative moral judgments of how we ought to be and how
we ought to morally judge the various character traits human beings display. In place of a
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teleological conception of nature in general, Hume appeals to sympathy and “the general
point of view” as the origin of moral distinctions and, thus, the origin of moral
normativity.75 The general point of view offers a normative perspective from which we
can form our moral judgments. However, when we look at what is really required for
Hume to substantiate his condemnation of the “monkish virtues,” we find that Hume
needs the resources of a teleological conception of human nature. In order to justify his
condemnation of the monkish virtues, Hume must in fact presuppose his own positive
conception of what is truly good for human beings, given the kinds of beings we are.
My goal in what follows is not to defend an interpretation of the historical Hume,
but rather to articulate a “Humean” alternative when it comes to conceptualizing the
relationship between human nature and an ethics of flourishing.76 Humeans differ on this
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issue, and I am taking the historical Hume as the basic source for this position. My
understanding of the historical Hume is heavily indebted to Annette Baier, Jennifer Herdt
and Michael Gill.
The Hume I represent here will be Baier and Herdt’s in the sense that I take Hume
to offer a normative account of moral judgment. Hume is not simply describing the
perspective from which we make moral judgments, but the perspective from which we
should. I believe Gill is right to argue that Hume’s project aspires to be a descriptive one
and not a normative one with respect to human nature. At least with respect to human
nature, Hume wants simply to describe how we are. Given Hume’s perspective on nature
in general, what is natural cannot be the source of normativity in his moral theory. But
with Herdt and Baier, I think there is a normative perspective to be found in Hume, and it
comes from the ‘general point of view.’ When Hume categorizes the “monkish virtues”
as vices, he is not simply describing how people judge these character traits. He is
indicating how such traits ought to be judged. The perspective from which we ought to
judge is a constructed, “artificial” point of view, as we shall see. The general point of
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view is not justified on the basis of its origin in human nature nor its role in bringing
human nature to perfection, but on the basis of its utility in solving the conflicts of human
social life.77 However, this being said, the impartiality required by the general view drags
in unacknowledged evaluative judgments about the “ends of man,” and hence an
unacknowledged teleological conception of human nature, or so I shall argue. I turn now
to a discussion of Hume’s moral philosophy and the philosophical problems to which it is
a response.

3.1 The New “Science of Man”: Human Nature and the Problem of Self-Interest
In the introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume announces his intention
to build a science of human nature on the model provided by “Lord Bacon” in the natural
sciences.78 He hoped thereby to emulate the great successes of the natural sciences in the
moral sciences by adopting and adapting its “experimental” procedures.79 Hume contends
that he together with Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler “have
begun to put the science of man on a new footing” by applying the methods of
“experimental philosophy,” grounding their conclusions in experience, and limiting their
philosophies to what experience can teach. It is only, he says, by “careful and exact
experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its
different circumstances and situations” that we can hope to come by any reliable “notion
77
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of [the mind’s] powers and qualities.”80 According to Terence Penelhum: “To say there
can be a science of the mental, as Hume sees the matter, is to say that what we think, feel,
or will can be explained as the effect of a cause and the instance of a natural law. Human
minds are not strangers in nature, but inextricably part of it.”81 This is indeed what we
find at the heart of Hume’s moral philosophy in the Treatise: an attempt to set down the
general rules—the governing “laws”—of our moral judgments and the necessary
conditions under which they obtain in order to advance the “science of man.”
While the intellectual landscape of Hume’s day was being re-shaped by the new
ideal of scientific understanding coming out of the natural sciences, moral philosophy
was dominated by the theory of natural law. Hume’s moral philosophy can profitably be
understood as a response to the problems of moral philosophy in the modern natural law
tradition, which accepted the view that human nature is the foundation of morality but
faced a new challenge in reconciling this with an understanding of human nature backed
by the methods of the new science.82
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Like the classical natural lawyers, such as Aquinas, modern natural lawyers such
as Grotius and Pufendorf were intent on building a science of morals on the basis of the
study of human nature.83 “The modern natural lawyers, beginning with Grotius,
emphasized the notion that the natural law governing human interactions in society can
be derived from the salient features of human nature, which include both the tendency to
pursue one’s own well-being and the inclination toward sociability.”84 However, unlike
the classical natural lawyers who maintained that the true good of the individual is
fundamentally common and shared, the modern natural lawyers take it that human beings
are fundamentally separate and self-interested. As such, the pursuit of one’s own wellbeing may or may not be a pursuit of the good. For the classical natural lawyers in the
Christian tradition, pursuing the perfection of my nature is a way of pursuing the good.
For the modern natural lawyers, the pursuit of individual well-being is increasingly
understood as equivalent to the pursuit of self-interest.
For epistemological reasons, the view of human nature grounding the modern
natural lawyers’ “science of morals” was under increasing pressure to be the view of
human nature susceptible to study by the natural sciences: the view of nature as
represented to us through its sensible qualities and stripped of any internal orientation to a
good yet to be attained. That internal orientation had previously been expressed through a
teleological conception of human nature. Empirical descriptions of human nature were
standing in relation to the modern natural law tradition, but I think we should understand him as sharing
certain preoccupations of the natural lawyers, particularly, a concern with the fundamental problem of
human conflict and war stemming out of our natural self-interest, along with a more limited vision of the
ends of ethics as seeking a workable solution for this conflict. Similar to the modern natural lawyers, Hume
is committed to an empirical conception of human nature and to offering an explanation of morality on the
basis of the facts of human nature. Still, even if he shares these assumptions and goals, I do not take this
alone to establish Hume as a natural law theorist, since the structure of justification in Hume’s moral
philosophy is significantly different.
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increasingly seen as both more “realistic” and more epistemically credible.85 On the basis
of a detailed psychological analysis, Hobbes argued that all human action is inevitably
driven by self-interest.86 For those who came after him, the insistence on a “realistic”
description of human nature, in practical terms, meant our self-interestedness could not
be ignored. What seems undeniable when looking at human beings simply on the basis of
our commonly accessible, sensible experience is that we act to satisfy our interests. But
the fundamentally self-interested characterization of human nature made it very difficult
for modern natural law theorists to coherently defend the natural law hypothesis “that
human nature is a starting-point for the discovery of fundamental moral principles.”87 On
the contrary, under the “realistic” Hobbesian description, human nature seems clearly
inimical to morality.
Many moralists took Hobbes’ theory of human nature to imply a denial of the
reality of virtue, and hence a denial of the reality of morality as such. For if what Hobbes
said was true, then there could not be any truly virtuous actions because these require a
virtuous motive, and Hobbes’ theory asserted that, at root, all our acts are selfinterested.88 While many after him sought to resist the apparent implications of Hobbes’
theory of human nature, no one after Hobbes could simply dismiss without addressing the
drive of self-interest, which more and more seemed like an undeniable fact of human
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nature.89 Thus, the thinner, more “realistic” conception of our nature presented problems
of its own.
Jennifer Herdt argues that it is possible to see the shift away from a teleological
conception of nature and toward what we might call an “empirical” conception of nature
beginning in the natural law theory of Grotius.
In Grotius the status of “natural” is ambiguous. Like the classical natural
lawyers, Grotius thinks that we can derive moral guidance from the proper
understanding of our nature, but he has a truncated understanding of
human nature, since he no longer sees it as tending toward good as
perfection. The older, teleological view of human nature was normatively
saturated, unlike Grotius’ “thinner” view of human nature. In Hobbes’
writings, “natural” has become thoroughly secularized—“natural” is just
the way things happen to be. . . . To talk about what is natural to human
beings is neither to discuss our final end nor to pass judgment on our
sinfulness. It is not to trumpet a call for transformation, but simply to
make observations about the conditions in which we find ourselves.90
The teleological conception of nature in general that Aquinas and the classical
natural lawyers had argued from was, as Herdt puts it, “normatively saturated.” As I
argued above, so was Aristotle’s. It carried with it an understanding of the good to be
achieved through the realization of that thing’s proper end. Grotius’s view of nature in
general (and Hobbes’s and much of the modern tradition after him) is “thinner” in that it
is operating only on the basis of—so to speak—“what the eye can see,” whereas the
classical natural lawyers (and Aristotle) took it that the evidence given by the senses was
only half the story. Some of these characteristics, tendencies, and capacities human
beings display are constitutive aspects of our final good, but this is not true of all of them.
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There are serious advantages to working with this “thinner” empirical conception
of nature in general. The thinner, end-shorn view of nature could avoid the seemingly
endless and intractable debates that had arisen in light of a theological interpretation of
our nature, and which concerned the degree of human fallenness and “corruption” of our
nature—a debate which we seemed completely incapable of refereeing. On the empirical
view of nature in general, what is “natural” can instead simply signify the way things
happen to be. Hence, this more limited conception of nature can be useful as a way of
avoiding the theological (and metaphysical) controversy embroiling the teleological
conceptions of human nature.
Hume, it turns out, is acutely aware of these advantages. He makes this clear in a
letter to Hutcheson in which he objects to Hutcheson’s own use of “nature” precisely
because it is a teleological conception that assumes a final end yet to be attained.
I cannot agree to your sense of Natural. ‘Tis founded on final Causes;
which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain and
unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for
Happiness or for Virtue? For this life or for the Next? For himself or for
his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these
Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose.91
Hume is correct in his critique of Hutcheson. Hutcheson’s definition of ‘natural’
does indeed depend on final causes and taking a stand on the question of the human end,
for Hutcheson is working with a teleological conception of nature. Like Aristotle and
Aquinas, Hutcheson maintained that the goal of ethics was to help us achieve the
perfection of our nature.
Hume was not alone in his rejection of a teleological conception of nature in
general in favor of an empirical one, but the increasing insistence on a more “realistic”
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and empirically grounded description of human nature was a double-edged sword.
Seemingly requisite upon epistemological grounds, it proved wholly inadequate to the
task of explaining morality as conceived by the natural law tradition. Specifically, it
made all action appear to be motivated by self-interest in a way that undercut the natural
lawyer’s ability to account for what was praiseworthy about acting in accordance with
one’s nature. The empirical view of nature in general—framing as it does a description of
ourselves encompassing not only that which is significant for our flourishing, but
everything from the trivial to the morally repugnant—made the ancient ideal of striving
to live in accordance with our nature appear absurd, if not downright morally
reprehensible.
With this perspective, we can see why Hume felt his Treatise to be a real
contribution to the “contemporary scene” in moral philosophy. In the Treatise, Hume
puts forward a moral theory based on the principle of sympathy. In this principle, Hume
takes himself to have identified a praiseworthy source of motivation in human nature.
Furthermore, he provides an account of human nature and the operation of sympathy that
he believes makes it fully consistent with the epistemological requirements of the new
science. Making use of the principle of sympathy was not in itself novel, but Hume’s
account of sympathy eschewed the teleological conception of nature those before him had
often invoked.92 Finally, in demonstrating that the principle of sympathy is as equally
original to human nature as self-interest, Hume offered the necessary foundation for
morals in human nature that it was increasingly clear the natural lawyers could not

92

For instance, Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and the “Latitudinarian divines,” such as Isaac
Barrow, Henry Grove, Joseph Butler, and Benjamin Whichcote. Herdt, Religion and Faction, 29-35.

93
provide with their “realistic,” but fundamentally self-interested, description of human
nature.

3.2 Hume’s Moral Philosophy and the Solution of Sympathy
Hume maintains that any adequate explanation of morality must show how our
moral judgments, such as they are, could have arisen given the facts of human nature, for
“no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some
motive to produce it.”93 But since what moves us, Hume famously argues, is not reason
but passion, or “sentiment,”94 Hume’s moral philosophy essentially offers us an
etiology—an account of the origins and causes—of moral judgment based on the
sentiments.
What explains the distinction we draw between “virtue” and “vice”? Why do we
label some character traits virtuous and others vicious? Hume thinks when we reflect on
our experience of making moral judgments, we find that common to all those attributes
we call virtues, is a feeling of pleasure at what is useful or agreeable either to ourselves or
others, and common to all those attributes we call vices, is a feeling of pain in what is
harmful and disagreeable either to ourselves or others. “Each of the passions and
operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or
disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the second vicious. This particular feeling constitutes
the very nature of the passion,” according to Hume.95 Given this account of the nature of
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moral judgment, a question arises. While it is clear how we might take pleasure in, and
therefore approve of, qualities that are agreeable and useful to ourselves since they bear a
clear connection to our personal self-interest, how is it that our feelings extend to cover
the benefits and harms suffered by others? We seem to approve of acts of benevolence
and generosity whenever we witness them, whether their exercise is directly to our
benefit or not, but why? And how is this possible? Hume’s answer is “sympathy.” Just as
we have a natural tendency to care for our own self-interest and to seek pleasure and
avoid pain whenever possible, we have a natural tendency to sympathize with the
pleasures and pains of others. By “sympathy,” Hume does not mean what we might
initially suppose. As Norton and Norton explain,
Hume does not . . . think of sympathy as a particular feeling. The word,
sympathy, does not there designate the feeling we have for a close friend
who is bereaved or in serious trouble. Hume would call that feeling pity or
compassion, while sympathy is his name for a means or principle of
communication (2.3.6.8)—his name for a general ability of humans to
know and to experience as their own the sentiments or opinions of
others.96
Hume introduces sympathy in Book II of the Treatise as a principle for the
communication of sentiment,97 and hypothesizes that sympathy operates on the basis of
the imagination’s propensity to convert ideas into impressions.98 It is because of
sympathy that when we see another person in pain, we cringe; conversely, when we enter
a room full of laughter, we find our mood lifted. Hume argues that it is through the
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entirely natural (meaning spontaneous and involuntary) operation of sympathy that we
come to feel pained by what causes others pain and take pleasure in what pleases them.
One objection to Hume’s appeal to sympathy as an explanation of our moral
judgments is that if our moral judgments are based solely on sympathy as he claims, then
our moral judgments should be prone to change from one situation to another.99 For
instance, I tend to sympathize more with some than with others depending on their
relationship to myself, and, given the same kind of situation, I will sympathize more on
some occasions than on others. But, so the objection runs, this is not how we make moral
judgments. Our moral judgments are universal, and if an action is wrong, then it is always
wrong, whether I feel displeasure at the act or not. Hume agrees that our moral judgments
are universal in scope, but he argues that this is not inconsistent with the thesis that
sympathy is the basis of these judgments.100 The reason is that our moral judgments are
not made merely on the basis of our own particular, partial point of view, but rather by
entering into “some steady and general points of view,”101 and exercising our sympathy
out of that perspective. This is the basis of Hume’s account of “the general point of
view,”102 and it is only by taking on the general point of view that our natural, limited
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sympathy widens into the extensive sympathy from which mature moral judgments are
made.
In order to judge a particular behavior or character trait out of the general point of
view, we must take the perspective of those most affected by the character trait or
behavior in question, to see whether such a trait is agreeable or disagreeable, useful or
harmful. But we must do so without entering into the person’s own particular, selfinterested sentiments, since judging from the perspective of those sentiments would be no
better than judging from our own particular and self-interested perspective. Instead, we
adopt their perspective, joined with the proper corrections for over-weaning concern for
one’s own self-interest and whatever other biases tend to color our judgment. The general
point of view is designed to yield the sentiment we would feel were we to enter
sympathetically into such a refined and impartial point of view.103
Hume divides the virtues into “natural virtues” and “artificial virtues,” and while
his initial account suggests that natural sympathy of itself is sufficient to ground our
approval of at least the natural virtues, ultimately both natural and artificial virtues must
be approved by an extensive sympathy exercised from the general point of view.104 As
Baier observes,
For Hume, all virtues, natural or artificial, get their status from the fact
that these traits are ones we in fact welcome in human persons, once we
have the relevant facts, take up a special impartial point of view, exercise
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our capacity for sympathy, correct its natural bias, and then finally let our
reflective feelings pronounce judgment.105
Successfully entering into others’ sentiments and exercising our sympathy from
the general point of view, Hume admits, takes “a great effort of imagination.”106 This
kind of sympathy is, therefore, quite different from the natural sympathy that is an
unreflective, spontaneous, and largely involuntary response induced by the imagination.
The active extension of our sympathy through the adoption of the general point of view is
something about which we must be intentional.
Hume’s initial description of sympathy makes it appear akin to social contagion
or emotional infection, passive and involuntary; however, when exercised from out of the
general point of view, sympathy observes general rules that allow it to correct for various
kinds of bias (for example, giving too much weight to one’s own perspective). Hume’s
developed account of the general point of view requires recourse to a kind of sympathy
that is much more conscious, intentional, and active than the sympathy he initially
describes as a principle for the communication of sentiment. The sympathy entailed by
the general point of view is more akin to a kind of sympathetic understanding that can be
sought out and into which we can actively enter. Furthermore, by incorporating the
observance of a set of general rules into the operation of sympathy exercised out of the
general point of view, this kind of sympathy is not something that operates just as it
should, spontaneously and naturally. Rather, it is an activity that we can do better or
worse and about which we must be intentional.
I agree with Herdt that Hume’s thinking about the principle of sympathy
undergoes extensive revision not only between the Treatise and Enquiry, but within the
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Treatise itself. And Hume must do this because our natural and rather limited sympathy
based on the passive communication of sentiments is insufficient to overcome the
conflicts of human social life. Natural sympathy is what we have for those close to us—
parents, children, close relatives and friends—but it gets weaker the farther removed a
person is from us. Furthermore, a totally passive form of sympathy leaves us vulnerable
to the phenomenon of contagion, which can lead us to sympathize with vicious forms of
mob mentality. As Herdt argues, when we enter into those general points of view from
which we make trustworthy moral judgments, we must extend our sympathy and actively
attempt to enter the point of view of those most affected by the person or character in
question. Our judgments will never find the wide concurrence they require if our
sympathy is not wide and extensive.
Morality, according to Hume, should be oriented toward happiness in this life,
here and now. This is why Hume countenances wit and high-spiritedness alongside
generosity, integrity, and moderation as virtues. We naturally find all of these agreeable
both in ourselves and others when we survey them from the general point of view.
Annette Baier notes how Hume “includes in his catalogue of virtues all and only the
qualities of head, heart and expressive body that he believes we will agree do make a
person a welcome fellow, whether in ‘that narrow circle, in which any person moves’ (T.
602) or in ‘the greater society or confederacy of mankind’ (E. 281).”107 It is this
perspective that ultimately leads him to speak so derisively of the “monkish virtues”—
celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, and solitude. All
of these, Hume thinks, make for a “gloomy,” “delirious,” and “dismal” character,108
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hardly the ideal companion in any sphere of life. What is common to all of the “monkish
virtues,” as Hume sees them, is that they devalue the genuine goods available in this life,
despising physical pleasures as mere “sensual gratification,” healthy pride as “worldly
vanity,” and good humor as “excessive gaiety.”109 According to Hume, the common and
usual course of the passions will lead us to find physical pleasure, pride in ourselves, and
good humor in others agreeable and pleasant. Failing to find these things agreeable
suggests a distortion of the natural course of the passions. These virtues of Christian
asceticism reject the natural sources of pleasure and cultivate a detachment from the
genuine goods of this world by instilling an excessive concern for a supposed good
available in the next.110

3.3 The General Concept of Nature and the Substantive Conception of Human Nature in
Hume
On Hume’s view, human nature is neither good nor evil. It is neither ultimately
benevolent (as Francis Hutcheson argued) nor ultimately self-interested (as Thomas
Hobbes argued). From the perspective of explaining morality, Hume believes sympathy
109
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is the indispensable principle of human nature, since it is the source of our distinctively
moral approbation of the virtues, both natural and artificial. However, self-interest is
equally important because it provides the motive to life in society and all the artificial
virtues which are indispensable to that life. We might say that Hume’s substantive
conception of human nature takes us to be “Self-interested Sympathizers.” Privileging
self-interest and sympathy above the other equally original principles of our nature is,
admittedly, an artificial simplification of his view,111 but emphasizing these two
principles brings out the contradiction that Hume finds inherent in human nature. On
Hume’s view, there is “some particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, along with the
elements of the wolf and serpent,”112 and we misunderstand the human condition if we
fail to acknowledge both. These are, according to Hume, both natural for us, being
equally “original” principles of human nature.
Hume’s conception of nature in general is, for lack of a better term, an
“empirical” one. He sought to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the study of
human nature and thereby enhance our understanding of human nature and its ultimate
principles. What we can know about the nature of anything will be known through
investigation, observation and discovery by the human senses. These are the methods of
investigation appropriate to the natural sciences and what we think of as the empirical
realm. Thus, when we say that on Hume’s view we are “self-interested sympathizers,” we
are not identifying an ideal toward which we ought to strive, as we are when we say that
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for Aristotle we are “rational animals.” Hume’s underlying conception of nature in
general means that the identification of our true nature and its ultimate principles simply
informs us about what is the case, not what ought to be or how we ought to make use of
this information.
Many scholars, Michael Gill among them, feel that the strength of Hume’s moral
philosophy is due in no small part to his greater reliance on an empirical conception of
human nature and his increased reliance on empirical observation to explain morality.
However, the downside of this method is that the more one relies on strictly empirical
observations to explain morality, the less one will be able to normatively justify what one
sees by those same standards of observation. On an empirical conception of nature in
general, the discovery that a given characteristic is ‘natural’ or a part of ‘human nature’ in
and of itself carries no normative weight. If we are thinking of our nature in these terms,
then Louise Antony, whom I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is certainly correct
and “the fact—if it is one—that such human universals as exist are due to our nature as
human beings is itself of no ethical importance.”113 Some characteristics are natural and
good, some are natural and bad. The identification of a characteristic as natural in this
empirical sense is, in and of itself, of no normative significance.
This is a different conception of nature than that which Aristotle was working
with, and the empirical conception of nature in general entails a strong distinction
between facts and values, between nature and norm. For Hume, that a character trait or
sentiment is natural or a part of human nature implies nothing about its moral status.
There are character traits that are perfectly natural, but judged from the general point of
view, perfectly vicious. There are “artificial” traits that are virtuous. Moreover, this
113
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general point of view that we need in order to form reliable moral judgments is itself an
artificial and humanly constructed viewpoint. Hume’s view on nature in general makes
the principles of human nature he identifies significant in explaining the phenomenon of
morality in human life, but what is “natural” is now irrelevant to the justification of
morality.
On Hume’s view, human nature has a strictly explanatory relevance for moral
philosophy. Human nature is the causal source of our sentiments pertaining to virtue and
vice, so understanding human nature is significant for moral philosophy insofar as we
want to explain the causes of the moral sentiments. But we cannot, on the basis of human
nature, reason about an ideal end toward which our moral lives ought to be aimed. The
normative justification for our moral practices, on Hume’s account of morality, derives
from the adoption of a practical perspective—a perspective which we adopt for the sake
of achieving peace in society and harmony between differing view-points—a perspective
he calls “the general point of view.” Is the general point of view an adequate substitute
for the discarded teleological perspective on human nature?
By his own standards, the successes of his project should be gauged by whether
Hume’s new “science of man” adheres to the epistemological standards set by the new
Enlightenment ideal of scientific understanding. This requires that he disavow the
teleological conception of human nature. In place of a normative account of human
nature, Hume substitutes an empirical conception of nature in general and postulates that
sympathy is the source of morally normative judgment and the basis of the distinctions
we draw between virtue and vice.
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However, it is not clear that Hume’s avowed account of sympathy can substitute
for the normative conception of human nature he sought to avoid. On the contrary,
Hume’s moral critique of the “monkish virtues”—which ought to be based on an
impartial judgment from the general point of view—appears to presuppose a teleological
account of the human end.
On the surface, the normative justification for the general point of view appears to
rest on a straightforward appeal to what is necessary for human flourishing—specifically
for concurrence in our moral judgments and peace in society. However, appealing to the
general point of view in fact presupposes the normativity that Hume purports to be
providing. What makes sympathy exercised out of the general point of view superior to
natural sympathy is its impartiality. But the concept of impartiality is itself a normative
concept: “What constitutes impartiality, if not the ability to give due weight to all of the
various factors involved?”114
Presumably, from within a flourishing-based ethical theory, one would account
for the legitimate interest each person takes in their own flourishing by giving greater
weight to what people find agreeable and useful for flourishing, and lesser weight to
other sorts of sentiments. If a person finds traits agreeable and useful that do not
contribute either to their own or others’ flourishing—for instance, the “monkish
virtues”—there will be nothing improper about giving such sentiments less weight as we
attempt to form a moral judgment that gives proper weight to the legitimate interests of
all affected parties.
When Hume condemns the “monkish virtues” as vices on the grounds that “they
serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortunes in the world, nor render
114
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him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of
company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment,” we see that Hume himself has an
account of the legitimate “ends of man” which he takes to be constitutive of true human
flourishing. It is only in light of some such account that Hume can condemn the monkish
virtues, for he transfers the “monkish virtues” to the column of the vices in manifest
defiance of the actual sentiments of the many people throughout history that have found
these traits quite useful. Many religious people have found these traits useful for drawing
closer to God in this life and preparing one’s soul for life in the next. 115 But Hume takes
these to be totally spurious ends. Herdt is quite right when she concludes that Hume
“cannot utterly avoid the sort of normative account of human nature which he rejects in
Hutcheson as being dependent on ‘final causes.’ Instead, he must provide his own.”116
Hume’s avowed account of human nature rests on an empirical conception of
nature in general. On the epistemological grounds that final causes cannot be known
through sense experience, Hume tries to avoid making any postulations about the ends
proper to human nature. But Hume’s own normative critique of ascetic Christianity
depends on certain assumptions about the ends of human nature. His assumptions about
what constitutes true human flourishing—for instance, that it is grounded in this world—
and his judgment that the “monkish virtues” fail to contribute to this-worldly flourishing,
underlie Hume’s judgment that such traits would never be felt as agreeable or useful by a
genuinely impartial judge—i.e., a judge who was not biased by a spurious regard for
other-worldly ends—from the general point of view.117
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The general point of view, which Hume proposes to substitute as the source of
normativity in place of a teleological conception of human nature, cannot in fact replace
the teleological conception of human nature that his predecessors had relied on. Hume’s
own moral judgment relegating the “monkish virtues” to the status of “vices” depends
upon a conception of human nature which is teleological in form, a conception of human
nature that takes our true end to be this-worldly and human flourishing to depend on a
rejection of spurious other-worldly ends and the other-worldly virtues that go with them.
This chapter aims to articulate the function that a flourishing-based ethic needs a
conception of human nature to fulfill in order to be adequately normative. Thus far, we
have examined two ways human nature can function in relation to an ethic of flourishing.
For Aristotle, there is a sense of nature (which we called “nature proper”), according to
which what is natural provides a normative ideal. As the proper end of ethical
development, virtue is both natural and normative. Virtue is our “natural end” and also
the end toward which our moral development ought to progress. Still, just because a
quality is “natural” does not necessarily imply that it is as it ought to be. Aristotle’s
concept of ‘mere nature’ leaves conceptual space for the judgment that there are things
that are “natural” and yet in need of improvement.

object to the claim defended here—that Hume needs a teleological conception of human nature—by
pointing to this explanation of why some people do not judge of the virtues and vices as they ought, what is
effectively an “error theory” for the moral judgments of the religious. On this objection, Hume does not
need to presuppose a positive, teleological account of human nature. All he needs to be able to do is explain
why people make errors in their judgments for particular cases. Error theories in this arena are important
ways of contending against competing perspectives. Having a plausible account of how and why one’s
opponent has gone wrong in their judgment is an important way of strengthening the plausibility of one’s
own position, but an error theory cannot substitute for the teleological judgments, in light of which some
conclusions are regarded as faulty and need accounting for as such.
Understood teleologically, Hume’s argument is that religion distorts (negatively interferes with) the
operations of the passions of justice and humanity that ought to be allowed to operate unchecked. These are
the “natural passions” that, if allowed to function naturally, would bring about greater unity and reduce the
factionalism that interferes with peace in society.
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In Hume, human nature has a different function. Hume appeals to the operations
of sympathy to explain how our moral judgments are made, but his empirical conception
of nature in general does not offer grounds for a judgment about how our judgments
should be made. In place of an account of the ends of human nature, Hume substitutes a
theory of the general point of view which is an “artificial,” or, as we might say,“sociallyconstructed,” point of view. But, as discussed, when it comes to the critique of the
monkish virtues, Hume’s judgment against them invokes an unacknowledged teleological
conception of human nature.

4. Marx
In the final section of this chapter, I analyze Marx’s concept of nature in general
as that impacts his moral critique of capitalism. Implicit in the Marxian analysis of
capitalism is a moral condemnation of capitalism for failing to meet the legitimate needs
of human beings. Marx’s critique of capitalism rests on the conviction that any just or
morally acceptable economic system must serve the well-being of all members of society,
not only the well-being of the propertied few.118 Furthermore, it must not prioritize the
needs of capital at the expense of the needs of human beings. The ideal is an economic
system that distributes the benefits of social cooperation in accordance with the socialist
motto: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”119
My focus in this discussion will be methodological rather than substantive. My
purpose is not to challenge Marx’s ideal of social justice or his conception of human
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nature per se, but to query his ability—in the terms of his own philosophy—to make
sense of the normative significance of human needs in a way that substantiates his
critique of capitalism for failing to meet legitimate human needs. Or, in other words, to
give teeth to the claim that capitalism fails to meet the needs of human beings.
Throughout his writings, Marx identifies human needs with human nature. For Marx,
human needs express and make manifest the essential characteristics of human nature.
Marx’s moral critique of capitalism hangs on his ability to distinguish legitimate from
illegitimate human needs and thereby defend the claim that, in failing to meet the
legitimate needs of human beings, capitalism is unjust.
Between his early “humanistic” writings and his later “scientific” writings,
Marx’s conception of human nature shifts from a teleological conception of human nature
to an empirical one. The following discussion focuses attention on the two conceptions of
human nature we find in Marx’s writings and elaborates the impact this has on his moral
critique of capitalism. I argue that Marx’s critique of capitalism depends on the
teleological conception of human nature, which we find in his early writings. When he
moves away from this in his later writings and endorses a strictly empirical conception of
human nature, he loses the resources needed to justify one of his central criticisms of
capitalism—namely, in failing to meet human needs, capitalism unjustly harms human
beings and should therefore be replaced by a socialist system that can meet such needs.

4.1 Human Nature and Human Needs in the Early Works
In his early “humanist” writings, Marx offers a critique of capitalism based on a
vision of human flourishing. Authentic human flourishing is envisioned by Marx as the
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highest state of human freedom: not merely freedom from the enslaving chains of
capitalism, but also freedom for the full flowering of human potential brought about in
and through engagement with the material world in productive activity, which is to say,
through “labor.” Labor is the fundamental mechanism for meeting human needs. But, for
Marx, not only is labor the means to meet our individual needs, it is also the way we
actualize our social natures as we provide for the material needs of others.
In Marx’s view, labor and the needs satisfied by that labor are fundamental
expressions of the human essence. Labor, for Marx, is not the drudgery we all do our best
to avoid. The true meaning of labor is creative human activity. In labor, we express (or
“make manifest”) our very selves. We make manifest our intelligence, our creativity, our
imagination, and our technical skills through labor. The product of our labor is also an
expression of our nature in that it is our idea, our imaginative capacity, and our technical
skill objectified. Our products embody the capacity we have to transform the world in
ways that meet our needs, and Marx calls such products “use-values.” Anything that
satisfies a human need—social, psychological or material—has use value, and for Marx,
“the need of an object is the most evident and irrefutable proof that the object belongs to
my nature and that the existence of the object for me and its property are the property
appropriate to my essence.”120
In this way, Marx represents human needs as intimately revealing the human
essence. Through the double meaning of “property,” Marx exploits the idea that the
world under a capitalist mode of production is a world turned upside-down. When in
reality, the product of my labor should be seen as belonging to me and my essential
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nature, under capitalism, the product of my (wage-) labor is seen as belonging to another:
the capitalist to whom I have sold my labor.
Under capitalism, labor takes on the unique form of wage-labor. This is the
commodity form of labor, and it can be bought and sold in the market. This
fundamentally changes the worker’s relationship to his or her work, and because of this,
Marx sees the institution of wage-labor as the root of the harms of capitalism, alienating
us from our labor and thereby from our essential nature as working beings. Marx thinks
that under these conditions, “The purpose and existence of labor have changed.” Under
capitalism,
The product is created as value, exchange value, and an equivalent and no
longer because of its immediate personal relationship to the producer. The
more varied production becomes . . . the more does his labor fall into the
category of wage-labor, until it is eventually nothing but wage-labor and
until it becomes entirely incidental and unessential whether the producer
immediately enjoys and needs his product or whether the activity, the
action of labor itself, is his self-satisfaction and the realization of his
natural dispositions and spiritual aims.121
As wage-labor, it does not matter to the worker what kind of labor she performs
because her work has become a mere means to a wage. No longer is the object of her
labor the means for the satisfaction of her essential needs, and hence the means of life;
instead, the wage has become the means of life. This critique of wage labor is the heart of
Marx’s critique of capitalist alienation. Through wage-labor, the worker is alienated from
her labor and her product. As a result, she is alienated from herself (her essential nature
as a productive being) and others (those to whom she should be connected through her
labor, but is not).
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Marx’s critique of capitalist wage-labor suggests that alienation is a travesty
because human beings are essentially creative, working beings who are in fact only
capable of authentic self-realization through the exercise of their productive capacities.
Productive activity is fulfilling when done in a human way because it is an expression of
what we most fundamentally are: active, conscious, free, social beings.122
Praxis is a technical term we can use to signify this distinctive, multi-faceted view
of human activity as conscious, free, social, and productive.123 When we say that, for
Marx, we are working beings, this must be understood in light of this multi-faceted
notion of praxis. Not all work is an expression and realization of our true human nature,
only that which is conscious, free, social, and productive. The capitalist economic system
based on wage-labor and private property ought to be replaced by socialism because it
cuts off access to truly human forms of flourishing by disrupting the social context in
which the actualization of our nature as active, conscious, free, social beings is possible.
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To summarize: the critique of capitalism found in Marx’s early economic writings
invokes a view of human nature as capable of fulfillment only through the realization of
the human needs for freedom and praxis. The needs of human beings are defined with
reference to these ends, and Marx’s moral critique of capitalism is that it fails to meet the
human need for freedom realized in and through conscious, free, social, and productive
activity.124

4.2 Human Nature and Human Needs in the Later Works
Before entering into the discussion of this section, which elaborates Marx’s
empirical conception of human nature and the extent to which this can be maintained
alongside a normative critique of capitalism, I want to remind the reader that my primary
concern here is not with the question of whether Marx is ultimately consistent or
inconsistent, or whether his early and later writings can be made compatible. My concern
is with the implications of these two very different conceptions of human nature for his
moral critique of capitalism. Marx has special significance for this chapter because his
philosophy shows quite clearly how different conceptions of human nature impact
normative criticism from within a flourishing-based framework. As I will argue, the
normative force of his criticism depends on holding onto the conception of human nature
that he articulated in the early writings. That conception is predicated on a teleological
124
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conception of human nature in general, according to which some ends are consistent with
the fulfillment of human nature and some are not. We might agree or disagree with the
substantive conception of human nature that he advances—i.e., that human beings are
essentially working beings—while recognizing that without a concept of nature in
general that is teleological in form, he lacks the resources to indict capitalism as having
failed to satisfy the essential needs of human beings.
While Marx’s view on nature in general changes in the later writings to an
empirical conception, what remains the same in both the early and the later writings is the
intimate connection between human nature and human needs. Needs are the
manifestation of our nature, and Marx sees human need as revealing the human essence.
This does not change. What does change between the early and the later works is how our
needs are determined, and hence how human nature is constituted.
In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx asserts that “all history is nothing but a
continuous transformation of human nature.”125 And then, in the sixth thesis of his Theses
on Feuerbach, Marx claims that “the human essence is no abstraction inhering in the
single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships.”126 Both
passages have often been cited as evidence that Marx denies the existence of a stable,
trans-historical human essence, as traditionally understood, and instead embraces a
“historicist” or “anti-essentialist” conception of human nature.127
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Contrary to the classical view, which takes human nature to be universal and
common across history, read as a historicist, Marx posits human nature as itself a
historical product, historically contingent and determined by the given social mode of
production in any epoch. In The German Ideology, Marx develops some of the
fundamental premises of his theory of historical materialism, in which he relates changes
in human history to changes in the dominant mode of production. According to Marx:
[T]he first premise of all human existence, and hence of all history . . . [is]
that men must be able to live in order to be able “to make history.” . . . But
life involves above all eating and drinking, shelter, clothing, and many
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to
satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. . . . The second
point is that once a need is satisfied, which requires the action of satisfying
Books, 1969); Kate Soper, “Marxism, Materialism and Biology,” in Issues in Marxist Philosophy, ed. John
Mepham and David-Hillel Ruben (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979); Colin Sumner,
Reading Ideologies: an Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law (New York: Academic
Press, 1979); Vernon Venable, Human Nature: the Marxian View (1945; repr., New York: Meridian Books,
the World Publishing Co., 1966.). Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend
(London: Verso and NLB, 1983), 50-51.
While it is quite common to find scholars attributing to Marx an anti-essentialist or historicist theory of
human nature, conceptually, it is quite challenging to articulate a coherent historicist theory of human
nature. Saying “historicist theory of human nature’ is something like an oxymoron because the concept of a
nature implies trans-historical properties while a historicist theory of human nature seeks to articulate a
theory of something which is forever changing. This inner tension in the concept creates fertile ground for
scholarly debate over who has given a “historicist” reading of Marx. For example, Terry Eagleton finds in
Sayers (1998) anti-essentialist reading of human nature in Marx that undercuts his claims to find a theory of
human nature in Marx. Terry Eagleton, “Self-Realization, Ethics and Socialism,” New Left Review 237
(1999): 150-161. Sayers disputes this interpretation of his work in his unpublished “Marxism and Human
Nature: A Reply to Terry Eagleton,” www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/articles/sayers/eagleton.pdf
(accessed 3.18.2013). I agree with Eagleton’s assessment that Sayers’s attempt to maintain that “human
beings are social beings through and through,” such that human “nature” is “simply a matter of social
relations,” sits uneasily with his insistence that there are “permanent, trans-historical properties of
humanity.” I agree with Eagleton that the historical features Sayers attributes to human nature are
constantly threatening to “historicize away” the notion of human nature being asserted (“Self-Realization,
Ethics and Socialism,” 151.)Likewise, Norman Geras argues that Sayers denies the existence of universal
human characteristics, and hence denies the existence of human nature, but Sayers points out that Geras
“simply assumes that the historical account of human nature must necessarily exclude the idea of universal
characteristics” (Sayers, Marxism and Human Nature, 185).This kind of controversy is almost inevitable in
any attempt to articulate a genuinely historicist conception of human nature.
To give one more example. I think Vernon Venable, for instance, can be read as an attempt to
articulate a genuinely historicist account of the defining features of human life which is not a denial of
human nature. He struggles mightily to give intelligible expression to the idea of a human nature that
changes. As noted above, Norman Geras simply judges Venable’s work, like Sayers’s, to be “antiessentialist” in the sense of denying the existence of human nature. I am not so sure. I consider it a great
merit of Karsten Struhl’s reading of Marx that he manages to intelligibly articulate Marx’s historical
concept of human nature without giving up on either its historical continuity or its historicity.
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and the acquisition of the instrument for this purpose, new needs arise.
The production of new needs is the first historical act.128
In this passage, Marx initially identifies “the first historical act” with the
production of the means for satisfying our biological needs. But in the process of working
to meet our basic biological needs, which Marx calls “natural needs,”129 we inevitably
produce new needs for ourselves, since we need the tools and other means of production
necessary for satisfying the original set of needs. Always conditioned by history, he calls
these our “necessary needs.”130 If we are to have clothing, we must have fabric, and if
fabric, then a loom. If we are to have cotton for the fabric, then we also need the
machinery to sow and harvest and spin that cotton, and so on and so on. Observe that
Marx also calls the production of these new needs “the first historical act.”
Marx’s seemingly contradictory claims about “the first historical act” have
occasioned much debate, but as Karsten Struhl argues, the best way to understand Marx
here is to see these two phenomena—the production of the means to satisfy our needs and
the production of new needs—as two aspects of the same process of productive activity:
“Productive activity produces not only a product which can satisfy the original need but
simultaneously new needs within the producers.”131 What this implies is that on Marx’s
view, “the process by which we transform the material world is simultaneously a process
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by which we continually create within ourselves new needs, and, thus, can be said to
change our nature.”132
The picture we get of Marx’s view of human nature on this reading is one where
human praxis and human need exist in a “feedback loop,” as it were, in which
developments in the one are constantly driving developments in the other. On this
reading, praxis is the source of Marx’s dynamic view of human nature. As praxis
changes, so do human needs and human nature. At each new stage of development as
human nature changes, new needs emerge as genuine requirements for the fulfillment of
human nature.
This raises the question: which, if any, of the ‘necessary needs’ generated in a
capitalist society are genuine needs, and which, if any, are distractions or (worse)
obstacles to the pursuit of human flourishing? Marx cannot appeal to human nature and
the ideal of human fulfillment, as he could in the early works, because human nature
itself is determined by the needs created by the present mode of production—which is to
say, by the current level of ‘necessary needs’—which is determined by the capitalist
economy itself. Can Marx claim that capitalism fails to meet the needs of human beings?
If the needs of human beings are determined by capitalism itself and he has no
conception of the human with a nature that holds within it its own criteria for fulfillment,
it is not clear Marx can condemn capitalism for failing to live up to the socialist motto of
justice. What needs, pray tell, are not being met?
One route open to him would be to define authentic needs in terms of basic
subsistence needs, but Marx is not willing to limit the scope of authentic needs to some
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minimalist list of “basic” needs as the “primitivists” are prone to do. Marx sees
developments of culture as at least potentially progressive, and he thinks it wrongheaded
to excoriate every development of culture with the single-minded aim of getting “back to
nature.”133
A human being “as rich as possible in needs,” whose very needs constitute the
“wealth” of socialist society, is an image Marx uses elsewhere to envision the ideal of
human flourishing.134 Becoming “rich in needs” requires the “many-sided” development
of human nature, which is only possible in interaction with a sophisticated and highly
developed culture. Human beings, on Marx’s view, can have legitimate needs for quite
sophisticated cultural goods.
As beautiful as such a vision of human development is, it complicates the problem
of whether Marx has any grounds for moral critique of capitalism because it is the very
fact that capitalism excels in creating new needs that makes Marx unwilling to condemn
capitalism in toto. For all of the harms it perpetrates on humankind, it is phenomenally
effective at creating ever new and more sophisticated needs. In pursuit of the valorization
of capital, capitalism inspires
the exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use
as well as new useful qualities of the old . . . likewise the discovery,
creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the
cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the
same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and
relations—production of this being as the most total and universal possible
133
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social product, for in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he
must be capable of many pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree—is
likewise a condition of production founded on capital.135
There is the suggestion in Marx’s writing that inauthentic needs are those specific
to a given historical epoch (those whose form fails to manifest in every epoch), but this is
a feeble attempt to draw the necessary distinction. First, it would mean that we would
only know which needs were inauthentic once socialism had undermined their material
basis, and they had disappeared. This is problematic since it undercuts our ability to make
any judgment, but it is not necessarily fatal. Sometimes it is only possible to see clearly in
hindsight. Second—this is more problematic—distinguishing authentic from inauthentic
needs based on whether they manifest in every epoch cuts against Marx’s claim that
human nature undergoes real change in history. If legitimate needs are those that manifest
in some form in every epoch, then while the material objects that satisfy human needs
may change form, human needs themselves do not really change from one era to another.
This solution cuts against Marx’s endorsement of cultural innovation as the progressive
and more complete realization of human nature by implying that any development that
actually generates a truly novel need has generated an “inauthentic” or “false need.” It is
entirely possible Marx himself recognized this response was insufficient, since he struck
the material containing this distinction from the final published text.136
In the final analysis, as Patricia Springborg notes, “Since socialism is a regime
based on the satisfaction of genuine needs, Marx has to establish some criteria to
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differentiate needs other than simply what historical determination has produced.”137
Marx’s philosophy of need and human nature in his later writings is inadequate for this
task. In his later writings, needs are determined historically in response to the contingent
developments of technology and praxis, and they must be “open to history to determine,
because the proliferation of tomorrow’s needs, unforeseen today, constitutes the motor of
progress.”138 Marx’s theory of history implies that human need, and hence human nature,
is a contingent product of history, changing with and determined by the given stage of
historical development. In this case, unlike the understanding of human nature articulated
in the early writings, there will be no grounds for distinguishing between authentic and
inauthentic needs, and so on this view, human nature and its needs will not be capable of
serving as a standard for the evaluation of the mode of social production because human
needs will themselves be the product of the given mode of social production.139
Just as with Hume’s conception of human nature, on Marx’s view, human needs
are explanatorily relevant as the drivers of technological and historical progress, but they
are not normatively relevant for making ethical judgments for or against a given form of
social organization. There are, therefore, no reasons related to human nature that we can
appeal to in order to make sense of the thought that capitalism creates “false needs” and
socialism satisfies “true needs;” nor is there any basis for the value judgment implicit in
such a claim. To the extent that Marx leaves human needs and, hence, human nature open
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to historical determination, he must give up his critique of capitalism for failing to meet
human needs.140
If human needs are to function as a normative category sufficient to ground
Marx’s ideal of social justice and subsequent critique of capitalism, Marx must embrace a
conception of nature in general which is teleological as opposed to empirical. His
emancipatory critique of capitalism depends on the assumption that human needs are not
for whatever history has happened to produce, but rather that there are authentic and
inauthentic needs and that authentic human needs in any age are for human freedom. On
this view, needs constitute the ontological conditions of human fulfillment. Only on this
basis can Marx say that capitalism ought to be overthrown by socialism because it is
exploitative and that only socialism can create the conditions necessary for human
emancipation, allowing as it does the free exercise of the totality of human potential.
According to this latter reading, the normative justification and the moral superiority of
socialism is grounded in the account of human flourishing, the details of which are
elaborated by his conception of human beings as beings of praxis.
To summarize: Marx’s capacity to distinguish legitimate (or authentic or true)
needs from illegitimate (or inauthentic or false) needs is crucial to his moral critique of
capitalism and to his ability to give substance to the ideal of social justice expressed in
the socialist motto, “From each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs.”141 The practical implementation of this vision of social justice depends on a
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normative conception of needs, and by implication, a normative conception of human
nature, given that Marx sees human needs as the essential expression of human nature.
To the extent that human needs and human nature are represented as empirically
and contingently determined in history—that is, to the extent that Marx embraces an
empirical conception of nature in general as defined in the previous discussion of
Hume—human nature will fail to provide an adequate normative resource for Marx’s
critique of capitalism. If human needs are determined in each era by the given social
mode of production, then it is difficult to say that the needs produced in us by the
capitalist system are inauthentic, illegitimate, or false in the way Marx’s earliest critique
of capitalism implies.

5. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, what can we say about the way the differing general
concepts of nature exemplified here in the thought of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx function
to inform each figure’s thinking in ethics?
Nature has two distinct roles in Aristotle, and it functions in two distinct ways in
ethical argument. As mere nature, it functions as a limit and a constraint on rational
action. It also functions as the potentials we are given to work with that we can develop
and cultivate through moral and other forms of education. As nature proper, nature
functions as an ideal of ethical development. It is an explicitly normative notion insofar
as it discriminates between correct and incorrect ways of cultivating the capacities and
potentials provided by mere nature.
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Hume’s moral philosophy has a strikingly different focus from that which we saw
in Aristotle. Whereas in Aristotle, the focus is on the nature of the human end, and the
argument is that virtue constitutes the substance of that end, in Hume the focus is on
explaining the origins of virtue as well as how we discriminate between virtue and vice in
our moral judgments. Hume argues that through the operations of sympathy, human
nature is the causal origin of our ideas of virtue and vice, and it is on the basis of the
principles of human nature that the sentiments of virtue and vice are felt, particularly on
the basis of our sympathy with others that we form our moral judgments. So whereas
Aristotle was primarily concerned with what we are aiming at in life, Hume is primarily
concerned with the efficient causes of our action—with the motivating “springs” of our
actions and the “principles” in the sense of efficient causes of our actions and,
consequently, our moral judgments.
For Hume, nature functions as the “ground” of morality in the sense that the
original principles of our constitution function as the efficient causes of our moral
sentiments. Hume thinks that if we are interested in understanding the moral life, we must
necessarily take an interest in human nature, since ultimately any legitimate explanation
will need to identify the source of our behavior or judgment in an empirically discernible
principle of human nature. Hume appeals to the principle of sympathy exercised out of
the general point of view to give a normative account of moral judgment. According to
Hume, trustworthy moral judgments will reflect how all those affected by an action or
character would regard it when judging from an impartial ‘general point of view.’ If
useful and agreeable from this impartial general point of view, then the act or character
will be deemed ‘virtuous,’ but if painful and disagreeable, then ‘vicious.’ While the
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general point of view appears to provide a way for avoiding controversial assumptions
about the proper ends of human life (and hence a teleological conception of human
nature), I have argued that judgments from the general point of view cannot avoid some
such assumptions. The impartiality that characterizes the general point of view requires
that we have some sense of what weight to give to the various sentiments to be
considered. And Hume can only disregard the sentiments of those who judge the monkish
virtues useful, and thereby arrive at the judgment that the monkish virtues are in fact
vices by taking a stand on the question of the human end. The monkish virtues are useful,
but only for ends that Hume believes to be completely spurious. Hume’s pronouncement
against the monkish virtues suggests either that he failed to judge from the general point
of view (which is why he failed to take into account the sentiments of those who judge
the monkish virtues useful), or that in order to judge from the general point of view in
cases where the sentiments are not all unanimous, we must know how to weigh
conflicting sentiments. In the latter case, giving due consideration would entail a
judgment about which sentiments reflect the legitimate interests of the parties involved,
and I have argued that distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate interests of
the parties depends upon a teleological conception of human nature.
In Marx’s early humanist writings, we find a teleological concept of nature in
general underlying Marx’s claims about human flourishing. In the Manuscripts of 1844,
Marx condemns capitalism as alienating. Human beings should find fulfillment in labor
as they creatively work to meet their own needs and the needs of those around them, but
capitalism transforms labor into a purely instrumental means to a wage workers must
have in order to survive. As people then experience it, wage-labor becomes an alien force
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in human life, and we actively seek to avoid it whenever possible, because it is felt as
forced labor.142 Labor should be the realization of human freedom exercised in the
satisfaction of a full range of human needs, leading to human flourishing. But wage-labor
is represented by Marx as an external force interfering with the full flowering of the
human potential for the free exercise of our conscious, creative, and social productive
capacities.
In both early and late writings, Marx identifies human needs as an essential
expression of human nature (inseparable from the labor that meets those needs). In the
early writings, human needs are clearly depicted as being for that which contributes to
human flourishing, but as Marx develops his theory of history, development of the social
forces of production is propelled from stage to stage by felt need expressed as a demand
for ever more sophisticated satisfactions. The drive to satisfy our needs creates in us new
needs for the means of production necessary to meet these needs. Positing human needs
as both the engine and product of historical change renders human nature a contingent
product of the social forces of production. But if human needs are for whatever the
current mode of social production has determined, then Marx cannot criticize capitalism
for failing to meet the human need for free, conscious, social, and productive activity.
Under capitalism, human beings have no such need, since human needs are for whatever
capitalism has brought us to feel as a need: if we happen to be workers, then our need
will be for a wage; if we are capitalists, then our need will be for the growth of capital.
Marx predicts that the forces of capitalism will, as a matter of fact, lead to the implosion
of capitalism as the masses are eventually deprived to the point where revolution
becomes inevitable, but Marx’s purely descriptive explanation of human nature in terms
142
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of felt needs leaves him unable to criticize capitalism for failing to meet the needs of
human beings, since human needs and human nature are determined by the forces of the
now-current social mode of production. Marx’s moral critique of capitalism requires the
support of a teleological conception of human nature that holds that human nature is
realized in free, conscious, social, productive activity. Our true needs are for those things
(and, derivatively, for institutions like socialism) that will enable us to realize this end.
Because in his later works he abandons this account of human nature for one constituted
by the social forces of production themselves, Marx loses the grounds needed to criticize
capitalism for its failure to meet human needs.
Whereas Hume describes human nature as the efficient-causal source of our moral
sentiments, the later Marx provides an account of the efficient-causal forces that shape
human nature. In both cases, the conception of nature in general is an empirical one,
which prevents either one from drawing conclusions about how human life should be in
contrast to how it is on the basis of considerations about our nature.
This analysis suggests that judgments about human nature that are relevant from
the point of view of informing our normative judgments about human flourishing are
going to take a distinctive form—what I’ve called here a teleological form—because they
characteristically involve drawing a distinction between ends, character traits, or needs
that constitute a fulfillment of human nature and those that do not.
In the course of her discussion of the appeal to nature in ancient ethics, Julia
Annas makes the following observations about the appeal to nature proper as the goal or
end of human development. These observations would apply equally well to what I’m
calling a “teleological” view of nature in general:
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It is obvious that this . . . use of nature presupposes two things. One is that
we can in fact distinguish between the thing’s or person’s nature and
outside influences that count as interferences with that nature. Plainly we
cannot do this just by looking at what actually happens; everything a
person does is a product of some combination of factors. We need to
distinguish between what the person naturally does and what is done to
him by way of interference. The second assumption is that we can
distinguish between what forms an expression of a person’s nature and
what forms a corruption of it—between a natural and unnatural
development
We can see at once that the notion of nature in this . . . sense is not a
neutral, ‘brute’ fact; it is strongly normative. . . . For ancient ethics, the
facts in question are neither simple nor obtainable by a quick glance; they
are facts which take some finding and the discovery of which involves
making evaluative distinctions.143
A teleological conception of nature in general will, then, be strongly normative
because it is based on a set of evaluative judgments about proper ends of development, in
light of which some factors in that development could count as “interference” or
“corruption.”
In this chapter, I’ve argued that the kinds of claims about human nature that are
normatively significant for a theory of flourishing will be “teleological” in form as
opposed to “empirical.” A teleological conception of human nature is formed by drawing
distinctions between proper and improper ends, needs, or desires. As such, it offers an
account of ends, needs, or desires that constitute a fulfillment or realization of our nature
and distinguishes these from those that do not. By purging assumptions about which
ends, needs, or desires contribute to the proper development and or fulfillment of human
life, an empirical conception of nature in general eliminates the perspective necessary for
supporting judgments about flourishing.
This argument is significant because (as we saw in the discussion of Louise
Antony) this is not commonly recognized. Antony (along with many others) assumes that
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the kind of claim about nature that would be relevant to “grounding” ethical claims would
be based on a view of nature in general that is “empirical” (like Hume’s). I have argued
that this view is mistaken, because if we insist on the “empirical” view of nature in
general, we’ll get the conclusion that Antony arrives at, which is that a theory of human
nature is of little relevance for an ethic of flourishing.
As I previously acknowledged, the effect of embracing a teleological conception
of human nature is that the appeal to human nature cannot plausibly be construed as an
appeal to an uncontroversial fact or set of facts about which persons are likely to be
agreed. While teleological conceptions of human nature articulate reasons in support of
the theory of flourishing—as has been shown in detail in this chapter through the
extended examination of the ethics of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx—they do not give
uncontroversial reasons. But they are reasons that make sense of the account of
flourishing and articulate what makes living like this good for us.
As I acknowledged in chapter one, it would, in principle, be possible to develop
an ethic of flourishing that jettisons (or greatly diminishes) its dependence on a theory of
human nature. While this is a possibility that deserves to be taken seriously—which I do
in chapter five—I believe an articulate conception of human nature is a significant
normative resource in a flourishing-based ethical framework. While I am not confident
that giving a theoretical conception of human nature a central role in an ethics of
flourishing will play a significant role in settling moral disagreements, I believe that
articulating the conception of human nature that a theory of flourishing depends upon can
make it clear where (at least some of) our deepest ethical disagreements reside.
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Distinguishing between the possible ends of human life and arguing that some are
fulfillments of our nature while others are distortions, stuntings, or maladaptations to
nonideal environments is indispensable to a perspective that would maintain that we have
natures which are well realized in some ways and not in others. It is this kind of claim
that feminists need to be able to substantiate if they are to offer moral criticism in light of
a standard of flourishing.144 There is a pressing need to distinguish those developments,
practices, rules, and norms that are a response to legitimate human needs and
appropriately supportive of human capabilities and potentials from those practices, rules,
and norms that do not serve legitimate human needs or which stifle or stunt potentials
that are important for leading an unfrustrated and fulfilling life. Louise Antony hits on
this aspect of the significance of an account of human nature for feminist moral
philosophy when she asserts that
[some] conception of human flourishing, grounded in assumptions about a
shared set of capacities, in fact lies behind feminism’s protest against the
treatment of women. . . . I take it to be feminism’s position that women
under patriarchy are systematically dehumanized—treated in way that
prevent or impede the full development of their human capacities. Without
a nonarbitrary background notion of human flourishing, the notion of
damage makes no sense.145
Our legitimate needs can be explained by pointing to those realizations of human
life that are genuine fulfillments and forms of flourishing and distinguishing those from
forms of life which are pseudo-satisfactions, or that distort or stunt our potential for a
fully human form of flourishing.
Some feminists have characterized the central thrust of feminist criticism in a
different light. Rather than characterizing feminist objections to patriarchy as a system
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that stunts or distorts the capacity of women to flourish, they see feminism as bringing
attention to the covert exercise of power in human life, particularly the exercise of power
through the gender system.146 Understood in this way, feminist ethics makes central
relations of power and questions authority in the use of that power. Illegitimate power
often rests on the use of coercive force, but the claim that a given phenomenon in human
life is (despite appearances) merely a product of force implicitly assumes a contrast with
what would come about absent the use of force, that is, “naturally.” Thus, distinguishing
between natural and forced behavior may be an important, even indispensable, critical
tool for feminist ethics whether feminism is understood as a defense of women’s full and
equal claim to human flourishing or as a movement to reveal the illicit exercises of power
in human life that operate via the gender system.
Being clear about the evaluative status of the conception of human nature that is
needed for an ethic of flourishing may also go some way toward assuaging feminist
concerns about moral theories that invoke a robust account of human nature. Flourishingbased ethics need a teleological theory of human nature. An empirical conception of
human nature will not be able to play the role that a flourishing-based ethic requires.
Being transparent about the status of the appeal to human nature means we eliminate one
perpetual source of skepticism that comes from smuggling in evaluative premises under
the guise of uncontroversial description. Recognizing that such evaluative distinctions are
in play is a step toward making responsible use of theoretical representations of human
nature in ethical argument.
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In the following two chapters, I explore the strengths and weaknesses of two
contemporary ethics of flourishing in light of the argument given here that a flourishingbased ethic needs a teleological (as opposed to empirical) conception of human nature.
First, I consider the flourishing-based virtue ethics of Rosalind Hursthouse, followed by
the human capabilities approach advanced by Martha Nussbaum. I argue that in
appealing to a teleological conception of human nature, Hursthouse gives human nature
the right methodological role in the ethic of flourishing she articulates. However, for
feminist purposes, the substantive conception of human nature she endorses is not
sufficiently robust to draw necessary evaluative distinctions between feminist and
patriarchal understandings of the virtues. In contrast, through the capabilities list,
Nussbaum articulates a substantive conception of human nature robust enough to support
and make sense of the liberal, feminist vision of human flourishing she advances.
However, Nussbaum wavers between an empirical and teleological concept of nature in
general. At times, Nussbaum claims an epistemological status for the capabilities list that
implies that it is an uncontroversial, quasi-empirical finding regarding what people
universally agree to be valuable for human life. At other times, Nussbaum acknowledges
that the capabilities list expresses an evaluative judgment about what full human
development requires. As I have argued in this chapter, an ethic of flourishing needs a
teleological rather than empirical concept of nature in general, in order to be adequately
normative. In this way, I argue that both of these ethics of flourishing need to be
modified—though in different respects—if they are to serve as the basis of a feminist
ethic of flourishing.
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CHAPTER 3
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE’S EUDAIMONIST VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE BENEVOLENT PATRIARCH

Everyone who is taking the ethical naturalist line takes it as obvious that
they are not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of human beings from
an ethically neutral human biology, but are already thinking about human
beings in an ethically structured way.1

1. Introduction
The previous chapter argued that in respect to its conception of nature in general,
any conception of human nature with normative significance for a flourishing-based
ethical theory will need to be teleological in form. The ends marked out by a teleological
conception of nature in general—whatever the substantive content of that conception may
be—serve to distinguish in at least a minimal way between legitimate and illegitimate
interests, desires, and needs. As I argued in the case of both Hume and the later Marx, in
the absence of such a distinction, their conception of human nature is incapable of
accounting for the distinction they need to be able to draw between legitimate and
illegitimate interests, desires, or needs of individuals.
In this chapter, I turn to a contemporary flourishing-based ethic I believe satisfies
this basic requirement that a flourishing-based ethic must employ a teleological
conception of nature in general. Rosalind Hursthouse has developed a flourishing-based
virtue ethic that aims to account for the virtues as states of character that reliably promote
human flourishing. The framework of natural normativity she appeals to presupposes a
form of biological teleology as operative in all living organisms, and the conception of
1
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flourishing she employs is grounded “naturalistically” by appeal to that which is
necessary for human beings to successfully pursue and realize the ends characteristic of
our species-specific form of life. While Hursthouse has maintained that the ends
associated with this account are epistemologically well-supported by the biological
sciences, the full picture of the end internal to human nature that is required by this
account is, I believe, more complex. The full picture entails an interpretation of human
life that goes beyond what the natural sciences can license. In this chapter, I argue that
Hursthouse requires the conceptual resources of a more “liberal” account of human
nature, by which I mean an account that is not restricted by what the biological sciences
can strictly license. I argue that feminists interested in the resources of Hursthouse’s
general approach will require something yet more “liberal” if they hope to give a
coherent feminist account of flourishing and the virtues constitutive of such flourishing.
While I believe that the methodological role Hursthouse assigns to a theoretical
conception of human nature in the context of a flourishing-based ethic is correct,
Hursthouse’s substantive conception of human nature is not sufficiently robust to account
for core feminist commitments as my discussion of Marilyn Friedman’s “Benevolent
Patriarch” brings out.
I begin section two with a brief discussion of a challenge to any form of feminist
eudaimonism posed by Marilyn Friedman. Showing the degree to which Hursthouse’s
moral philosophy can provide resources to meet this challenge will, I believe, vividly
illuminate the strengths and limitations of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism.
After laying out Friedman’s challenge, section three is devoted to exposition of the
details of Hursthouse’s project and is organized by the three theses she calls “Plato’s
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Requirements on the Virtues,” but I give special attention in section three to the
conceptual background for this project in the work of Philippa Foot, whose ideas about
the grammar of the word ‘good’ led her to the notion of natural normativity. In section
four, I develop an analysis of the concept of human nature found in Hursthouse in terms
of its role and function in the theory, making explicit what the theoretical place of the
appeal to human nature is in this kind of theory and reviewing some of the points
Hursthouse has made often enough about what the appeal to human nature is not intended
to do. The theoretical role of human nature in the context of this unique form of
eudaimonism is shown to be quite different than it is often assumed to be. This theoretical
account of human nature is an ethically informed account, the upshot of which is that this
account of human nature cannot be justified strictly on the basis of the biological
sciences, and Hursthouse ultimately needs (and does, in fact, rely on) a conception of
human nature that is more robust than it first appears. In section five, I argue that a
minimally feminist eudaimonism would likewise require the resources of a more robust
(and hence more controversial) conception of human nature to account for core feminist
convictions about the virtues such as, for example, that patriarchal benevolence (the
putative virtue of Friedman’s Benevolent Patriarch) is not a genuine virtue. As it stands, a
feminist eudaimonist equipped with the theoretical framework Hursthouse provides
would be incapable of defending such a conclusion, but the kind of modifications
necessary to defend this conclusion are, I believe, fairly clear and the exercise
demonstrates how a theoretical conception of human nature can serve as a resource for a
feminist flourishing-based ethic.
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2. Marilyn Friedman’s Benevolent Patriarch and the Challenge for Feminist
Eudaimonism
Marilyn Friedman argues that eudaimonist moral theory cannot advance the goals
of feminism because the feminist eudaimonist will be committed to an untenable and
implausible conjunction of premises.2 The eudaimonist unites reflection on the good life
to philosophical argument that moral virtue is necessarily a defining feature of any truly
good life. According to Philippa Foot, the eudaimonist “suggestion is, then, that
humanity’s good can be thought of as happiness, and yet in such a way that combining it
with wickedness is a priori ruled out.”3 For feminists interested in utilizing a eudaimonist
perspective, the challenge is to show how visions of success and happiness that passively
accept or actively entail oppression and domination are misguided or false conceptions of
happiness, because true happiness requires moral goodness.
However, Friedman maintains that the feminist eudaimonist will (by virtue of her
feminism) be committed, first, to the supposition that the domination and oppression of
women by men is morally vicious and, second (by virtue of her eudaimonism), to the
thesis that “men who dominate or oppress women cannot flourish or be happy.”4
However, as a counter-example to this thesis, Friedman presents us with the case of the
Benevolent Patriarch. The Benevolent Patriarch is a
devoted family patriarch, a man who believes that men should be the
heads of families because they are superior to women in such capacities as
leadership and decision-making, and perhaps also because male leadership
is required by religious norms. The benevolent patriarch does not love the
women in his life as social equals to himself. However, he may harbor no
2
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hostility toward them and may sincerely love them in the same way that
any adult might love a young child who is dependent on his or her
protection and guidance. For the patriarch, women are like children who
will never fully grow up and who therefore require lifelong protection and
guidance.5
Friedman does not say so, but we can even imagine the benevolent patriarch
having a robust conception of women’s dignity as women, that leads him to condemn
practices and attitudes that he identifies as degrading or disrespectful to women. What he
does not possess is a conception of women’s dignity as a function of their equality.
Women, for him, possess a form of dignity strongly colored by norms of gender and only
fully realized in and through forms of gender-based subordination.
Friedman further argues there is no reason to believe the eudaimonist feminist’s
claim that, because he possesses a significant vice, the Benevolent Patriarch cannot be
happy.
I believe the benevolent patriarch can plausibly flourish and be happy
about his life overall despite his mistaken and derogatory beliefs about
women. He can still flourish in today’s world because he will probably not
have much trouble finding a woman who is willing to be a full-time wife
for him and who may do an excellent job as the full-time mother of their
children. This man will probably be relieved of the burden of a two-career
household, in which case he will be able to devote himself to success at
work, thereby gaining sufficient income to ensure for his family a safe
neighborhood to live in, good schools to attend, and all the other familiar
middle-class privileges that will give his children (his sons, at any rate) an
advantageous start in life. He may also have time to participate in the
public life of his community, perhaps by running for office on the local
school board.6

Friedman argues that the Benevolent Patriarch is quite likely to be personally
successful and lead a happy life as gauged by common indicators of material success and
personal satisfaction. All of this seems plausible enough. Friedman presents this
5
6
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argument not against any eudaimonist in particular, but rather against what she thinks any
eudaimonist—by virtue of her commitment to the necessity of virtue thesis and her moral
opposition to patriarchy in any form—must say in order to sustain her position.7 This
raises an interesting question: can a feminist eudaimonist equipped with the conceptual
framework articulated by Hursthouse rebut this charge? Alternatively, is Friedman right
to think the eudaimonist cannot reject the possibility that the Benevolent Patriarch is
primed to lead a happy, successful life? After a discussion of Hursthouse’s unique form
of eudaimonist moral philosophy, I return to this question in section five.

3. Contemporary Eudaimonism: Rosalind Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian Ethical
Naturalism
In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse defends a Neo-Aristotelian, flourishingbased virtue ethic.8 As I said in the introductory chapter, it is not clear that all
“flourishing-based” ethics can or should be identified as “eudaimonistic,” but
Hursthouse’s arguably can for she commits herself to one of the central tenets of the
ancient eudaimonists: the virtues benefit their possessor.9 Hursthouse argues that the
virtues are character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia. To say this means that:
1) The virtues benefit their possessor. (They enable her to flourish, to be, and live
a life that is, eudaimon.)

7
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2) The virtues make their possessor a good human being. (Human beings need the
virtues in order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a
characteristically good, eudaimon, human life.)
3) The above two features of the virtues are interrelated.10
Hursthouse develops these three theses, which she dubs “Plato’s requirements on
the virtues,” to provide a framework within which a rational vindication of the virtues is
possible: those character traits are genuine virtues that benefit their possessor and make
her good qua human being. Hursthouse’s defense of the general claim that “the virtues
are character traits that a human being needs for eudaimonia” is built up out of the
argument for each of these sub-theses. Hence, it is worth pausing to review the arguments
given in support of each of these claims.

3.1 “The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor”
Hursthouse offers a quite general, intuitive argument for the claim that the virtues
benefit their possessor. Philosophers have often enough rejected as untenable the claim
that developing the virtues is in each person’s best interest. A common argument against
the thesis involves a thought experiment in which one tries to imagine successfully
convincing whatever character one imagines to have a full range of vices—the gangster,
drug baron, autocratic strongman, or Cruella de Vil-type11—that, lacking the virtues, they
cannot live truly happy lives. The consensus is that such an attempt would fail to
convince the moral skeptic or truly wicked person that they are not truly happy, but since
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these people generally believe themselves to be happy, and they evidently lack the
virtues, the thesis is taken to be false.
In contrast to this approach, and following R.M. Hare, Hursthouse recommends
looking at the debate from a different angle. Admitting we are unlikely to be able to
convince the moral skeptic or thoroughly wicked character that the virtues are in their
interest, she argues that, nevertheless, it is striking and significant that those we call
“good parents”—those who really want the best for their children—give their children a
moral education that encourages and attempts to nurture the virtues rather than their
opposites. Though they may not be able to guarantee that the virtues will bring true
happiness and success in life, if we look at what they do in the course of raising their
children, few parents seem to believe that the virtues are irrelevant or that cultivating the
vices will be just as good a bet if they want their children to live good and successful
lives.12 Prima facie, the way good parents typically try to raise their children suggests a
widespread conviction that the virtues (on the whole) benefit their possessor, making
their possessor fit to succeed and capable of dealing with the most predictable of life’s
challenges. This suggests that people generally believe the virtues are necessary for a
truly good life.
Despite this, Hursthouse maintains that the virtues are neither necessary nor
sufficient for eudaimonia. Rather, she regards the virtues as our ‘best bet’ when it comes
to dealing with the realities of human life and the vicissitudes of human fortune. In line
with the ancient eudaimonists, Hursthouse maintains that “A virtue is a character trait a
human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well,” but she interprets this claim
as parallel to one’s doctor’s advice that if you want to preserve your health, you should
12

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 174-176.

138
quit smoking and drink only in moderation.13 There is no guarantee that following the
doctor’s orders will bring one glowingly into old age. The doctor’s advice is no foolproof
assurance, but this is the only reliable bet. “The claim is that they are the only reliable
bet—even though, it is agreed, I might be unlucky and, precisely because of my virtues,
wind up dying early or with my life marred or ruined.”14 While such tragedy can befall
the virtuous, Hursthouse also thinks that it is quite possible that, on the other side, the
vicious will just get lucky and, even without virtue, “flourish like the green bay tree.”
Thus, Hursthouse interprets the claim that “the virtues benefit their possessor” as the
claim that the virtues are our most reliable bet for leading a successful and happy life. In
any case, they are certainly more reliable than the life of vice, which “clearly carries its
own risks.”15
Hursthouse’s argument that the virtues benefit their possessor by being the most
reliable bet for one who wants to live a good and successful—eudaimon—life is an
intuitive one. I call this an “intuitive” argument because the key concept on which the
argument turns is left unspecified. The argument works with a common sense, intuitive
conception of ‘benefit’ and the idea that flourishing is a benefit to the agent. The
argument at this stage does not depend on any clarifications regarding the nature of “true
benefit” or dislodging any misguided ideas a person might have about what will benefit
and what will harm. This argument operates within the realm of common sense, even
while it undermines a common line of philosophical argument by asking us to bring the
assumptions we accept in the practical sphere of child-rearing into line with the
assumptions we accept upon philosophical reflection.
13
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3.2 “The Virtues Make Their Possessor a Good Human Being”
The argument for the second thesis is more complex. It depends on a clarified
conception of benefit arrived at through philosophical reflection. The claim that “a virtue
is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well” is taken
to imply not only that the virtues benefit their possessor (as explained above), but that
“the virtues make their possessor a good human being.” At this stage in the argument, we
begin to get a clarification and specification about the nature of the benefit that the
virtues (most reliably) bring: the benefits of the virtues are benefits to us qua biological
members of the human species. The argument for the second thesis introduces the unique
form of naturalism to which Hursthouse is committed.
Following Philippa Foot, Hursthouse argues there is an important analogy
between ethical evaluations of flourishing and biological evaluations of flourishing. In
order to grasp the analogy, it helps to see how the evaluation of character traits—as
virtues or vices—mirrors the evaluation of the biological aspects of ourselves. Character
traits—understood as robust dispositions involving both reason and emotion—come to be
understood as those aspects of ourselves that are appropriately subject to moral
evaluation.
In order to argue for the second thesis, Hursthouse takes up a line of philosophical
argument initially set out by Philippa Foot that aims to ground objective attributions of
human moral goodness “naturalistically.” Ethical naturalism, broadly conceived, is the
view that the claims of ethics about what one should do and be are ultimately justified by
facts about human nature and the circumstances of human life. The variety of ethical
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naturalism defended by Foot and Hursthouse conceives of human beings as part of a
“natural, biological order of living things.”16 Ethical evaluation is made in light of what it
is to be a good human being, i.e., a “flourishing” member of the human species, and
ethical evaluations are understood in a way that makes them structurally identical to
evaluations of other natural living things. This kind of ethical naturalism maintains that
ethical evaluations are analogous to the evaluations of health and good function in plants
and non-human animals.
Ethical naturalism of this sort has been developed most prominently by Elizabeth
Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, and Rosalind Hursthouse. The
philosophical thesis common to these figures is that the conceptual use of species
categories to identify living organisms implies a set of normative judgments that establish
not only the bounds of species membership, but also standards for measuring well-being
for particular members of the species. Thus, there is a kind of normativity within the
natural world that is expressed in the norms of the form of life for the species, or in what
is necessary for members of a given species to progress through the lifecycle in a speciestypical fashion. Philippa Foot has called this “natural normativity.” Anscombe refers to
these norms as “Aristotelian necessities,” while Thompson calls them “Aristotelian
categoricals.”17
In his essay “The Representation of Life,” Michael Thompson articulates the
conceptual and logical background of this perspective. He argues that our very ability to
identify an individual as an organism of a certain species or as engaged in certain life
16

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 206.
Foot, Natural Goodness, 38; G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Promising and Its Justice, and Whether it Needs to
be Respected in Foro Interno,” Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 3 no. 7/8 (1969): 68ff;
Michael Thompson, “The Representation of Life,” in Virtues and Reasons, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin
Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002): 267.
17

141
activities presupposes a set of normative judgments about the form of life (i.e., the
‘species’) of the organism.18 Thompson argues, “If a thing is alive, if it is an organism,
then some particular vital operations and processes must go on in it from time to time—
eating, budding out, breathing, walking, growing, thinking, photosynthesizing.”19 Yet our
very ability to identify the life activities of the organism requires a prior identification of
that which is characteristic of its form of life—the way(s) this kind of thing progresses
through the life cycle—and this necessarily implicates a set of normative judgments with
respect to the species, since what it is to be engaged in any one of those activities for any
particular organism can only be identified in the wider context of its form of life.
John Hacker-Wright offers the very useful example of cellular division as a case
in point. In a single-celled organism or bacteria, cell division is a form of reproduction,
but in a multicellular organism, cell division is a form of organismic growth and
maintenance. Cellular division is a different kind of activity in these different forms of
life. What follows from this recognition is that “identifying an organism also involves
taking a normative stance on what is going on in the organism. In situating the organism
within the wider context of a form of life, we are situating the individual organism
against a view of how creatures of that sort normally function.”20 Hence, to look at any
individual as a member of a species is to look at that individual from a normative
perspective, according to the norms set by the form of life of which it is a member.21
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Facts about the organism’s form of life constitute the basis of natural normativity.
Whether one is a good (or conversely, defective) member of the species is determined by
the way that members of the species characteristically pass through the various life
stages. As such, the species norm sets standards for things such as development and
behavior in the individual.
Foot argues that an analogous principle applies to the ethical evaluation of
members of the human species. “To determine what is goodness and what defect of
character, disposition and choice, we must consider what human good is, and how human
beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing a human being is.”22 Of course,
ethical evaluations do not pertain to physical growth and development, which are matters
of health, but rather pertain to states and actions subject to choice and freedom, matters of
human will. The analogy suggests that ethical evaluations have to do with those aspects
of ourselves that are ethically relevant, which, from a virtue-theoretic standpoint, are the
dispositions of character. Foot argues that we can evaluate good dispositions of character
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in the same way we evaluate good roots and good instincts in plants and animals: by
whether and how they conduce to the characteristic flourishing of a member of that
species. Whether a character trait is or is not a virtue, then, turns on its connection to the
characteristic way human beings live and flourish.
Hursthouse adopts Foot’s basic concept of natural normativity and with it the
teleological perspective on living organisms. She also agrees with Foot that a good
human being is one who exhibits those character traits necessary for flourishing as a
human being. Furthermore, Hursthouse develops Foot’s thesis by elaborating it in the
terms of a systematic framework within which she aims to make the justification of
individual virtues possible.23 According to Hursthouse, a person counts as an ethically
good human being insofar as the ethically relevant “aspects” of her constitution conduce
to the characteristic ends of the human species and thereby enable her to flourish as a
human being.
According to Hursthouse, we can identify in the natural world differing levels of
complexity in living things, from plants to non-human animals to human beings.
Amongst the most complex are social animals where Hursthouse argues that we find a
confluence of four characteristic “aspects”—their (i) parts, (ii) operations, (iii) actions,
and (iv) emotions and/or desires—conducing to four characteristic “ends”: (1) individual
survival, (2) continuance of the species, (3) characteristic enjoyments and freedom from
pain, and (4) the good functioning of the social group.24 The evaluation of any individual
as a good member of its species turns on how well each of its species-characteristic
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aspects conduces to the achievement of its species-characteristic ends. In each case,
Hursthouse emphasizes that how these ends are realized is as important as the
achievement of the ends themselves. For example, not only must the actions of the
individual conduce to the good functioning of the social group, but they must do so in a
species-characteristic way. I will call this conceptual framework the “framework of
natural normativity.”
She goes on to argue that something analogous is true for human beings as well,
though when we arrive at the task of evaluating ourselves, Hursthouse maintains that we
need to add a fifth “aspect” for evaluation, since we are not only social animals but also
rational. Hence, human beings are subject to evaluation in light of a fifth aspect—(v)
rationality—over and above the four we share with other social animals. The good
functioning of human beings is categorically distinct from the good functioning of other
highly intelligent social animals because our actions must contribute to the ends of our
species in a “characteristically rational” way. Even though Hursthouse maintains that the
ends characteristic of human flourishing are identical to those of other social animals, the
way we pursue these ends is distinctive. A ‘characteristically rational’ way, Hursthouse
specifies, is “any way which we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to
do.”25 This means that the ultimate criterion for any character trait counting as a virtue is
whether or not it contributes to the achievement of the specified ends of our species and
does so in a way that we can see as a good way of achieving this end. Thus, the
conception of practical rationality Hursthouse’s account requires is clearly substantive, as
opposed to instrumental. What counts as “rational” (and, therefore, as potentially
virtuous) will be more restricted than what is merely an effective way to realize the ends
25
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of our nature. Thus, the all-important question becomes ‘What ways can we legitimately
see as good ways of pursuing these ends?’ I will return to this point in assessing the
response to Friedman that seems available to Hursthouse.
In order to use the framework of natural normativity as a framework for
understanding ethical evaluations, we need to separate out those aspects of ourselves—
the parts, operations, actions, and reactions—which are merely physical (e.g., the
dexterity of our hands and the regulation of our breathing and heart rate, our metabolic
capacity and our reflexive reactions, and so forth). While these can certainly be crucial
for human flourishing, evaluation of these things is a matter of health, not ethics. Moral
evaluation—and the praise and blame that characteristically accompany it—presupposes
the capacity for free choice made possible by our rationality.26 Although this form of
ethical naturalism attempts to connect our understanding of ethical evaluations to
evaluations of good biological function by attending to the characteristic elements of
human flourishing, it is important to emphasize that ethical evaluation remains distinct
insofar as it is restricted to those aspects of ourselves that are in some meaningful sense
“up to us.”27 Ethical naturalists like Hursthouse are not attempting to reduce ethical
evaluations to evaluations of good biological functioning as measured by physicians and
veterinarians. What we are left with when we separate out those aspects of ourselves that
26
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are merely physical is notable. We have actions taken from reason; we have our emotions
and desires (the ones that are not merely reactions to physical stimuli); and the
(occasional) action taken because of those desires or emotions (the ones that are not
merely physical).28 These are all aspects of ourselves that enter into the exercise of the
virtues as traditionally understood.
Character traits, as understood in the Aristotelian tradition, involve “a complex
unity of one’s values, choices, desires, emotions, perceptions, interests, expectations,
attitudes, sensibilities and actions” in a way that is deeply engrained and not subject to
moment-by-moment voluntaristic changes.29 A character trait typically involves a certain
set of attitudes and emotions concerning a specific sphere of human concern.30 However,
in contrast to other kinds of personal traits or qualities, which can be fairly local in scope,
a character trait is global in scope and shapes the agent’s actions and reactions in
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accordance with trait-characteristic reasons wherever the subject matter specific to the
character trait comes into play.31
Furthermore, when we attribute a character trait as a virtue, we also attribute to
the person the capacity to reason well about matters connected to that virtue, since each
of “the virtues involves getting things right, for each involves phronesis, or practical
wisdom, which is the ability to reason correctly about practical matters.”32 When we
understand virtues as robust character traits, Hursthouse argues, the “concept of a virtue
emerges as tailor-made to encapsulate a favourable evaluation of just those aspects
which, according to the naturalism here outlined, are the ethically relevant ones.”33
Thus, character traits emerge as the candidate “aspects” of ourselves that we
properly look to when making ethical evaluations. Understood in light of the framework
of natural normativity, if a character trait is a virtue (a good character trait), then it ought
to conduce in a fairly regular sort of way to the ends of the human species,
naturalistically understood: individual survival, continuance of the species, characteristic
pleasures and freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group. When we
look at the character traits we typically think of as virtues, does this seem to be the case?
Hursthouse observes that “it has long been a commonplace that justice and fidelity to
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promises enable us to function as a social, cooperating group”34 and that charity “directed
to the young and helpless particularly serves the continuance of the species; directed
more widely it serves the good functioning of the social group by fostering the individual
survival, freedom from pain, and enjoyment of its members, and also by fostering its
cohesion.”35 Furthermore, without “honesty, generosity and loyalty we would miss out on
one our greatest sources of characteristic enjoyment, namely loving relationships.”36
Similar accounts can be given for courage and temperance.
Encouraged by the fact that we seem to be able to make sense of many of the
virtues on the standard list by examining them in this light, Hursthouse concludes that we
have good reason to think that the second of “Plato’s requirements on the virtues” is true:
the virtues do make their possessor an ethically good human being, naturalistically
understood, because they contribute to the species-characteristic ends of human life.
Human beings seem to need the virtues in order to live well and to flourish as human
beings, and to live characteristically good, eudaimon, human lives. The rational support
for that claim is the argument provided by the framework of natural normativity that the
virtues are character traits encapsulating just those aspects of ourselves—i.e., the ones
that are rationally informed and subject to decision and choice—that are susceptible to
distinctively moral evaluation. These aspects are “virtues” when they conduce in a
characteristically rational way to the ends of a flourishing human being conceived in
terms of individual survival, continuance of the species, characteristic pleasure and
freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group.
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As I noted at the outset of this section, this argument constitutes a clarification of
the kind of benefit that the virtuous can expect to receive: the virtues benefit their
possessor—the first thesis—but they benefit their possessor qua human being. The
virtues bring about our flourishing as human beings—i.e., as members of a species with a
species-specific form of life—and thereby make their possessors good human beings.
This is how the first two features are inter-related, which is the third of “Plato’s
requirements on the virtues.” The virtues benefit their possessor, but the benefit they
bring makes their possessor a flourishing member of the human species.

3.3 “The First Two Theses Are Inter-Related” (Because Human Nature Is Harmonious)
That the first two theses are inter-related Hursthouse takes to imply not only what
was explained above—that the benefit the virtues bring about is our flourishing as
members of the human species—but also that the virtues can benefit us in this way
because our nature is such that human flourishing is possible. While connecting the first
two theses is important and clarifying the conception of benefit and relating human
nature to a positive conception of flourishing is significant, it is Hursthouse’s conviction
that we must presuppose a conception of human nature as harmonious that is most
philosophically interesting and methodologically significant for revealing the role and
function of human nature within this moral framework.
The third of “Plato’s requirements on the virtues” (which says that the first two
theses are interrelated) is an essentially hermeneutic thesis. It requires that we interpret
our nature—its aspects and ends—as (at least potentially) harmonious rather than as just
“a mess,” the “ill-assorted bricolage of powers and instincts” that Bernard Williams
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suggests may be our lot.37 Looking at both the very general features of the human
condition and the historical, evolutionary account of how human beings have come to be
as they are, Williams has wondered whether anything like the kind of fulfillment
imagined in the Aristotelian tradition is a plausible aim for human beings. The
Aristotelian project presupposes that the essential requirements imposed by each of the
fundamental human ends is compossible with the requirements imposed by each of the
others, at least to the extent that making trade-offs to accommodate each of them is a
reasonable and not a futile strategy. Consider, for example, one possible conflict between
the ends of human flourishing as articulated by Hursthouse: the pleasure of the individual
and the good functioning of the social group. One can imagine the case in which, given
the circumstances of human life, one must be sacrificed to preserve the other. But if our
flourishing depends in a deep way on both, then sacrificing either will represent not
simply a trade-off, but rather a kind of mutilation—a sacrifice of something without
which a good life cannot be lived.
Imagine, for example, that social conservatives are right when they argue that a
functioning, stable society depends on the majority of that society’s children being raised
in stable two-parent families. In the absence of affordable and widely available birth
control, this means society needs strong marriage relationships, low divorce rates, and
low rates of reproduction outside of that context. But that, in turn, means placing heavy
37
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strictures on the ways people in that society express themselves sexually and pursue
sexual pleasure. If the needs of a well-functioning and stable social group are compatible
with the characteristic human pursuit of sexual pleasure, then the trade-off in terms of
limiting the boundaries and the context under which such pleasure can legitimately be
pursued may be reasonable. But if the strictures and taboos required to achieve this are
not mere limitation, but rather are a repression of something essential, then the limits
represent no mere trade-off but a cutting off—a mutilation—of a part of us that is
essential for human flourishing. If the demands of these two ends are not compatible (and
by hypothesis, they are not), then we might alternatively allow the free exercise of human
sexuality and the pursuit of such a characteristic and (by hypothesis, essential) pleasure,
but in this case, we will necessarily be cut off from a form of social functioning equally
essential for human flourishing. This will represent a mutilation of a different sort, but a
mutilation no less real and serious. The prospect that what is necessary for a minimally
adequate form of flourishing could be impossible to realize because the ends of human
nature are fundamentally incompatible presents the real possibility that, given what
human nature is, human flourishing is an unrealistic, and hence unreasonable, aim.
Still, Hursthouse argues—I think plausibly—that the belief that flourishing is
possible is an essential feature of the ethical outlook of even the most minimally virtuous,
since taking flourishing as one’s goal—either for oneself or for others—requires one to
believe flourishing is possible. Moreover, as Hursthouse perceptively points out, the
thesis that human nature is harmonious is not an extra assumption that eudaimonism
requires but which Kantianism and utilitarianism can do without. “[E]ven Kant and
utilitarianism will be affected by this . . . since we cannot be required to adopt the
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happiness of others as an end, or its maximization, if happiness comes only through
astonishing luck.”38 Both Kantians and utilitarians enjoin us to act in ways that promote
the well-being and the happiness of others, but if our nature is such a mess that no course
of action can reliably be expected to bring this about, then the possibility opens up that it
does not really matter what I do, or what I intend. Rejecting the thesis that human nature
is (potentially) harmonious has significant practical consequences.
If we really are, by nature, just a mess, then we are beings for whom no
form of life is likely to prove satisfactory at all. Any individuals who
flourish individually and socially are an extraordinary accident and so
(please note) are those who flourish individually and anti-socially. Neither
is likely, for given that we are just a mess, what is to be expected, what
happens unless we are, individually, astonishingly lucky, is that we don’t
flourish at all, notwithstanding our rationality and our desire to do so. [. . .]
The belief that harmony is possible for human beings, that we have the
virtues neither by nor contrary to nature, but are fitted by (our) nature to
receive them, is, I think, an essential part of the ethical outlook even of the
minimally virtuous—any of us who think that being right about ethics
matters.39
The thesis that human nature is harmonious underwrites the hope that taking
flourishing as the aim of practical reason is reasonable and meaningful because
flourishing is possible for creatures like us, and harmonizing these ends in ways that lead
us to make trade-offs is the counsel of wisdom, not futility.
Whether we adopt an ethical outlook (i.e., take a general view of the world that
holds that it is meaningful to strive for good lives and that such lives are systematically
connected to morality in some way) or we accept a nihilistic or immoralist outlook (i.e.,
take the view that it is either pointless to strive to lead good lives—nihilism—or that
immorality is just as, or even more likely to lead to the best kind of life possible for
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human beings) seems to depend on a certain understanding of our nature: that our nature
is (or can be made) harmonious.
However, neither the view that human nature is ultimately ‘a mess,’ nor the view
that human nature is harmonious seem (to me at least) to be necessitated by the empirical
evidence or the anthropological record. There seems here to be a choice to make about
how we will interpret the various impulses our nature gives rise to and what significance
we will accord the various kinds of trade-offs necessitated by our finitude and the
external circumstances of human life.40 Sustaining an ethical outlook (as opposed to a
nihilistic or immoralist outlook) depends on a certain understanding of our nature. But
this is an interpretation of our nature and the interpretation is made necessary by our
ethical outlook.41 So the argument is one that works from the perspective of asking about
the presuppositions required to sustain an ethical outlook (as opposed to falling into
nihilism or immoralism), and arguing that a certain interpretation of our nature is justified
because it is necessary for sustaining an ethical outlook.
The conclusion we come to, then, is that human nature is relevant to our moral
theorizing because the question of how we interpret our nature is directly related to our
ability to give a reasonable account of our ethical outlook, whatever that may be. Insofar
as any ethical outlook is defined by a persistent drive to live well ourselves and find a
way of life that will enable others to do so, and our practical commitments embody the
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hope that this is possible, this presupposes that flourishing is possible for creatures like
us.42

4. Analysis: The Concept of Human Nature and Its Function
What role can we see human nature playing in Hursthouse’s unique form of
ethical naturalism? Hursthouse gives extensive attention to this question in the sense of
trying to make clear what the appeal to nature is not intended to do. The appeal to human
nature, Hursthouse insists, is not intended to provide a value-neutral, extra-ethical
foundation for ethics, and the conception of human nature to which she appeals is neither
value-neutral nor extra-ethical, as the third thesis clearly reveals. Regarding what the
appeal to human nature is intended to do, Hursthouse’s position is more ambiguous, but
there are a few things we can establish that are worth noting.
As previously discussed, one function played by the concept of human nature
(qua concept of the human species) is to specify and clarify the concept of benefit which
the theory invokes when it claims that the virtues benefit their possessor and enable her to
flourish. Though Hursthouse’s initial arguments employed a vague, intuitive conception
of benefit, the theory ultimately draws on an account of what is involved in successfully
progressing through the life cycle of our species in order to specify more precisely the
kind of flourishing the virtues (by hypothesis) bring. An account of the ends of human
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life qua members of the human species is crucial for this theory insofar as the theory
takes its conception of flourishing from the idea of living successfully as members of a
certain natural kind.
Another theoretical role played by the concept of human nature is that it serves to
link the concepts of flourishing and virtue. It is the concept of human nature—the way
the theory conceives of our species-specific form of life with certain ‘aspects’ being
central and human life as a whole defined by the pursuit of individual survival, the
continuance of the species, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and the good functioning
of our social group—that allows Hursthouse to defend the claim that the virtues are
necessary for flourishing (because they are our “best bet”). As Simon Hope observes,
human nature plays a very particular justificatory role in neo-Aristotelian ethical
naturalisms. It does not justify specific moral practices or particular judgments, rather the
conception of human nature answers the question, “Why think these thick moral concepts
[i.e., the virtue terms we appeal to when making particular moral judgments] are the right
ones?”43 In this way, a conception of human nature as oriented toward certain abstract
ends serves as one element of a complete theory that attempts to fit “our concepts of
virtue and good human being and excellence and defect in living things (and a number of
other concepts) together” in a way that yields “the best abstract understanding” of virtue
and what it is to be a good human being.44
Borrowing a phrase from Bernard Williams, Hursthouse has described neoAristotelian ethical naturalism with its intense reflection on human nature as a form of
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“coherentism with a hermeneutical agenda.”45 This expression succinctly captures two
very important aspects of the role of human nature in Hursthouse’s theory. First, I will
explain how it is a form of “coherentism,” then I will discuss its “hermeneutical agenda.”
When it comes to reflection on human nature, this means making a certain interpretation
of our nature coherent with other ethical concepts and commitments.
Speaking again of Foot’s project, Hursthouse describes Foot’s broad endeavor as
a coherentist project, the driving force of which was the demand for a consistent account
of the word ‘good’ across ethical and non-ethical contexts. Foot’s project can be seen as a
kind of coherentism insofar as she strove to give a consistent analysis of the word ‘good,’
and initially, “hardly anyone but her thought that they should work on getting their
ethical and meta-ethical beliefs to cohere with a whole lot of other beliefs they had about
good roots, good eyes, good cacti and so on, because they assumed those were
irrelevant.”46 When it came to language use, it was not clearly the case that the grammar
of the word underwent a radical change depending on the context, but that was what the
subjectivist, expressivist, and prescriptivist theories claimed.
The structure of Hursthouse’s account is coherentist in another sense as well.
Rather than taking one concept—e.g., virtue or human nature—as basic or foundational
and deriving other concepts from that as many modern moral theories do,47 Hursthouse’s
eudaimonism might be thought of as taking a number of distinct concepts as primary, but
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not basic.48 A cluster of primary terms—i.e., virtue, flourishing, good human being—are
appealed to in order to explain and elucidate the others, but it is not claimed that any can
be reduced to or derived from any of the others. (Thus, it would be mistaken to read
Hursthouse as positing the ends of human nature as fundamental values from which we
can derive the virtues, which is what Brad Hooker takes her to be doing.49) In both these
ways, Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism can be seen as a kind of coherentism.
Why describe it as having a certain “hermeneutical agenda”? Hursthouse suggests
that the view of ourselves employed by neo-Aristotelian naturalism is useful for
dislodging certain entrenched Enlightenment views of ourselves as special sorts of
beings—persons—which are quite set apart from the rest of the natural world. “[We] go
for the [biological or animal] analogy [to moral evaluation] in part to curtail our hubristic
tendency to think of ourselves in that inflated way. The analogy puts us firmly in our
place as something distinctly less than that special.”50 Thus, one of the intended effects of
taking this perspective on ourselves—as members of the biological order of living things
with ends continuous with those of other living organisms—is to lead us to think of
ourselves and interpret our lives in a less hubristic way. So part of the hermeneutical
agenda is to bring us to interpret our lives in a way to which we are not generally
accustomed. (This links up with the coherentism because it is this interpretation of our
lives that we are trying to make coherent with other important views we have, for
instance, about the virtues, the word ‘good,’ and what it means to ‘flourish.’)
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I believe Hursthouse’s eudaimonism can be described as advancing a
hermeneutical agenda in a different sense as well. Her eudaimonistic reflections on the
presuppositions necessary for sustaining the practical engagement characteristic of any
ethical outlook suggest a positive reason for modifying our views on human nature. Prior
to thinking about the aspects and ends of human life and considering the way in which
the virtues relate to these and these ends and aspects relate to one another, we may have
seen no reason to regard our nature as either harmonious or disharmonious. But upon
reflection, seeing the implications of these views for our practical engagement with the
world—ethical, nihilistic, or immoralist—the consequence of not abandoning our ethical
outlook seems to be that, on grounds of consistency, we need to adopt a view of our
nature as harmonious.
To what extent is our conception of our nature a matter for hermeneutic
considerations? That is, to what extent should we take the truth of our conception of
human nature to be open to interpretation? Christopher Gill, writing on Cicero’s
eudaimonism, describes how
it is a premise of the whole account that a person’s understanding what
‘nature’ means develops hand-in-hand with (and as part of) his moral
development. [. . .] In this respect, Cicero’s account of moral
development, like Aristotle’s account of the human function, appeals to
the ‘inside’ view of the ethical agent for its intelligibility and plausibility,
although it invites the agent to enlarge and develop his understanding of
the world, or ‘nature’, from that ethical viewpoint.51
As Gill understands it, eudaimonist reflection in the ancient tradition invites the
agent to enlarge and develop his or her understanding of ‘nature’ (and human nature in
particular) from an ethical viewpoint. This is, methodologically, quite similar to the role
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we see human nature being given by Hursthouse. I think this is an equally apt description
of the line of thought we currently see Hursthouse developing. According to Hursthouse,
“Everyone who is taking the Aristotelian naturalist line takes it as obvious that they are
not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of human beings from an ethically neutral
human biology, but are already thinking about human beings in an ethically structured
way.”52 Thus, Hursthouse clearly denies that neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is trying
to derive ethical evaluations from biological facts; however, her account of what neoAristotelian ethical naturalists are doing if they are not doing this is rather
underdeveloped. I suggest we understand it along the line of reasoning described by Gill
as characteristic of the ancient eudaimonists: in bringing nature to bear on our ethical
thinking, we are at the same time invited to enlarge and develop our understanding of the
world, including ‘nature’ and ‘human nature,’ from that ethical viewpoint. When we do
so, the person’s understanding of human nature will properly change and develop in
response to her moral development and as a function of her ethical outlook.
The implications of this way of thinking about appeals to human nature in moral
reasoning are quite radical. If our concept of human nature is something that develops
with our ethical understanding, then it makes just as much sense to speak of a mature
understanding of human nature as it does to speak of a mature moral perspective. In this
case, human nature is not going to enter into ethical theory as the “facts of the matter,”
which can be specified independently of an ethical outlook, the truth of which will be
clearly accessible to anyone, no matter their stage of moral development. Our
interpretation of human nature will be shaped by an ethical outlook, and properly so.
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To summarize, I have argued (following Hursthouse) that the shaping of one’s
conception of human nature by one’s ethical outlook is reasonable on the basis of a very
general commitment, which is likely to be common to any ethical outlook. Any ethical
perspective which holds that it is meaningful to strive for good lives and that such lives
are systematically connected to morality implicitly requires a conception of human nature
as harmonious. But if this is correct—and Gill’s description of the relationship between
one’s conception of human nature and one’s ethical outlook is correct—then it is not only
the very general outlines of an ethical outlook, but also the substantive commitments of
an ethical outlook that will have implications for a person’s conception of human nature
(and vice versa).
Finally, allow me to put a point on the differences between Hursthouse’s
coherentist proposal and more common foundationalist assumptions about how human
nature will inform ethical theory. The assumption of the foundationalist is that a
conception of human nature, formed independent of ethical or evaluative considerations,
will provide an objective, value-neutral basis upon which we can justify specific ethical
judgments. (For example, Louise Antony, as I explained in chapter 2, argues against the
appeal to human nature in ethics assuming that this is the role human nature would play if
the appeal to human nature were successful.) Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian ethical
naturalism, by contrast, suggests that the conception of human nature does indeed
“justify” certain ethical judgments (i.e., that it is worth our while to strive to live well and
better), but the conception of our nature is not formed independently of our ethical
reflection. Reflection on the ethical life as an attempt to lead the best kind of life possible
given the human condition (which includes conditions beyond ‘human nature’) leads us
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to adopt a certain understanding of our nature as the only one consistent with such an
ethical endeavor, as discussed above.
This, however, raises the possibility that when it comes to giving a rational
justification for individual virtues, the picture is more complicated than Hursthouse
represents it. The conception of human nature relevant to justifying the virtues as
constitutive elements of an ethical outlook will itself be shaped in some significant ways
by that ethical outlook itself. While the thesis that human nature is harmonious is likely to
be required by a number of ethical outlooks because it bears on a quite general
commitment common to major ethical perspectives—whether Kantian, utilitarian or
eudaimonist—even beyond this, substantive differences in ethical outlooks will have
consequences for one’s view of human nature. In particular, in the same way one’s view
of human nature (as just “a mess” or as “harmonious”) has implications for the ability to
maintain an ethical outlook as opposed to an immoralist or nihilistic outlook, how one
substantively characterizes the virtues may have implications for the substance of one’s
conception of human nature and the ends characteristic of human flourishing.53
Furthermore, every particular ethical outlook is, in part, a product shaped by the
history and culture of a specific place and time. “Different local forms of life will
understand ‘kindness’ or ‘loyalty’ or ‘justice’ in substantively different ways, with
substantively different interconnections between these and other thick concepts, in the
service of substantively different ends.”54 Because of this, a very general or schematic
account of human nature is not likely to be able to adjudicate disputes between the
competing conceptions of the virtues associated with different ethical outlooks. It is
53
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unclear whether the very general characterization of the ends of human nature to which
Hursthouse appeals—based as they are on what can be justified by the biological and
health sciences—could possibly judge between these culturally specific conceptions of
the virtues. Human nature, in this framework, is supposed to help answer the question:
Why think these virtues are the right ones? A more specific version of this question asks,
“Why think this description of the virtue is the right one?” Assuming a Hursthousian
framework, the theory’s capacity to answer this question will be directly related to the
conception of human nature on which it can draw. I return to develop this point in detail
in the following section, where I offer an analysis of the extent to which Hursthouse’s
framework enables a feminist eudaimonist to respond to Marilyn Friedman’s case of the
Benevolent Patriarch.

5. Responding to Friedman: The Prospects for a Feminist Eudaimonism
In light of this discussion of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism, and in
light of the previous analysis of the role of human nature in a theory of this sort, can this
framework serve as the basis of a feminist eudaimonism? Marilyn Friedman has argued
that eudaimonism is a non-starter for feminists, since as eudaimonists they will be
committed to the claim that the virtues are necessary for flourishing, while as feminists
they will be committed to the claim that a person like the Benevolent Patriarch possesses
at least one serious vice, and yet, all appearances suggest that the Benevolent Patriarch is
capable of flourishing and leading a good life. In this section, I develop the line of
response made available by Hursthouse’s eudaimonist ethical naturalism. I will argue that
Friedman’s general objection to feminist eudaimonism turns out to be misdirected when
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raised against Hursthouse because Friedman simply assumes an intuitive conception of
flourishing and this is not the kind of flourishing that Hursthouse claims the virtues bring
about. However, Friedman’s objection remains relevant. In order to really forestall the
possibility that patriarchal benevolence is a morally legitimate form of benevolence,
feminists operating out of Hursthouse’s framework will need either a more robust
account of practical rationality—in order to argue that this is not a “way which we can
see as good”—or a more robust conception of the ends constitutive of human flourishing.
The first thing that must be established is that the beliefs, tendencies, emotional
reactions, and attitudes of the Benevolent Patriarch constitute a character trait, and not
some other kind of personal quality. As previously explained, character traits, as
understood in the tradition of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, entail “a complex unity of
one’s values, choices, desires, emotions, perceptions, interests, expectations, attitudes,
sensibilities and actions.”55 I think it is plausible to imagine the Benevolent Patriarch
possessing a robust character trait—call it ‘patriarchal benevolence’—with the complex
intertwining of all these facets. Patriarchal benevolence would be a standing disposition
to act benevolently—that is, a disposition with the intention to do good to others—in a
way that is strongly shaped by beliefs and expectations related to gender. What Friedman
describes can easily be imagined to be a form of benevolence conditioned by certain
beliefs about women’s systematic inferiority to men in regards to strength, intelligence,
worldly competence, business acumen, and so on. (Of course, one could have all of these
beliefs and just be a chauvinist, but that is not the case we are imagining here. What we
are imagining in this case is a form of benevolence, not outright domination or
exploitation in pursuit of self-interest.) To be a form of benevolence, the beliefs,
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emotions, attitudes, and actions directed toward women must be consistent with an
intention to benefit and not harm, but as patriarchal, this kind of benevolence would
understand women’s interests as conditioned by their need for special protection and
tutelage in a range of areas. These beliefs are taken as reasons for men to be protective of
women (e.g., because women are weak or childlike in their vulnerabilities), to assume
positions of leadership and direction in decision-making (e.g., because women are not as
competent to do so), but when doing so, to take the good of all into account.
This peculiar form of benevolence can also be plausibly imagined to involve a
whole range of emotional reactions and attitudes to what it sees as improper reversals of
appropriate gender hierarchy: anger at actions that take advantage of women’s weakness
or vulnerability, chaffing under the authority of women in the workplace, etc. On the
presumption that benevolence is a character trait, I take it that a modified form of
benevolence, conditioned by norms of gender hierarchy, can quite plausibly be construed
as a character trait.
Granted that ‘patriarchal benevolence’ is a character trait, we are now in a
position to examine this character trait using the framework of natural normativity. What
we want to know is this: is patriarchal benevolence a virtue or a vice? The framework of
natural normativity provides us with a set of criteria by which to evaluate character traits
over which we have some question. A virtue, according to Hursthouse, is a character trait
that (1) benefits its possessor and (2) makes its possessor a good human being. And, as
discussed above, a good, flourishing human being in the sense employed in (2) is one
who successfully pursues and attains the four naturalistically-defined ends of individual
survival; the reproduction of the species; characteristic pleasures and the avoidance of
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pain; and the good function of the social group. Additionally, a good human being will do
so in a characteristically human way, which is to say a way that is rational and that its
possessor can rightly see as good.
Before considering the possible ways in which a feminist equipped with
Hursthouse’s eudaimonist framework might reason about patriarchal benevolence, we
should observe that, as it stands, Friedman’s argument is not an argument against
Hursthouse’s form of eudaimonism because so-directed it trades on a homonymous use
of the word ‘flourishing.’ At the intuitive level, there is no reason to think patriarchal
benevolence (on the whole) will not benefit its possessor by enabling him to flourish in
the ways Friedman suggested: the Benevolent Patriarch will be freer to devote himself to
his career, and if he is successful, then he and his family will be able to live in a relatively
safe neighborhood, experience the material and psychological benefits that follow, etc.
However, as I explained above, Hursthouse does not ultimately endorse such an intuitive
conception of benefit. Hence, when Friedman argues that the Benevolent Patriarch is
entirely capable of leading a good life and “flourishing,” this is no objection to
Hursthouse’s argument that human beings need the virtues in order to flourish or a
counter-example to the assertion that patriarchal benevolence is a vice. For this is not the
kind of flourishing that it is claimed the virtues produce or the vices inhibit.
Because the conception of benefit comes from the idea of what it is to
successfully live the form of life specific to our species, the claim that ‘the virtues benefit
their possessor’ and enable her to flourish cannot be debunked by pointing to instances in
which the virtuous person (say, as a result of her virtue) is taken advantage of or (because
she refuses to engage in bribery) loses out in a business deal that would have paid
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handsome returns. Nor can it be debunked by pointing to a case like the Benevolent
Patriarch, who accrues culturally significant symbols of success and “flourishes.” In both
cases, the vicious (or the one who is at least not so virtuous) clearly “benefit” in a certain
sense. But this is irrelevant, since this is not the kind of the benefit the eudaimonist
claims the virtues characteristically bring. Taking Friedman’s argument as an argument
against the (neo-Aristotelian) eudaimonist trades on a homonymous use of the word
‘flourishing’—it uses the same word but employs a different meaning. According to the
neo-Aristotelian eudaimonist, the virtues benefit their possessor in the sense that they
enable their possessor to flourish as a good human being by conducing to the
achievement of the four naturalistically defined ends of the human species. But this is not
the sense given to ‘flourishing’ by Friedman’s argument.
Even if Friedman’s argument is not an objection to a Hursthousian eudaimonism
as it stands, her argument still raises a potentially significant objection to feminist
appropriations of Hursthouse’s eudaimonism if the framework as it stands would have to
admit that patriarchal benevolence was a morally legitimate form of benevolence and,
therefore, a virtue. Can feminists appeal to the framework of natural normativity to show
that patriarchal benevolence is not a virtue? In order to argue this, the Hursthousian might
argue in one of three ways: First, she might argue that patriarchal benevolence fails to
meet Plato’s requirements on the virtues, either (a) because it does not benefit its
possessor or (b) because it does not enable its possessor to flourish by conducing to (one
or more of) the four ends of the species, naturalistically defined. Second, she might argue
that, as gender-specific, it does not constitute a human virtue. Third, she might argue that,
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despite being conducive to the four ends, it fails to conduce to the four ends of the human
species in a characteristically rational way.
With regard to the first line of argument: does patriarchal benevolence satisfy
Plato’s requirements on the virtues? In particular, does it benefit and enable its possessor
to flourish by achieving the ends of the species? The anthropological records of human
society will not decisively support the claim that patriarchal benevolence is incompatible
with the four naturalistic ends. History bears witness to the much worse quality of
outright patriarchal domination as quite pervasive in many human societies. These same
societies nevertheless managed to function well enough for their individual members to
survive and reproduce the species and create contexts in which characteristically human
pleasures were available to many members in many realms of life (even if the pleasures
of full autonomy and other forms of human excellence were denied to most women and
many men). In light of this, it is implausible to think we can argue against patriarchal
benevolence on the grounds that it undermines the achievement of the first three ends of
human life essential for human flourishing, naturalistically understood.
It might be said that patriarchal benevolence undermines the fourth end (the good
functioning of the social group), since it entails the suppression of the functioning of part
of the group. However, as articulated by Hursthouse, “the good functioning of the social
group” is measured by the degree to which the cooperative activity of the group sustains
the other three ends. A group functions well, according to Hursthouse, when it enables
“its members to live well (in the way characteristic of their species); that is, to foster their
characteristic individual survival, their characteristic contribution to the continuance of
the species and their characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment of such things as it
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is characteristic of their species to enjoy.”56 As Hursthouse has developed the idea of the
“good functioning of the social group,” there is no basis for claiming that members
cannot be assigned significantly different functions in the collective pursuit of these four
ends.
Might a feminist eudaimonist argue that a more egalitarian form of benevolence
supports the good function of the social group in a way that is more efficient since all
members are allowed to contribute on terms of equality? One can imagine endless
debates between feminists and the partisans of patriarchy over which form of the virtue is
“more efficient,” but there is no question that both are capable of maintaining relatively
stable and long-lived forms of human society. Besides this, the claim that only those traits
that bring about these four ends in a maximally efficient way are genuine virtues would
make the theory far more determinant than Hursthouse seems to want. The benefit of
making character traits the locus of moral assessment is that they leave space for different
cultural expressions of the virtues. However, if, like charity, patriarchal benevolence can
be seen as a virtue because “directed to the young and helpless [it] particularly serves the
continuance of the species; directed more widely it serves the good functioning of the
social group by fostering the individual survival, freedom from pain, and enjoyment of its
members, and also by fostering its cohesion,” then the framework of natural normativity
will be problematic when looked at from an ethically-informed feminist standpoint. It is
problematic, not because it is too determinate, but because in allowing different cultural
expressions of the virtues it fails to rule out enough.
Still, two other lines of argument remain open. Rather than argue about whether it
is or is not a virtuous character trait, the feminist eudaimonist might argue that, whatever
56
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it is, it is not a human character trait. It is a character trait the exercise of which is, by
definition, restricted to half the human population. It is a character trait that women
cannot possess, and by that measure alone it is not a candidate for human virtue. Human
virtues are character traits that are, in principle, available to the whole of the human
population, and patriarchal benevolence is, in principle, a character trait restricted to men.
But this reply is unconvincing, for it simply begs the question of whether the human
virtues (benevolence, for example) can take on specific modifications in respect of the
different forms in which human beings come. Is there a form of benevolence appropriate
for males and a form of benevolence appropriate to females of the species? These
questions (authentic enough) show this reply to be a merely verbal solution. There is a
substantive question at stake and the reply does not address that question.
That leaves us with one line of argument: patriarchal benevolence can contribute
to the achievement of the four naturalistic ends, but it does not do so in a rational way—a
way we can see as good. The virtues are not merely instrumentally effective means of
achieving the naturalistically-defined ends of human life. To be a virtue, a character trait
must conduce to those ends in a characteristically human way. Not only must the ends be
characteristic and appropriate to our species, so must the means: a character trait that is a
virtue will conduce to these ends in a rational way. Maybe patriarchal benevolence is
akin to piety. If we look at the way piety tends to contribute to and reinforce other virtues
and thereby support the ends characteristic of human flourishing, we might think that
piety is, indeed, a virtue. If, however, we ask whether this is a rational way of achieving
these ends, our answer about piety will depend on whether we think it is rational to
engage in the sorts of activities pious people typically engage in—praying, going to
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church (or the mosque or temple), spending time thinking about God, trying to honor and
understand the will of God more fully. Whether it is rational seems to turn most vividly
on whether one thinks God exists or not. If God does not, then doing these sorts of
things—spending one’s time and energy in these ways—cannot be regarded as rational.
On the other hand, if one thinks God does exist, then piety might indeed be rational.
However, the framework of natural normativity has no resources to settle this dispute. It
can only indicate the source of the dispute. Whether piety is a virtue or not turns on a
metaphysical aspect of one’s ethical outlook: whether one thinks God exists or not.
In the same way that the framework of natural normativity cannot settle the
dispute about piety, it may not be able to settle the dispute over patriarchal benevolence.
The views about women held by the Benevolent Patriarch are part of an overall ethical
outlook, and Hursthouse maintains that this kind of argument is only effective from
within a shared ethical outlook. Hursthouse denies that the framework is intended to
convince the moral skeptic (see Section 2.1), and Hursthouse may hold that the
framework of natural normativity should not be expected. However, this gives the
framework of natural normativity such severely limited argumentative and persuasive
scope that one wonders if it isn’t too limited for feminist purposes. It does not appear to
provide the necessary resources for ethical argument with those with whom one disagrees
at the more basic level of ethical outlook. At most, it seems to provide us with resources
for persuading one those who are already (fairly) virtuous and functioning with—what is
from a feminist perspective—a well-formed and rationally well-founded ethical outlook.
At this point, Hursthouse’s naturalistic framework runs out of resources to
adjudicate our deep ethical disagreements. There would seem to be two options available:
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one is to argue from a fuller conception of human good, the other is to argue from a more
developed account of rationality, as Hursthouse does in the case of piety, where what is
rational turns on fundamental metaphysical truths.
Take the first alternative. Without getting into the specifics, feminists who believe
patriarchal benevolence cannot be a legitimate form of benevolence need a conception of
flourishing that can account for the fact that human relationships characterized by
equality and mutual respect are better forms of human sociality—that the quality of
human life shaped by such attitudes and actions is superior to one not so shaped.
Independent of its instrumental efficacy toward extrinsic goods like individual survival,
the reproduction of the species, characteristic pleasures and pains, and the good function
of the social group, a life that achieves these things by inculcating character traits (such
as patriarchal benevolence) that enshrine systemic forms of social hierarchy is less
desirable than one that achieves them through character traits expressing the value of
equality. It is not clear how a naturalistic conception of the ends of human flourishing,
based strictly on what can be licensed by the biological and health sciences, could
support such a conception of the human good.
The alternative strategy would pick up with Hursthouse’s suggestive remark that a
“rational” way is “any way that we can rightly see as good,”57 and develop a conception
of practical rationality substantive enough to provide grounds for the claim that
patriarchal benevolence is not a way we can rightly see as good in our pursuit of human
flourishing. It may be one way these ends can be achieved, but it is not a rational way.
Here we require a substantive conception of practical reason. As discussed above, it will
not do to appeal to a conception of rationality as instrumental means-ends reasoning
57
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because both hierarchical and egalitarian gender relations have proven themselves
capable of sustaining these ends. Hursthouse’s own schematic proposal that a “rational
way” is a way that we “rightly see as good” clearly goes beyond a merely instrumental
conception of practical reason (and is certainly a necessary condition). However, given
all of the ethical disputes we can imagine will ultimately rest on a judgment about
whether this form of the virtue or that form contributes to human flourishing in a way
that we can rightly see as good, it is too thin an account of practical reason.
Both of these alternative responses strain the framework’s exclusive reliance on
naturalistic, quasi-scientific considerations. Feminists will need either a more expansive
conception of flourishing or a more expansive conception of rationality in order to
distinguish one kind of flourishing life from another. A thin account of rationality that
merely assesses the instrumental efficacy of these means toward the naturalistically predefined end of flourishing is not enough to discriminate between patriarchal and
egalitarian forms of benevolence—or probably to do quite a lot of other work that
feminists want done by a moral theory.
While Hursthouse’s thin account of the ends of human nature—based on what the
biological and health sciences can license, and supplemented by consideration of the
presuppositions of an ethical outlook—can take us some way toward an explanation and
justification of the place of the virtues in human life, it cannot adjudicate more finegrained disputes about the virtues insofar as these differ between ethical outlooks. Even
still, the framework Hursthouse provides shows the way these disputes could be
rationally argued, but the resources to do so are tied to a more developed account of
human nature—an account that is going to be much more controversial than the rather
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thin account licensed by the biological sciences and the very general presupposition
common to any ethical outlook that human nature is harmonious.
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CHAPTER 4

MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HUMAN NATURE, AND THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH

1. Introduction
This chapter brings together several of the major themes of this dissertation. The
capabilities approach provides a prominent example of a feminist moral philosopher
appropriating the ethics of flourishing to provide a theory of social justice that can
address the obstacles to flourishing that women face. The capabilities approach, as
advanced by Martha Nussbaum, seeks to articulate and defend a list of human
capabilities, the minimal functioning of which each and every person must be able to
choose in order to flourish as a human being. While I agree with her critics that the
capabilities list is not as uncontroversial as she has sometimes claimed, I believe the
virtue of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach lies in the fact that it articulates and offers
arguments for an account of human nature that can support and make sense of a liberal
vision of human flourishing. Nussbaum’s conception of human nature supports what is,
in many ways, a deeply compelling and powerful vision of human flourishing.
By engaging with the criticisms of Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller Okin, and
Alison Jaggar, I will advance the argument of this dissertation that a feminist ethic of
flourishing (such as the capabilities approach) needs a robustly normative conception of
human nature which is, to use the language of chapter two, teleological. When Nussbaum
distinguishes between human capabilities—defining some as essential for human
flourishing and fulfillment and others as impediments to flourishing—she is invoking a
teleological conception of human nature. I believe the criticisms of Ackerly, Okin, and
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Jaggar can be understood as raising objections which are versions of the Problem of
Representation (discussed in chapter one). Ackerly and Jaggar suggest that the solution to
the problems plaguing Nussbaum’s list of capabilities lies in the direction of a
proceduralist moral epistemology. Against these critics, and with Nussbaum, I believe we
cannot do without substantive moral reflection on our account of human nature, and I
strongly suspect that no methodological proceduralism will allow us to avoid this.
However, such a strong claim is beyond my ability to argue and beyond the scope of this
chapter. In order to defend a more modest claim, I examine the resources available in Iris
Marion Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism, and I argue that underlying this
proceduralism is an unacknowledged (and un-argued) commitment to a conception of
human nature very similar to Nussbaum’s. Showing how these commitments covertly
enter into Young’s proceduralism strongly suggests that Nussbaum is correct to think we
cannot avoid substantive commitments about the nature of the human condition and the
conditions of human fulfillment, and that, as difficult as it is, substantive argument on the
nature of the human condition is unavoidably necessary.
While I defend Nussbaum’s attempt to forge paths for substantive reasoning about
human nature (and in my exposition I offer a novel, integrationist interpretation of her
“substantive-good approach” to moral reasoning), I believe her critics are right to raise
questions about the status of the capabilities list as a whole. Nussbaum is ambiguous at
times about the status of the capabilities list and has sometimes claimed an
epistemological status for the capabilities list that implies it is an uncontroversial, quasiempirical finding about what people universally agree to be valuable about human life.
Even if we grant such a questionable claim, if the capabilities list is the product of an
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empirical investigation into what people generally believe to be valuable about human
life, it is still not clear why we should preserve, protect, and promote these capabilities in
the way the theory directs us to. Here, the distinction drawn in chapter two between
teleological and empirical concepts of nature in general becomes relevant. The “thick
vague theory of the good” expressed in the capabilities list clearly invokes a distinction
between capabilities that contribute to the fulfillment of our nature (a life with “human
dignity,” as Nussbaum says) and capabilities that do not (because they are either
insignificant or incompatible with human flourishing). This puts the capabilities list as a
description of human nature squarely within the ambit of teleological conceptions of
human nature. However, once this is acknowledged, the contestable nature of this
account comes to the fore.
This chapter will proceed as follows: In section two, I provide an original
interpretation of the argumentative method Nussbaum has developed to argue for the
capabilities list. In section three, I assess the criticisms of Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller
Okin, and Allison Jaggar, and argue that these can be understood as raising the Problem
of Representation. Ackerly and Jaggar have proposed that the capabilities list could be
more convincingly argued for on the basis of a deliberative procedure, so in section four I
look at how Iris Marion Young’s proceduralist, discourse-based method of political
justification might be put to use to provide an account of fundamental capabilities. In
section five, I raise a further aspect of the Problem of Representation and argue that
coming to terms with this means explicitly acknowledging that the capabilities approach
depends upon a teleological conception of human nature.
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2. The Capabilities Approach to Quality of Life and Fundamental Entitlements
Martha Nussbaum has advanced and defended a theory of basic human
capabilities as a standard for gauging quality of life and establishing a universal set of
norms with respect to civil, political, social, and economic entitlements.1 As such, “the
capabilities approach” is an approach to both human development and fundamental
entitlements (or rights) based in claims of justice.2 She argues that all people—simply by
virtue of being human—are entitled to the things they need in order to live a “truly
human life,” by which she means a life with basic human dignity. Nussbaum appeals to
an intuitive concept of dignity in order to distinguish between those capabilities that have
a legitimate claim to support and those that do not.3 In order to live a life with dignity,
1
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certain capabilities fundamental to human life must be respected. The capabilities
Nussbaum advances as worthy of our respect include:


Life



Bodily Health



Bodily Integrity



Use of the Senses, Imagination, and Thought



Emotions



Practical Reason



Affiliation



Relationships to Other Species



Play



Political and Material Control Over One’s Own Environment4

The ten items on the capabilities list are advanced at a high level of generality
with the intention that this generality leaves room for multiple specifications and diverse
cultural interpretations of each item. While Nussbaum wants to affirm that there is room
for a reasonable degree of pluralism with regards to interpretations of the items on the
list, she is equally adamant that the list be understood as fully universal: “The capabilities
in question are held to be important for each and every citizen, in each and every nation,
and each person is to be treated as an end.”5 Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list of
human capabilities. It is a selective list that aims to capture those capabilities that are
essential for flourishing in a fully human way, and is, for that reason, frequently

their endorsement. In this way the “overlapping consensus” Nussbaum believes we need as a matter of
political justification will be more accessible.
4
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portrayed by Nussbaum as an evaluative and normative list based on an evaluative
conception of human nature as capable of realizing a species-specific kind of dignity. The
capabilities list is intended to articulate the necessary conditions of a good human life,
and for this reason, Nussbaum has at times referred to the list as “the thick, vague theory
of the good.”6
Nussbaum argues that the capabilities list, given suitable contextual specificity,
can serve as a practical measure of social justice in any society by establishing a
minimum standard above which every human being has the right to function should they
so choose.7 She maintains that “the ‘basic capabilities’ of human beings are sources of
moral claims wherever we find them: they exert a moral claim that they should be
developed and given a life that is flourishing rather than stunted.”8 Conversely, “it is
wrong when the flourishing of a creature is blocked by the harmful agency of another.”9
On these grounds, Nussbaum argues that wherever the threshold level for capability to
function is not met, the claims of justice have not been met. This surprisingly bold
assertion that the capabilities make a legitimate moral claim upon us lies at the heart of
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Nussbaum’s insistence that failures of capabilities are failures of justice. The potential of
each individual for a dignified existence, grounded in their standing as a member of the
human species—with powerful and wonderful potentials that deserve to be protected and
fostered—stands at the center of the capabilities approach, which seeks to articulate the
baseline requirements of human dignity and flourishing wherever human life is found.
As a moral theory, the capabilities approach can usefully be understood as a twostage theory. Nussbaum does not herself present the theory in this way—as having two
distinct “stages”—but I think it is helpful to see it this way to keep the different parts of
the theory separate.10 In the first stage, the capabilities approach generates a list of
capabilities. For each item on the list, an argument must be given showing that a fully
human form of life requires a minimum capability for functioning in that area, and that a
life without a minimum level of capability in that area is a life unfit for a human being.
To this end, Nussbaum has appealed to at least five different sorts of arguments to justify
particular items’ status on the list. The first four are (a) Aristotelian internalist-essentialist
arguments, (b) literary arguments, (c) evidence from personal life narratives, and (d)
evidence that preferences formed under appropriate conditions commonly concur with
the internalist-essentialist and literary arguments. Each of the various kinds of arguments,
or “approaches” as she has sometimes called them, aims to get at this idea of what a
“truly human life”—a life with dignity—requires. Nussbaum also argues that it is
important to bring the conclusions of these first four arguments together in (e) reflective
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equilibrium, and that demonstrating that these various arguments can be brought together
to form a consistent list of capabilities is a significant form of justification for the
capabilities list as a whole.11 According to Nussbaum, the primary weight of
epistemological justification rests on bringing these particular arguments—that a certain
capability is a necessary constituent of a fully human form of life—together in reflective
equilibrium. However, Nussbaum also believes that achieving an overlapping consensus
(in the Rawlsian sense) on the list would provide a secondary form of epistemological
justification.12 A brief word about each of these kinds of arguments is in order.

2.1 Aristotelian Internalist-Essentialist Arguments
The Aristotelian internalist-essentialist approach appeals to a few intuitively
powerful ideas related to kind membership and the concept of a “truly human life” to
articulate the moral significance of certain human capabilities. The first idea is that
without certain key capabilities, a life would not qualify as a human life at all. Nussbaum
contends that “certain functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that
their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence
of a human life.”13 It is important to note and recognize the boundaries around what
counts as a minimally human form of existence because if we are concerned, for instance,
to establish metrics for a good human life, a life that is not even minimally human could
11
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not, perforce, be a good human life. The idea is that without certain key capabilities, a life
can fail to qualify as a human life at all: “Some functions can fail to be present without
threatening our sense that we have a human being on our hands; the absence of others
seems to signal the end of a human life.”14 Nussbaum cites as examples the most severe
forms of mental disability and senile dementia.15 But we can also think of voluntarily
adopted forms of life that, on their face, appear to offer a viable path for human life, but
are not actually coherent options for a fully human form of life. For example, it seems
like one could pursue a life of simple pleasure without any rational reflection and still
count this as a human life. However, following the line of reason Plato employs in the
dialogue Philebus, Nussbaum argues that while it has the appearance of plausibility,
ultimately the pursuit of pleasure without the rational capacity is incoherent. It would not
really create for a life we would recognize as human, since by omitting reason one would
also be omitting things such as the belief that one is enjoying oneself, the memory of
pleasure, and the ability to calculate for future pleasure (21b6-c6).16 As Socrates says,
what we would seem to have in this case is “not the life of a human being, but one
belonging to some jellyfish” (21e6-8).17
A second way to get a handle on this idea is to attend to concepts of kind
membership. The intuition at the heart of the capabilities approach is the idea that “there
is something that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not a merely animal
way.”18 This “truly human way” expresses the dignity and worth of a human form of
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life.19 There is an intuitive divide between reduced (that is, “merely animal” or
“dehumanized”) forms of existence on the one hand and expanded (that is, “superhuman”) forms of existence on the other. Both of these contrast with “truly human”
forms of life, and Nussbaum argues that there are stories and myths from many cultures
and times that attempt to articulate the significance of these ideas. In so doing, they
articulate the moral significance of kind membership. We’ve inherited stories of
anthropomorphic creatures and divine beings that are humanoid, but not quite human for
one reason or another. The reasons the beings in question–-however close to us they may
be in appearance—do not qualify as “human” reveal something important about the
boundary between human and non-human forms of life and about what it is to live a
“truly human” life with its unique capabilities and limitations. Internalist-essentialist
arguments operate on the basis of these two central ideas: the idea that there are certain
functions or capabilities, the absence of which signals a life which is no longer human in
any meaningful sense, and the idea that a “truly human life” requires certain capabilities
and is incompatible with others (such as divine immortality). While Nussbaum must
believe that internalist-essentialist arguments could be made for each of the items on the
capabilities list, she herself has only pursued the kind of lengthy and detailed arguments
required to demonstrate this for two of them: practical reason and affiliation.20
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2.2 Literary Arguments
A common sense of the tragic in human life forms the basis for another set of
arguments for the central capabilities. Appealing to literary and dramatic depictions of
tragedy, Nussbaum argues we can see in many different cultures and many different
times a shared sense of tragedy at a human life cut short or a life with powerful potentials
unrealized. Tragedy hinges on the idea that personal failings within or the forces of fate
without can threaten the goods necessary for human flourishing and fulfilment. Because
of this, tragedy can also express a vision of what counts as depravation or as a mutilation
of one’s humanity. Insofar as we are able to resonate emotionally with the tragic tales of
cultures far removed from our own, this reaction suggests a common sense of the
significance of certain features of human life. The same powers of the person that moved
the original authors of these stories are moving us as well: “Insofar as we are able to
respond to tragic tales from other cultures, we show that this idea of human worth and
agency crosses cultural boundaries.”21 Tragedy reveals a common sense of the “human
being as having worth as an end, a kind of awe-inspiring something that makes it horrible
to see this person beaten down by the currents of chance—and wonderful, at the same
time, to witness the way in which chance has not completely eclipsed the humanity of the
person.”22
If we resonate with the moral phenomenology Nussbaum describes as
characteristic of the experience of tragedy in life and art, we are also likely to find strong
reasons grounded in humanity itself “for protecting that in persons that fills us with
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awe.”23 As a way of distinguishing it from the so-called “narrative method,” which I
discuss next, we might call these arguments invoking the experience of tragedy the
“literary approach” to identifying the capabilities. If they draw on ancient folklore,
literature and texts from the world’s wisdom traditions, both the internalist-essentialist
and literary arguments offer methods by which to query a wide swath of human intuition
about what is particularly important and central for human life.

2.3 Real-Life Narrative Arguments
In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum structures much of her discussion
of the capabilities approach around the narrative of two women’s lives. This real-life
narrative offers in-depth descriptions of the lives, struggles, challenges, and aspirations of
two economically poor Indian women—Vasanti and Jayamma—she met during a period
of field study in India. In the course of telling the story of these women’s lives,
Nussbaum discusses the capabilities in terms of their concrete significance for the lives of
these two women. Summing up the ways in which the various capabilities (or the lack
thereof) have conditioned their lives, Nussbaum concludes that the application of the
“capabilities framework, when used to evaluate these lives, does not appear to be an alien
importation: it seems to square pretty well with the things these women are already
thinking about . . . and want when they think about them.”24 Though Nussbaum also
admits that in some ways the “list goes beyond what the two women are currently
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thinking” since, for example, neither desire or value education for themselves in the way
the list does.25
Looking to the lived reality of two economically poor women—members of the
demographic the list is centrally intended to serve—and what they say they want in terms
of capabilities yields mixed results in terms of confirmation of the capabilities list. This
brings us to a final method considered by Nussbaum for establishing the capabilities list:
the empirical evidence that people actually desire certain capabilities. This method would
ground the capabilities in actual expressed preferences or some suitably refined set of
preferences (for instance, rational or informed preferences).

2.4 Evidence of Preferences
A good deal of Women and Human Development is devoted to the challenging
question of what role the actual desires or preferences of people ought to have in
determining which capabilities to place on the list. Nussbaum’s position on the
significance of desire for the purpose of formulating the capabilities list has occasioned
significant criticism, so I think it is worth saying a little more in detail on this point.
Preference-based or “subjective welfarist” theories of value begin from the
premise that the satisfaction of preference is the ultimate source of value.26 If preferences
are the ultimate source of value, then the value of human capabilities would repose on
their being so preferred. This initial statement of this theory, as I have given it here, is too
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crude because, as many advocates of the preference-based account of value openly
recognize, the satisfaction of some preferences may constitute a disvalue to the subject—
for example, the satisfaction of preferences that exist on the basis of misinformation.
Subjects are frequently mistaken about information relevant to their preferences but
assuming the subject has “informed” preferences, the source of value lies in the
satisfaction of preferences, according to these theorists. Theorists who accept this line of
reasoning take an informed-preference approach to value so it is not all preferences
whose satisfaction is of value, but only the informed ones.27
Procedural constraints on the formation of preferences are thought to be necessary
by many advocates of subjective welfarism to address the problem of uninformed or
irrational preferences (i.e., preferences for satisfactions that seem clearly to conflict with
the agent’s own best interest). Nussbaum cites as representative Christopher Bliss, John
Harsanyi, Richard Brandt, and Richard Posner.28 While the satisfaction of preferences is
still held to be the basic form of value, these defenders of the theory argue that the only
preferences deserving of satisfaction are preferences formed under the proper conditions,
for instance, those formed with full and accurate information,29 or those formed freely
and absent forces of intimidation, authority, or hierarchy.30
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In addition to misinformed preferences and coerced preferences, another serious
challenge is the problem of adaptive preferences—those that have been shaped or created
by oppressive social norms. Though preference-satisfaction continues to be influential as
an account of value in economics and social choice theory, many of its advocates have
recognized the complex problems of adaptive preferences and the need for a more
sophisticated account of the kind of preferences that legitimately justify social policy. As
such, these theorists recommend that legitimate preferences—preferences deserving
satisfaction—be restricted to the class of preferences that have been formed in the right
way and under the proper conditions (which each theorist specifies as he or she deems
most defensible).
In light of these problems, Nussbaum argues that while these procedural
modifications to subjective welfare accounts of value offer substantial improvements
from a normative perspective, they remain problematic. In order to respond to these
problems, the theorists invoke various kinds of procedural constraints, but the procedures
themselves invoke substantive moral norms that are unjustifiable in terms of their own
account of value. For example, Richard Brandt argues that we need to distinguish
between people’s expressed preferences and their true or rational preferences. He
maintains rational preferences are those that would survive or be produced by a sustained
process of “cognitive psychotherapy,” defined as “value-free reflection” that “relies
simply upon reflection on available information, without influence by prestige of
someone, use of evaluative language, extrinsic reward or punishment, or use of
artificially induced feeling-states like relaxation.”31 But, as Nussbaum points out, “the
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absence of authority, intimidation, and hierarchy in the method . . . expresses values—
independence, liberty, self-driven choice—that Brandt actually thinks very important.”32
We can think of this problem as posing an “accounting challenge.” The
procedural constraints each theorist places on the formation of preferences encode
normative values such as reasonableness, independence, equality, and freedom, but these
substantive procedural norms cannot themselves be justified simply on the basis of
expressed preferences. A preference-based theory of value cannot “account” for the value
of the norms that they propose are necessary for sifting legitimate preferences (those
formed in a valid way, deserving satisfaction) from illegitimate preferences (those not soformed). The upshot of what I have here called the accounting challenge is that the most
sophisticated versions of procedurally-constrained, preference-based accounts of value
require normative resources they cannot account for on the basis of their own theory of
value.
If this analysis is correct, then procedurally constrained preference-based accounts
of value require—although without recognizing it—some other source(s) of value. In
light of this, Nussbaum argues the capabilities list cannot ultimately be grounded in
preferences because preferences alone might be for capabilities that are harmful or
unreasonable, entail the domination of others, or enable one’s own oppression (just to
give a few clearly objectionable examples). Neither can the value of the capabilities list
be grounded in a procedurally constrained form of subjective welfarism because these
theories beg important questions about the value of the norms they require to differentiate
between preferences. Therefore, we need an account of the value of the capabilities that is
based on grounds independent of preferences. This seems correct to me.
32
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While Nussbaum is unwilling to allow preferences to settle questions of value, her
stance on the epistemic value of preferences is complex. Nussbaum is clearly opposed to
two extremes. On the one hand, she thinks it is wrong to give the facts of desire—even
the facts of “informed desire” (desire that has been laundered in light of some set of
normative criteria)—the last word. She argues that because desire is malleable and
especially susceptible to social pressures and norms about, for example, what one can
legitimately expect in life (or what a person of one’s social position can legitimately
expect), actual desires are an unreliable guide to settling normative questions. On the
other hand, she thinks it is wrong to entirely dismiss desire as untrustworthy. When she
calls the substantive-good approach “non-Platonist,” this is what she is referring to:
unlike Plato, she believes desire needs to be taken into consideration and given some
weight, not just dismissed as untrustworthy and irrelevant to questions of normative
justification, as the Platonist confidently does.33 Desire is potentially misleading, but it
also represents an authentic way of “reaching out for the apparent good,” and this should
be taken seriously.34 Her solution is to grant desire a heuristic role in the process of
formulating the capabilities list, and to grant that procedurally-constrained forms of
subjective welfarism offer valuable insight into the nature of the good, even if they do not
offer an adequate account of the value of the norms their procedures require. Nussbaum
appears to think that if we can give an independent account of the value of the norms that
subjective welfarists require as constraints on the formation of preference, then the results
of a procedurally constrained approach to preference-satisfaction can offer a valuable
check on the conclusions that the capabilities theorist has argued for on other grounds
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(i.e., what contributes to a “truly human” form of life). Nussbaum even calls a suitably
norm-laden proceduralist approach to preferences an “essential complement” to the
substantive-good approach, since through “a dialogue between the two, we gain
confidence that we are on the right track.”35 Though she rejects the idea that an appeal to
people’s preferences can serve as a foundational form of justification for the capabilities
list, when suitably refined by a norm-laden procedure, preferences have an ancillary role
to play in questions of justification. Importantly, they should enter in as one data point in
identifying the necessary constituents of a truly human form of life.
Because Nussbaum takes such a view of the place of preferences in justifying the
capabilities list, the fact that Vasanti and Jayamma do not seem to value education (for
themselves) does not count decisively against a list that includes education. In more
recent writings and in response to the criticism that she did not take the evidence of
Vasanti and Jayamma’s preferences seriously enough, Nussbaum appears to downgrade
the status of these narratives, suggesting they are only heuristic devices meant to
illuminate for the reader the real-life challenges facing the world’s poorest, and they are
not intended to justify the list in any way. 36 But this concedes too much to the critic, and
it is not clearly consistent with the role their stories should have, given what she says
about the importance of attending to the evidence of desire in light of the best
procedurally-constrained theories of preference-satisfaction. The real question at stake is
whether Vasanti and Jayamma would desire education had their preferences been formed
under the right circumstances.
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2.5 Reflective Equilibrium
Finally, as a “framing method,”37 Nussbaum has argued that each of these
approaches to identifying the capabilities necessary for a truly human form of life should
be brought together in “reflective equilibrium.” Following Rawls, Nussbaum endorses a
coherentist approach to justification:
Justification rests upon the entire conception and how it fits in with and
organizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. . . .
[J]ustification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of
everything fitting together in one coherent view.38
The capabilities approach endorses a holistic, coherentist approach to
justification, which is put to work at the level of formulating the capabilities list as the
theorist attempts to work out the basic principles of the theory. Do the powers and
capacities that evoke an emotional response in tragedy cohere with those that seem
centrally important when we reflect on the idea of a “truly human life”? Is this account
consistent with what we generally find people striving after? If they’re striving for other
sorts of capacities, can we account for this in a way that preserves the integrity of the
basic idea? These and other sorts of questions bring the various kinds of arguments
together in support of an account of the capabilities that are minimally necessary for a
dignified form of human life.
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Thus, when formulating the capabilities list, intuitive arguments are offered in
support of each item in order to support the claim that every individual has a justified
claim to a minimum level of functioning in that area. As a matter of political justification,
these intuitive arguments need only establish the list as the basis of an overlapping
consensus.39 With this overlapping consensus, we expect that there may be different
reasons—stemming from differing religious and metaphysical outlooks—in support of
the individual capabilities, or even different understandings of human dignity these
capabilities are taken to express. By accepting many different conceptions of human
dignity, Nussbaum is optimistic that people from many different perspective will be able
to agree that no person should be forcibly kept from functioning in these areas (even
though someone might think that all persons ought to choose not to function in some
specific area), and that supporting each of these capabilities is centrally important for
human flourishing and a life with dignity.40
This integrative interpretation of Nussbaum’s method for justifying the
capabilities approach is distinctive in the literature in seeing the various kinds of
arguments—internalist essentialist, literary, narrative, and preference-based—as parts to
be integrated through reflective equilibrium into a larger coherentist argument about the
nature of the human good, which Nussbaum characterizes in terms of what is necessary
39
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for a truly human life with distinctively human dignity. These various kinds of arguments
support Nussbaum’s claims about the nature of a “truly human” form of life and what
human dignity requires, but the individual conclusions from each argument need to be
checked for consistency with one another. They do not stand alone. This means, for
example, that none of the internalist-essentialist arguments offer conclusive evidence that
a given item belongs to the “thick vague conception of the good” articulated by the
capabilities list. Our all-things-considered judgment that a given item on the list properly
belongs depends on a whole series of considerations about how it fits in light of the
totality of evidence available.
This means my interpretation differs significantly from that of Alison Jaggar, who
interprets the various arguments as independent methods of justification Nussbaum has
pursued and abandoned over the long course of revising and developing the view. Jaggar
interprets the different methods as supplanting one another, with the development of new
methods implying a rejection of earlier methods.41 It is definitely true that Nussbaum’s
method for justifying the capabilities list has developed over time, with the appeal to
narratives based on actual women’s lives, arguments from informed-desire, and the
attempt to draw these arguments together in reflective equilibrium (alongside other
considerations of life quality and social justice) coming much later than the internalistessentialist and literary arguments about the concept of a truly human life. However, an
integrated interpretation is more generous and fits better with Nussbaum’s habitual
practice of referencing older arguments in the course of advancing newer arguments. 42
Her most recent theoretical work on the capabilities approach, Frontiers of Justice, brings
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the capabilities approach into conversation with contractarian approaches to social
justice, and it relies heavily on older work, especially Women and Human Development.43
But WHD (especially chapter one) is the most systematic exposition and synthesis of
Nussbaum’s earlier work on the capabilities approach. In it, Nussbaum asks her reader to
attend to some of the very earliest arguments advancing the capabilities approach,
particularly those provided in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of
Ethics,” “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” and “Human Functioning and Social Justice,”
which are cited repeatedly.44 These are the most significant essays developing the
internalist-essentialist approach to moral reasoning, and WHD provides a lens on those
arguments as reasoning about substantive goods of human life. In WHD, all of this is
supplemented with an articulated position on the role of desire in justification, on which
no detailed stance had previously been taken.
Jaggar finds Nussbaum’s new appeal in WHD to a “substantive-good approach”
to moral reasoning particularly obscure. She criticizes the substantive-good approach as a
method because it is not clearly distinguishable from the capabilities approach as a
whole, and she thinks Nussbaum’s claim to be using a substantive-good approach to
moral reasoning simply obscures any attempt to get clear on the nature of the moral
epistemology behind the capabilities approach: “This conflation obscures the distinction
between substantive-good approaches in general and the capabilities approach in

43

FJ isn’t the most recent writing on the capabilities approach. In 2011, Nussbaum published a short work
on the capabilities approach: Creating Capabilities. This is something like a practical guide to the
capabilities approach for students and development workers interested in the capabilities approach. It adds
little of anything new in terms of political or philosophical justification, although it treats new topics in a
chapter on “Capabilities and Contemporary Issues” and gives a historical exposition of the important notion
of human dignity in a way not found in any other work. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human
Development Approach, esp. chap. 7.
44
Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics;” “Aristotelian Social
Democracy;” “Human Functioning.”

196
particular, making it difficult to examine Nussbaum’s moral epistemology separately
from her substantive claims about the capabilities.”45 One plausible reason the
substantive-good approach is not clearly distinguished from the capabilities approach is
that Nussbaum does not intend the substantive-good approach as yet another method,
different from what she has previously articulated, but rather as a characterization of the
theoretical approach as a whole. Just as identifying Nussbaum’s method of justification
as “coherentist” offers a helpful characterization of the epistemology without introducing
a new method as such, identifying the capabilities approach as a version of a substantivegood approach offers a useful characterization as a contrast with other broad forms of
moral reasoning. For instance, although the capabilities approach is like utilitarianism in
making claims about the nature of the good foundational, it is unlike most forms of
utilitarianism insofar as it attempts to reason from a “thick,” or substantive,
characterization of the human good (as opposed to a “thin” account of the good
conceived of as pleasure, or desire- or preference-satisfaction). A substantive-good
approach can also be contrasted with proceduralist approaches to moral reasoning that
focus on the formal conditions for decision procedures that can be understood as fair or
reasonable. In contrast, the capabilities approach focuses argument directly on the
substantive requirements of a dignified or truly human life. In describing the capabilities
approach as a “substantive-good approach,” it is best to understand Nussbaum as
focusing attention on these broad differences between the capabilities approach and other
theoretical alternatives. As a substantive-good approach, the capabilities approach argues
from a thick characterization of the human good, and it argues immediately about how
the human good is to be characterized rather than about the procedures by which a
45
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minimally, or thinly, specified good might reliably be produced. While Jaggar is right
then to see that the substantive-good approach Nussbaum claims to be employing has not
been clearly distinguished from the capabilities approach, I do not see that this is, in
itself, grounds for complaint.
Confirmation for my reading and the claim that there is a relationship of mutual
support between older and newer approaches to arguing for the capabilities can be seen
clearly in a more recent summary by Nussbaum of her preferred method for justifying the
capabilities list. In this summary statement of her method, she explicitly links some of the
oldest (internalist-essentialist) and newest (informed-desire) arguments in support of the
approach. Nussbaum reiterates the method for generating the list—a set of questions that
lead us to consider what is necessary for a “truly human” life, a life “worthy of the
dignity of a human being”—and emphasizes that in compiling the final list, we need
independent arguments for each item on the list and not simply a vague appeal to our
personal intuitions about human dignity.46 These arguments, together with the supporting
evidence of what people tend to prefer under circumstances conducive to the formation of
free and authentic preference, are brought together in support of the basic list of
capabilities, and these are presented as the universal requirements of social justice.
We think about human dignity and what it requires. My approach does this
in an Aristotelian/Marxian way, thinking about the prerequisites for living
a life that is fully human rather than subhuman, a life worthy of the dignity
of the human being. [. . . ]
We now argue, moving through the various areas of human life in
which political planning makes choices that influence people’s lives at a
46
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basic level, that this fully human life requires many things from the world:
adequate nutrition, education of the faculties, protection of bodily
integrity, liberty for speech and religious self-expression—and so forth. In
each case, an intuitive argument must be made that life without a
sufficient level of each of these entitlements is a life so reduced that it is
not compatible with human dignity.
These arguments are based in a kind of freestanding reflective
intuition, not on existing preferences. . . . Nonetheless. . . it is a good sign
if these arguments converge with the deliverances of the best informeddesire approaches, those that build in informational and ethical
constraints.47
I began this exposition by describing the capabilities approach as having a twostage character. In stage one, a list of fundamental capabilities must be generated. I’ve
now described how that is done and the justification Nussbaum has provided in support
of the list as a whole. My reading is integrative: it sees the various arguments given as
mutually supporting parts of a whole. At stage two, the capabilities theorist applies the
list of capabilities endorsed in stage one either to concrete questions of quality of life or
to normative questions of social justice to articulate what is owed to each and every
person as a matter of justice.
With this general characterization of the capabilities approach in place, I turn in
the next section to some criticisms that have been raised against it. Specifically, I focus
on criticisms of the arguments to which Nussbaum has appealed in the course of
compiling the capabilities list. While it has been important for Nussbaum that the list be
expressed in a fully universal way, critics have argued that the list does not represent
universally what is important and central for flourishing for all people. Rather, it
represents what is important for people like Nussbaum who are liberally minded and
intellectually and artistically inclined. In what follows, I will argue that these theorists are
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articulating a version of the Problem of Representation in their criticisms and showing
how this problem affects the capabilities approach.

3. The Problem of Representation, Part One
Nussbaum’s arguments in support of the capabilities list are intuitionist and
coherentist, as I explained above. A number of Nussbaum’s critics have argued that the
intuitionistic method of justification employed by the capabilities approach is flawed and
inadequate from a feminist perspective.48 Alison Jaggar argues that, for the purpose of
formulating a list of capabilities meant to define the threshold of a dignified human life,
an adequate methodology must have some reasonable set of procedures in place to
protect against the biases of the theorist herself about what constitutes a dignified form of
human existence.49 However, rather than protecting against the theorist’s bias, the
capabilities approach employs a method that may in fact legitimize the biases of the
theorist by encouraging her to endorse her “deepest beliefs,” i.e., her own deep-seated
biases about the world. The implication of this criticism is that Nussbaum’s intuitionism
suffers from what I called in chapter one the “Problem of Representation.” Jaggar
gestures at discourse ethics as a possible procedural resource for providing a more
adequate methodology for formulating a list of capabilities. Following up on Jaggar’s
suggestion, Chad Kleist recently argued that “discourse ethics as a method best grounds
the capabilities approach as a genuinely universal moral theory.”50 Similarly, Brooke
Ackerly argues that a central list of capabilities should be formulated on the basis of a
48
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discourse with certain normative features.51 There are clear resources available in the
tradition of feminist thought that Jaggar and Ackerly point to, since feminists working in
the areas of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy have thought quite seriously and
carefully about the normative constraints and procedures needed for deliberation to
generate morally legitimate outcomes.52 However, with Nussbaum, I think proceduralism
is an inadequate method for generating an account of foundational normative values (as
the capabilities list is intended to do), because the procedure itself must presuppose
substantive moral values if it is to be remotely plausible that the procedure will generate
legitimate outcomes.

3.1 Brooke Ackerly
In Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism, Brooke Ackerly advances what
she calls “a Third World feminist theory of social criticism,” wherein she endorses a list
of capabilities as a standard for social criticism. Ackerly regards the theoretical
justification for a concrete capabilities list as compelling, arguing that “social criticism
requires, among other things, universal standards by which to assess given local
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practices.”53 She argues that having such a list is important and that “Nussbaum offers a
draft of such criteria.”54
However, Ackerly questions both the content of Nussbaum’s capabilities list and
the methodology behind it. Ackerly regards Nussbaum’s methodology of social
criticism—appealing to the list as an independent and universal standard of minimum
entitlements—as inadequate because Nussbaum does not incorporate a methodological
check to guarantee that the proposals of the social critic represents the views of everyone.
“The problem with [Nussbaum’s] method is that nothing requires that ‘we’—those who
are doing the inquiry—consider how all people live or find something that others can live
with.”55 Nothing requires Nussbaum “to seek out all unfamiliar views or to take them
seriously. Consequently, the inquiry is biased toward what is familiar to those doing the
inquiry, be they the entire society or philosophers within it.”56 She notes that the
capabilities approach encourages the theorist “to find out what we deeply believe to be
most important and indispensable.”57 However, without any rigorous mechanism for
validating the intersubjective validity of these judgments, Nussbaum’s methodology is
liable to make misguided and inappropriate policy recommendations rooted in her own
personal opinions rather than in what is universally regarded as indispensable for a
dignified human life.58 “The problem with the capability ethic,” says Ackerly, “is not that
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Nussbaum’s list embodies liberal values, but rather that Aristotle’s method allows her
to.”59 For Ackerly, the root problem is not that the capabilities list Nussbaum endorses
embodies liberal values. Capabilities consistent with liberal values might very well figure
in a list that Ackerly would accept as valid. The root problem she finds in Nussbaum’s
approach is that the method by which the list is produced does not put an adequate check
on the influence of the theorist’s own biases, nor does it guarantee the results of the
inquiry are universally valid.
In this criticism, we see Ackerly raising a version of the Problem of
Representation. Ackerly’s concern is that in proffering a list of capabilities that purports
to articulate the basic aspects of human nature—the actualization of which constitutes
human flourishing—Nussbaum has not represented a vision of human flourishing, but
rather a vision of flourishing uniquely attractive and suited to the kind of person
Nussbaum herself is. This is a version of the Problem of Representation insofar as the
accusation is essentially that the theorist has represented herself—and other persons like
her—as the paradigm of humanity. Those who do not fit this mold will be aberrant.
In Ackerly’s estimation, an intuitionism that seeks rational coherence amongst the
totality of the theorist’s beliefs is not adequate to protect against the fundamental and
deeply held biases of the theorist. The capabilities approach is as likely to reinforce this
bias as it is to challenge it. To correct for this, Ackerly argues that the social critic must
promote and engage in dialogue that is maximally informed and fully inclusive.
There are two problems with Ackerly’s proposed solution. She argues that a
normative deliberative process must be fully inclusive. Full inclusivity, she supposes, will
school early to be a better way to promote female literacy.” Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism,
108.
59
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generate a more informed deliberation. A fully inclusive deliberation will be maximally
informed since it will include the perspectives of all those affected by the outcome of the
deliberation. Hence, she sees a fully inclusive deliberation as an epistemically superior
method for generating the capabilities list. However, it seems that inclusion is neither
necessary nor sufficient as a constraint on the deliberative process. It is not sufficient
because (as Ackerly herself admits) some information can be misleading, and in such a
case, more information would not necessarily lead to better deliberative outcomes. If this
is the case, then “full” information is not sufficient to guarantee epistemically reliable
deliberative outcomes, because the process would also need a constraint designed to filter
out actively misleading information. Full inclusion is also not a necessary condition of
normatively significant deliberation. Women-only consciousness-raising groups have
often argued for the need for exclusion as a condition of epistemic reliability. Some
deliberative processes might be more trustworthy if they are exclusive. Ackerly’s concern
is legitimate, but her solution is problematic. I will put forward what I think is a more
adequate response to the Problem of Representation in the final section.

3.2 Susan Moller Okin
As discussed above, in Women and Human Development, Nussbaum provides a
narrative description of the lives of a number of economically impoverished women in
the process of discussing the implications of the capabilities approach and demonstrating
its real-world applicability. Susan Moller Okin objects to Nussbaum’s use of these
narratives, arguing that Nussbaum’s use of the actual experience of economically
impoverished women does not exemplify the “dialogue” with real women that Nussbaum
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herself calls for.60 Okin highlights the fact that in the entire study, Nussbaum only quotes
each of these women directly once. The rest of what we know of them is filtered through
Nussbaum’s own language, understanding, and interpretation.61 Okin argues that—as a
result of failing to enter into the requisite kind of dialogue with persons of different
backgrounds—the capabilities approach is insufficiently attentive to what Brooke
Ackerly calls “the silent voices”: the voices of actual women whose lives are shaped and
whose perspectives are marginalized by circumstances of serious poverty, gender-based
hierarchies, and oppression. As a result, Okin argues that although the capabilities
approach purports to employ a list of basic capabilities reflecting a broad, cross-cultural
consensus on the most significant capabilities for human life, the capabilities list in fact
represents little more than the opinions and experience of the theorist behind it. Okin
asks, “From where . . . does Nussbaum’s list, her comprehensive account of the human
capacities and functionings, come? . . . [It] seem[s] to draw more from the life of a highly
educated, artistically inclined, self-consciously and voluntarily religious Western woman
than from the lives of the women to whom she spoke in India.”62 Okin argues,
furthermore, that a list of basic capabilities that is appropriately sensitive to the silent
voices to which Ackerly draws attention would be much more basic, with items much
less “fanciful.”63
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Okin’s critique raises two different issues. The first is an issue of method.
Nussbaum has responded in part to Okin’s criticism of her method by clarifying that she
does not intend her use of narratives drawn from real life in WHD as an independent
method of justification. She offers a sketch of the method of justification she endorses
along the lines of what I described above in section two, and her response positions these
narratives as one among several methods of reasoning that should be brought into
reflective equilibrium. She says she intended the narratives to illuminate and make
poignant the significance of the various capabilities on the list. However, in her reply to
Okin, Nussbaum also re-casts the significance of Vasanti and Jayamma’s stories as
offering the kind of ancillary support she had earlier claimed procedurally constrained
informed-desire approaches provide. She argues that both Vasanti and Jayamma are
involved politically in groups whose deliberative structure fosters the formation and
expression of normatively significant preferences.
Given that Vasanti, at least, is a participant in a group that deliberates in
accordance with procedures that I describe in chapter 2 [of WHD] as
characteristic of the best informed-desire approaches, and given that
Jayamma is an active participant in the political culture of Kerala, which
has related features, I am inclined to think that these examples, along with
others taken from such groups, can also play . . . the modest partial role in
justification that I assign to informed-desire approaches.64
Even if we grant that these narratives offer concrete examples of people with
desires that are trustworthy because, formed under appropriate conditions (i.e., in a
political context devoted to collective deliberation and activism in which members’
contributions are relatively equal and members receive information about the many kinds
of life possibilities open to them), the weight Nussbaum’s method actually assigns to
such examples is minimal. Thus, Nussbaum’s response avoids what appears to be the root
64
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issue: that Okin believes any list of basic capabilities should be grounded in what actual
women say about their lives and what they say is significant to them. Giving Vasanti and
Jayamma’s stories the status of a “heuristic device” or that of an example of normatively
significant informed-desires does not do that. Okin charges Nussbaum with mere lip
service to the ideal of attending to what people with diverse perspectives actually believe
is important. Instead, Okin accuses Nussbaum of relying on a form of intuitionism that
functions to justify her own (idiosyncratic and possibly elitist) ideas about the nature of
the human condition, human dignity, and the conditions of full human flourishing.
The second issue Okin raises concerns the content of the list. (As a matter of
record, Okin is critical on a wide array of fronts. These two are simply the most relevant
for our purposes here.) Okin believes that the capabilities list contains items that are far
too “intellectualized” and “fanciful” to belong on a list of “basic capabilities.” This is
related to the first criticism insofar as Okin believes that, had Nussbaum given sufficient
attention to what actual women in conditions of dire poverty and subject to serious
gender-based oppression say that they want, the content of the list would have been much
more basic—probably focused on bodily needs such as “being able to eat adequately and
not to be beaten.”65 It is Okin’s position that if we are going to promote a set of basic
capabilities as the basis for a set of fundamental entitlements, then our list ought to be
much more basic, more akin to the kinds of capabilities advanced by Amartya Sen or
Brooke Ackerly, since these are more likely to reflect what women in dire poverty
actually say they want.66 Again, I think we can see in Okin’s criticism concerns about
representation and an accusation that Nussbaum has represented herself—and other
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persons like her—as the paradigm of humanity. Thus, Nussbaum has not articulated a
universal ideal of human life, but an ideal that fits the lives of persons like herself.
The justification for respecting and prioritizing the actual expressed preferences
of people is complex.67 In her criticism of Nussbaum, Okin does nothing to contribute to
the quite necessary discussion of the problems that beset the assertion that respect for
persons demands respect for preferences as opposed, say, to respect for a constrained set
of preferences or respect for individual rights, both of which are live alternatives for
political liberals. Nussbaum, by contrast, has dealt with this problem at length in WHD,
confronting head-on the problems of uninformed and adaptive preferences.68 I will return
to the methodological issue of the need for a method that incorporates genuine dialogue
in the next section, since Okin’s criticism on this point is reiterated by Alison Jaggar.

3.3 Alison Jaggar
Finally, Alison Jaggar has endorsed both Ackerly’s and Okin’s criticisms, adding
that Nussbaum’s flawed method of justification means the weight of justification must
ultimately rest on an appeal to her own moral authority. Not having provided a method
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that gives readers good reason to believe the capabilities list genuinely reflects the
deepest and most secure beliefs of everyone regarding the most important capabilities for
human flourishing, the capabilities approach offers us no reasons to accept the list as
having wider validity than as a coherent expression of Nussbaum’s own philosophical
intuitions on the matter. Using the language of Jürgen Habermas, Jaggar calls the method
“monological”—it can only be expected to reflect the reasoning of the theorist him- or
herself. If the list is accepted, she concludes, it must be on the basis of the authority of its
author. Jaggar maintains that in the end, “the non-Platonist substantive-good approach is
simply a claim to privileged moral authority.”69 According to Jaggar,
The methodology of the non-platonist substantive-good approach is problematic
in several overlapping respects. It runs the risk of exclusiveness because it fails to
mandate that everyone should participate in developing the list of capabilities;
instead, an unidentified “we” draw on the ideas of other vaguely identified
“people.” In addition, it is explicitly non-egalitarian: some people, the same
unidentified “we,” assume authority to decide whether or not those people’s
desires are “informed” or “corrupt” or “mistaken.” . . . If other people agree with
“us,” “we” use their preferences as data supporting “our” list but, if they disagree,
“we” reject their ideas as flawed data. They are “witnesses;” “we” are the judge.
Justification still rest ultimately on “our” intuitions—not on those of everyone.70
Because she believes the final judgment on the central capabilities rests with the
theorist building the list, Jaggar argues that the method ultimately relies on the authority
of the theorist to make the list. Thus, Jaggar argues that the methodology behind the
capabilities approach is shaped by two morally problematic features: it is exclusive
insofar as it does not require the resources of everyone’s intuitions about the central
capabilities, and it is non-egalitarian in encouraging the theorist to privilege his or her
own moral judgment when it comes to determining which intuitions (of those others we
have opted to consider) should be rejected and which endorsed. The result, Jaggar thinks,
69
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is a method of moral reasoning that privileges the perspective of the theorist and is
thereby susceptible to the theorist representing her own partial and limited perspective as
universally valid. The problem is not one of malicious intent. Even if the theorist should
be well-intentioned and trying to form her judgments on the basis of the evidence, the
method itself provides no protections against the excessive influence of the theorist’s
personal bias.
I submit that in these criticisms, Okin, Ackerly, and Jaggar are each
independently identifying in Nussbaum’s methodology the problem that was discussed in
chapter one as the Problem of Representation. While Nussbaum purports to be
representing universal features of the human condition in the form of capabilities that
ought to be supported for each and every individual, her critics have argued that the list
does not universally represent what is important for all lives. Rather, it represents (and
the methodology allows it to represent) what is important for Nussbaum herself (or
possibly for politically liberal-minded persons more generally). Though Nussbaum
aspires to have formulated a genuinely cross-cultural and universally valid list (at least
for the modern world), the contents of the list actually represent what is most significant
for persons whose social situation reflects Nussbaum’s own as a well-educated, wealthy,
Western woman with plenty of inclination and leisure to pursue intellectualist pleasures.
What Jaggar and Ackerly both point to as a solution to this problem is a method
with more fine-grained procedures for guaranteeing that the contributions of all are heard
and given equal weight. Ackerly’s own Third World theory of social criticism appeals to
the resources of deliberative democratic theory, and in Jaggar’s estimation, what is
needed is some form of “morally-constrained proceduralism” designed to correct for the
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sorts of flaws to which Nussbaum’s method is susceptible.71 Jaggar gestures at the
deliberation-based proceduralism developed in discourse ethics. Instituting a
deliberation-based procedure for winnowing a list of basic capabilities would also seem
to go some way toward satisfying Okin’s demand that Nussbaum exhibit the dialogue
with differently situated and especially poor women that she herself calls for in her
method.
Nussbaum has already engaged with one kind of proceduralist theory of value as
an alternative to the intuition-based theory of value that she defends. In WHD, Nussbaum
engages with procedurally constrained, preference-based accounts of value and argues
that the intuitionistic epistemology behind her favored theory of value is necessary to
avoid the question-begging appeal to values other than preference-satisfaction that even
the best procedurally constrained, preference-based accounts of value entail.72
If Nussbaum’s objective is that the beliefs of all should be represented in the
formulation of the capabilities list such that it has an authentic claim to universality, then
a discourse-based proceduralism will be stronger than the preference-based
proceduralisms with which Nussbaum has engaged. For instance, a sufficiently inclusive
discourse would have a verifiable claim to represent universally the capabilities that are
believed important for a flourishing, fully human life. If, as Jürgen Habermas has argued,
there are transcendental norms of discourse to which persons must be committed in order
to engage in discourse at all, then there may be values (such as universal moral respect
and egalitarian reciprocity) that come from the discourse itself and can be accounted for
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pragmatically.73 In this way, there may be values that place moral constraints on
preferences and have a valid justification, thereby avoiding the accounting challenge.
Thus, discourse-based forms of proceduralism have some clear strengths over preferencebased proceduralisms, and thereby present a stronger challenge to Nussbaum’s arguments
that adequate theories of quality of life and distributive justice depend upon the resources
of an intuitionistic, substantive-good approach to moral reasoning. In the next section, I
follow up on this alternative proposed by Ackerly and Jaggar and explore what a
deliberations-based proceduralism has to offer the capabilities approach. For reasons of
space and time, I focus on the thought of just one figure: Iris Marion Young. Her work on
the requirements of normative deliberation is well-developed and has been influential in
feminist political theory and beyond. Furthermore, she is vividly aware of and attentive to
the real-world problems of moral and political justification for agents living in non-ideal
conditions shaped by oppression and domination. Nussbaum’s current position is,
likewise, a response to such problems. She contends that feminists need a list of universal
values by which to judge preferences precisely because she believes oppression has the
power to shape consciousness and preferences in ways that reinforce oppression. Young
is acutely concerned with the possible distorting effects of oppression and domination on
the process of deliberation, and this leads her to defend strong substantive constraints on
discourse as necessary conditions of normative legitimacy. This mutually shared starting
point will make the comparison all the more fruitful. Nevertheless, I will argue that
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Young’s deliberation-based theory of democratic process does not avoid the problem that
leads Nussbaum to argue that we need substantive modes of reasoning about the nature of
the human good, and that the best procedures implicitly rely on such an account of the
good. We will find this to be just as true for Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism as
it was for the preference-based proceduralisms Nussbaum criticized in WHD. I will argue
that Young’s deliberative procedure suffers from the central problem Nussbaum
identifies with preference-based proceduralisms, a problem which I call “the accounting
challenge.” Specifically, Young’s deliberative procedures implicitly rely upon an account
of central human capabilities reminiscent of the capabilities list Nussbaum advances. It is
precisely because oppression and domination undermine these valuable capabilities that
they constitute a harm.

4. Iris Marion Young on the Conditions of Normative Deliberation
Under what conditions can a decision arrived at collectively be considered
normatively valid and binding? Different theories of democracy answer this question
different ways.
For instance, aggregative theories of democracy (otherwise known as “pluralist”
or “interest group pluralist”) hold that decisions that express majoritarian opinion are
valid because they express either the strongest or most widely held preferences of the
group.74 Deliberative theories of democracy, on the other hand, maintain that collective
74
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decision making under appropriate conditions can be construed as a collective form of
practical reason, the outcome of which has a claim to reasonableness and, under the right
conditions, can also claim strong normative validity. These are central questions for
democratic theory, but answering such questions has a more general applicability for
theories of procedural normativity.
A theory of practical reason based on a normatively valid process of collective
deliberation might be able to provide an alternative method for formulating a list of
central capabilities. Such a method would not be susceptible to the charge of
“monologism,” and if it were sufficiently inclusive and representative, it would have a
clear claim to represent what all people actually believe to be the most central and
significant capabilities for human life. Such an account would provide a basis from which
to build a genuinely universal list of capabilities that could serve as a neutral starting
point for cross-cultural moral reasoning. This would be valuable since it is precisely what
the capabilities approach seeks.
Building on the normative tradition of discourse ethics pioneered by Jürgen
Habermas and Karl Otto-Apel, Iris Marion Young has argued that an agreed-upon
outcome of a social process of deliberation can reasonably be regarded as just if the
process is characterized by inclusivity, equality, reasonableness, and publicity.75
According to Young, justice “is nothing other than what the members of an inclusive
public of equal and reasonable citizens would agree to under these ideal
circumstances.”76 A brief word on each of these requirements is in order. Young
interprets the norm of inclusion as requiring that all those affected by a given decision be
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included in the process of discussion and decision-making. As Young sees it, “inclusion
allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspectives relevant to the
problems or issues for which a public seeks solutions.”77 Equality requires not only that
all have a free and equal opportunity to speak, but that none of the participants “is in a
position to coerce or threaten others into accepting certain proposals or outcomes.”78 This
is important, since only if the discourse is free from domination can participants “be
confident that the results arise from good reasons rather than from fear or force or false
consensus.”79 Securing the participants’ confidence in the outcome as a product of good
reasons suggests the need for a third norm: reasonableness. For Young, the norm of
reasonableness is not so much about the content of the claims entered into the discourse
as it is about the dispositions of the people engaged in the discourse:
To be reasonable is to be willing to change our opinions or preferences
because others persuade us that our initial opinions or preferences, as they
are relevant to the collective problems under discussion, are incorrect or
inappropriate. Being open thus also refers to a disposition to listen to
others, treat them with respect, make an effort to understand them by
asking questions, and not judge them too quickly.80
Finally, in regards to the publicity requirement, Young maintains that for an
outcome to be regarded as just, the decision must be arrived at under conditions in which
all speakers enter claims with the knowledge that they are speaking to a public to which
they are answerable. Therefore, every claim must be entered in a way that “aims in its
form and content to be understandable and acceptable” to all.81
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I believe it is especially the requirement and specification of the publicity
criterion that make Young’s normative procedure dependent on an account of human
nature—an account that is specifically characterized by a set of fundamental capabilities
justice requires us to respect. We can uncover this conception of human nature and the
fundamental capabilities that justice requires us to respect by unpacking the concept of
publicity.
Publicity entails entering claims acceptable to all. According to Young, one of the
conditions for acceptable claims is a compatibility with the fundamental claims of others
based on justice:
Knowing that they are answerable to others, and that they are mutually
committed to reaching agreement, means that each understand that his or
her best interests will be served by aiming for a just result. Each is thus
motivated to express her interests or preferences in terms that aim to
persuade others that they are compatible with justice in this case, which is
to say that they do not seek to ignore or cancel the legitimate interests of
others.82
This stipulation raises an important question: what constitutes the legitimate
interests of public persons (i.e., persons entering public claims)? According to Young,
legitimate interests are “generalizable” interests, which is to say interests that “others can
recognize . . . as legitimate without denying their own legitimate claims to selfdetermination and self-development.”83
By self-determination Young means “being able to participate in determining
one’s action and the condition of one’s action.”84 A person is therefore self-determining
when they are free, particularly when they are free of conditions of domination. Young
maintains that this freedom for self-determination cannot be understood simply as
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“negative freedom”—freedom from the interference of particular others—but must
include freedom from institutional relations of domination, meaning relations “that award
differential power to some agents to constrain the choices and actions of others.”85 This
implies that individuals must be able to participate in making “the collective regulations
designed to prevent domination.”86 The capability for self-determination is one of the
fundamental capabilities, then, that must be respected if the publicity norm is to be met
and the outcomes of the discourse are to be regarded as morally legitimate and binding.
The other capability Young appeals to is the capability for self-development. Selfdevelopment requires that people are able to meet their “basic needs” for food, shelter,
health care, and so on,87 but Young is not willing to limit our legitimate interest in selfdevelopment to provisioning for basic needs. Young agrees with Amartya Sen that the
value of self-development is to be thought of primarily in terms of capabilities—what
people are able to do and to be:
As doers and actors, we seek to promote many values of social justice in
addition to fairness in the distribution of goods: learning and using
satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings;
participating in forming and running institutions, and receiving
recognition for such participation; playing and communicating with
others, and expressing our experience, feelings and perspective on social
life in contexts where others can listen.88
In this list, Young names some of the central capabilities of persons institutional
oppression tends to undermine: the capability to learn; to use our skills in socially
recognized settings and in a way that is satisfying; to play and communicate with others;
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and to express our experiences, feelings, and perspective on social life in a way that leads
to others hearing us. Violating these capabilities would render the discourse illegitimate.
For Young, the legitimate interests of persons for self-determination and selfdevelopment define the basic requirements of social justice. Social justice has to do with
“the institutional conditions for promoting self-development and self-determination of a
society’s members.”89 Institutional constraints on self-development constitute forms of
oppression whereas institutional constraints on self-determination are understood as
forms of domination.90 These twin entitlements of persons to the institutional conditions
necessary to satisfy their legitimate interests in self-development and self-determination
establish the basic requirements of social justice, which all persons are entitled to as
members of a just society. By incorporating these entitlements into the conditions of
publicity—one of the conditions of normative deliberation—Young places a substantive
constraint not only on the “form” of the claims entered into discourse (which is how she
describes publicity), but the content of the claims entered. This has the effect of ruling
out of bounds some actions or policies people might, as a matter of fact, believe they
have an interest in—namely actions or policies that violate the rights of others to selfdetermination and self-development—in short, those which harm others unjustly.91 But
this means Young has not defined justice in a strictly proceduralist way.
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90
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Young’s claims that all people are entitled to an equal opportunity to develop and
exercise important capacities (self-development) and that all people should be free from
systemic forms of domination (self-determination) function as the fundamental
entitlements of persons. These are absolute prohibitions on injustice in Young’s theory of
social justice. For her, only interests which are compatible with the fundamental right of
all to self-development and self-determination are legitimate. Otherwise put, only those
interests that are compatible with these two basic requirements of justice may be entered
into normatively legitimate deliberations.92
Officially, according to Young, an agent (whether a person or a collective) “has
an interest in whatever is necessary or desirable in order to realize the ends the agent has
set.”93 However, as this discussion shows, the criterion of publicity—which says that we
must see ourselves as answerable to others and therefore only enter claims others can, in
principle, accept—rules out a subset of claims individuals might want to make on the
basis of interests they perceive themselves as having. Interests that are incompatible with
the legitimate claims of others to self-development and self-determination are illegitimate

that her account requires this independently defined conception of social justice: it is either so minimal that
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grounds upon which to make claims. Young is specific about the requirements of selfdevelopment and self-determination, and the way she spells them out reveals a
conception of human nature characterized by a set of fundamental capabilities that must
be respected: the capabilities to be self-determining; to participate in the process of
collective self-regulation designed to prevent domination; to learn; to use our skills in
socially recognized settings and in ways that are satisfying; to play and communicate
with others; to express our experiences, feelings, and perspectives on social life; and to
do so in a way that leads to others hearing us. As we can see, Young endorses a
conception of human nature and its fulfillment that draws on a list of capabilities, and in
her discussions of self-development and self-determination, the reader catches glimpses
of the positive capabilities she takes to be significant.
Returning to the initial question that inspired this discussion of Young’s
deliberative theory of justice: Can the procedure she defends plausibly ground a
normative conception of the human capabilities? If we adapted Young’s theory of
deliberation for this purpose, a legitimate list would be the product of collective
deliberation characterized by inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity. Because
publicity entails respect for the rights of others to self-determination and selfdevelopment, and implicit within these ideals is a conception of central capabilities that
must be respected, Young’s account of normative deliberation could not justify a list of
capabilities without being circular by virtue of presupposing a list of capabilities from the
outset.
To summarize: my argument here has been that a deliberation-based
proceduralism such as Young provides cannot substitute for substantive argument over
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the capabilities list because the constraints she places on the procedure, which give its
outcomes normative validity, are dependent on a prior account of the person as entitled to
self-determination and self-development. Young understands self-determination and selfdevelopment in terms of essential capabilities. As was discussed above, selfdetermination entails the capability to participate in making “the collective regulations
designed to prevent domination,”94 while self-development entails such capabilities as
“learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings;
participating in forming and running institutions and receiving recognition for such a
participation; playing and communicating with others, and expressing our experience,
feelings and perspective on social life.”95 When this list is made explicit, there is clearly
some common ground between Young and Nussbaum, who defends capabilities such as
control over one’s political environment, being granted the social bases of self-respect
(which is akin to the social recognition that Young thinks important), play, and use of
one’s senses, imagination, and thought (under which Nussbaum includes things like
communication of one’s own perspective and self-expression). Additionally, the five
faces of oppression Young identifies—exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness,
cultural imperialism, and violence—correspond in fairly obvious ways to central and
significant capabilities, such as: being able to appropriate the benefits of the exercise of
one’s own capabilities (which exploitation undermines);96 “having a right to seek
employment on an equal basis with others”97 and exercise one’s capacities in a way that
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brings recognition and self-respect (both of which marginalization undermines);98 and
“being able to be secure against assault”99 and the threat of assault (both of which
violence undermines).100
When Young incorporates publicity as a constraint on the discourse and requires
that agents observe even this minimal standard of justice in entering claims, she invokes a
conception of the person as a being with legitimate interests in their own well-being
(which she articulates as freedom for self-development and self-determination). But
because of this, we cannot use such a procedurally constrained form of discourse as a
method for formulating a list of fundamental capabilities. The validity of the procedure
itself depends on presupposing some such list, so to use such a process would be circular.
In this section, I raised and argued against the possibility of substituting a
deliberation-based, proceduralist method of reasoning for Nussbaum’s own intuitionist
method of reasoning about the capabilities. It is worth repeating, I think, that the issue at
stake is one of methodology in moral epistemology, not in political legitimacy. An
advocate of the capabilities approach could argue (and I am quite sympathetic to this) that
a deliberation-based proceduralism is inadequate for formulating the capabilities list,
while still leaving open that deliberation-based procedures may be the most just and wise
processes to employ when it comes to implementation of the capabilities, given that the
capabilities need to be interpreted and implemented in context-sensitive ways. The reason
for this difference is that deliberation-based procedures only result in valid or just
outcomes if the procedures constraining the deliberation are themselves just, and for this
98
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we need a prior account of human nature and the human good that cannot itself be
provided by a value-neutral process of deliberation. This is another version of “the
accounting challenge” we discussed above as affecting preference-based proceduralisms.
Just as the preference-based forms of proceduralism Nussbaum interacts with in WHD
face an “accounting challenge,” Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism would face
the same challenge. The normative constraints on the procedure require an account of the
human good which the procedure must respect, but for this reason it cannot be used to
generate an account of the human good without begging the question in a fundamental
way.
Now, this obviously does not show that there is no deliberation-based
proceduralism that can avoid the accounting challenge. The source of the challenge for
Young’s deliberative proceduralism is, arguably, that it is not rigorously proceduralist
enough. It introduces an independent, albeit thin, conception of justice into the
constraints placed on the procedure, and is therefore reliant on a set of independent
intuitions about the requirements of justice rather than letting the procedure alone define
what is just independent of intuition. Nevertheless, I believe considerations of this nature
are an argument in favor of a form of moral reasoning that draws on evaluative intuitions
about the human condition and the human good. In the context of the capabilities
approach, this means substantive moral reasoning about the capabilities is still necessary.
Granting that some kind of substantive moral reasoning is needed, should
feminists endorse the methods Nussbaum has advanced, or should these methods be set
aside in light of the criticisms enumerated above? Her critics charge that the methods she
employs do not do enough to reduce the influence of personal bias on the conclusions of
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the list (see Ackerly and Okin), and that, because the moral epistemology behind the
substantive good method is not clearly laid out, its validity cannot be assessed
independent of the moral authority of the author (see Jaggar). In this chapter, I’ve
provided an interpretation of Nussbaum’s substantive-good intuitionism that aims to
defend the approach against the charge that there are no clear lines of reasoning by which
we can assess the list independent of its author’s moral authority. There are independent
arguments and I’ve argued that they are to be taken in conjunction and made coherent
through a process of reflective equilibrium. As such, Nussbaum’s intuitionism has a
claim to transparency about where these intuitions of “ours” are coming from. This
makes rational dispute over each of the items possible insofar as reasons for each item on
the list are open to view and can be endorsed by reasonable people on the basis of their
own judgment that they are good and sufficient reasons. This is sufficient to rebuff the
charge that the items on the capability list finally depend on nothing more than the moral
authority of the author of the list. The moral epistemology of the capabilities approach as
articulated by Nussbaum cannot be dismissed as an appeal to her own moral authority.
Furthermore, I believe that the capabilities approach, grounded as it is in an
account of core capabilities essential to human fulfillment has something valuable to
offer. Nussbaum’s capabilities list expresses an account of human fulfillment that is
clearly at home in a liberal conception of value, the predominant features of which are a
commitment to the individuality of the person and respect for autonomous choice.
Nussbaum has articulated in a robust way what one kind of liberal position clearly
presupposes to be of value in human life. Many political liberals, who share much in
common with Nussbaum when it comes to the substance of their conclusions, have
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preferred to reason toward these conclusions through procedural rather than substantive
methods. Our discussion here has shown that a number of well-known proceduralist
alternatives do not avoid presupposing the value of certain specific capabilities. However,
rather than argue for them, these proceduralist alternatives simply presuppose the value
of these capabilities. The capabilities approach as such, then, is no more contentious for
its explicit stance on the value of a definite list that it advances as worthy of protection.
Moreover, it has the virtue of being explicit about this and of offering arguments on this
front. This is important for feminist moral theory, which has often failed to fully develop
and make articulate the normative foundations required to defend practical moral and
political positions.101 If feminists are going to employ a flourishing-based moral
framework like the capabilities approach to articulate moral and political social criticism,
the normative basis of this approach needs articulation and argument. As I’ve argued, a
theory of human nature is an indispensable normative resource within such a moral
theory. The feminist ethics of flourishing may need better arguments than those provided
by Nussbaum’s substantive-good approach, but it is unwise to reject a well-developed
method of reasoning on such a difficult question as human nature without a better
alternative to offer.
While I find much that is of value in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and I have
defended her arguments for the capabilities, which are made in the context of an
intuitionist moral epistemology, I have not gone so far as to argue for or endorse
intuitionism as such. Feminist moral philosophers attentive to issues of moral
epistemology have raised a number of objections to intuitionism. Some of these concerns
almost undoubtedly motivate the criticisms discussed above. Especially concerning are
101
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forms of intuitionism that rely heavily on an appeal to the “self-evidence” of the
philosopher’s favored intuitions,102 and some objections against intuitionistic moral
epistemologies are well-founded.103 However, Nussbaum does not invoke self-evidence;
she relies on a coherentist form of intuitionism which seeks to achieve “reflective
equilibrium” between intuitions, considered judgments, and principles, and she offers
arguments for the intuitions she appeals to, rendering them more akin to considered
judgments. One of the inherent limitations to any coherentist approach to justification is
that coherence is no guarantee of truth. At the limit, it is entirely conceivable that one
could have a coherent set of false beliefs. Less dramatically, one might have a coherent
set of true beliefs that was partial in some important respect, excluding certain true
beliefs and so producing only a partial picture of the full reality in question. In advancing
a list of central capabilities that deserve special protection, either one of these failings
would be serious, since it would unjustifiably enshrine a partial and particular form of life
as universally valid, possibly foreclosing other legitimate alternatives that cannot be
squared within the account. Nevertheless, seeking coherence across a set of beliefs or
intuitions one has other reasons for thinking true (or if that is too strong in some cases,
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then at least one has no good reason to think them false) is an epistemic virtue. It can
serve to demonstrate consistency and fit, and, in that regard, can be the basis for greater
epistemic confidence. Whatever its limitations (and there are serious limitations), a
coherentist pursuit of reflective equilibrium is considerably less problematic than other
forms of intuitionism feminists have rightly criticized.104

5. The Problem of Representation, Part Two
While I am unwilling to dismiss the argumentative strategies Nussbaum has put
forward, I think her critics are right to scrutinize the capabilities list and the status she has
at various times claimed for it. Recall that the Problem of Representation has two sides.
First, in advancing philosophical accounts of various phenomena in human life, moral
philosophers have often passed off their normative ideals under the guise of descriptive
analysis. Margaret Walker describes how this works:
The accounts they [i.e., some moral philosophers] produce of certain
positions, postures, and lives often are given and taken as disinterested,
indeed rationally critical, examinations of what moral agency, autonomy,
or responsibility simply “are,” and what people and lives look like when
they exhibit these. These accounts, however, are not just descriptions.
They are idealizations and defenses (one might say, idealized defenses) of
certain conceptions: They affirm these as terms which should govern our
moral assessment of ourselves and others.105
Articulations of “what it is to be human” are susceptible to the same ambiguity.
Second, (and it is this side of the critique that Ackerly and Jaggar have pressed) feminists
have found a predictable relationship between the ideals embedded in these descriptions
and the faces behind those ideals. The ideals very typically reflect the life and social
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position of the philosopher. Ackerly and Jaggar have accused Nussbaum of advancing an
account of human capabilities that does not really describe what is necessary for all
people to flourish; rather, it describes the capabilities that are important for a woman of
her own inclinations and social position to flourish. Jaggar argues that Nussbaum has
given us little reason to accept this conception of human flourishing. To the contrary, I
have argued that Nussbaum’s argumentative strategy is valuable and that there are
reasons given in defense of the capabilities on the list that can be assessed independently
of the authority of their author. But insofar as the Problem of Representation
encompasses the problem of passing off normative ideals under the guise of descriptive
analysis, I think Nussbaum’s critics would be right to be suspicious.
Part of what the Problem of Representation identifies is value judgments parading
as neutral facts. If a flourishing-based ethic cannot do without a normative conception of
human nature, then an important part of addressing feminist concerns about the Problem
of Representation is being transparent about the nature of the claims being made.
Nussbaum has vacillated between the idea that the answers to questions about what it is
to be human capture our best self-understanding in a quasi-scientific sense, and the idea
that the answers to these questions are fundamentally evaluative matters invoking
judgments of significance about what makes for a good human life. For instance,
Nussbaum has described the method behind the capabilities list as an “attempt to
summarize empirical findings of a broad and ongoing cross-cultural inquiry.”106
However, in the same discussion, she also asserts that “because the account is evaluative
from the start . . . it is called a conception of the good.”107
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In a similar way, in some of her earlier writing on the internalist-essentialist
method, Nussbaum vacillates between the idea that the internalist-essentialist arguments
capture our best self-understanding in a quasi-empirical sense, and the idea that the
answers to internalist-essentialist questions are fundamentally evaluative matters
invoking judgments of significance about what makes for a human life properly socalled, that is, a truly human life.108
In more recent work,109 she has taken to identifying the kind of life made possible
by the freedom to exercise human capabilities as a life with “dignity,” an idea which
expresses with much less ambiguity the fact that the capabilities list expresses an
evaluative vision of what is necessary for a good human life.110 It is presumably the
connection to flourishing (expressed in terms of a life with dignity) that makes the “moral
claim” of capabilities to their own fulfillment worthy of our respect.111 Self-destructive
and harmful capabilities (e.g., for killing, brute-force domination, manipulation, and
revenge) can also be described as capable of an existence that is “flourishing” as opposed
to “stunted.” But in this case, Nussbaum thinks our legitimate refusal to respect these
potentials rests on a judgment that they are inconsistent with human flourishing.
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The capabilities view refuses to extract norms directly from some facts
about human nature. . . . [W]e must begin by evaluating the innate powers
of human beings, asking which ones are the good ones, and the ones that
are central to the notion of a decently flourishing human life, a life with
human dignity. Thus not only evaluation but also ethical evaluation are put
into the approach from the start. Many things that are found in human life
are not on the capabilities list. The political conception does not have the
job of fostering greed or making sure that crime and brutality get a chance
to flourish, although these activities are surely based in human powers.
The conception of flourishing is thoroughly evaluative and ethical; it holds
that the frustration of certain tendencies is not only compatible with
flourishing, but actually required by it.112
Here we see Nussbaum clearly taking the position that human flourishing consists
not in the realization of all human potentials, but in the fulfillment of those that contribute
to the end of human dignity. This stance entails a conception of human nature defined by
a distinction between appropriate and valuable developments of our nature and harmful
and destructive developments of our nature. I have tried to bring articulacy to convictions
of this sort. This conviction that our nature must be understood as well-realized by some
developments and not by others is one of the principle markers of a teleological
conception of nature in general (see chapter two).
It is worth noting that when Nussbaum has been tempted to describe the contents
of the capabilities list as an empirical finding, she has not been claiming that the
capabilities list is a product of an inquiry into human nature as made through the natural
or social sciences. She has, rather, claimed that the list is a product of empirical
investigation into what people, in different times and different places, have believed is
valuable about human life. However, even if we have an empirical finding about widespread evaluative judgments, such a discovery cannot put the capabilities list on the
footing it requires. If this is all the capabilities list is, then it will not be able to play the
112
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normative role the capabilities approach requires it to play. In terms of its normative
significance, this argument for the capabilities list would put the capabilities list on par
with Hume’s appeal to sympathy. Just as Hume has a difficult time using the fact that we
can (and often do) sympathize with others to explain why we should,113 Nussbaum’s
account will have difficulty explaining why the fact that many people around the world
take these capabilities to be valuable implies that we should value and protect them. On
the other hand, if the capabilities list is, rather, based on a set of judgments about which
capabilities—amongst the many human beings possess—are a constitutive element of
human fulfillment and flourishing, then we escape Hume’s problem, and it is clear what
normative ground Nussbaum has for privileging the capabilities on the list. The challenge
with such a position is that the capabilities list can no longer be represented—as
Nussbaum represents it at points—as an uncontroversial ground upon which most (if not
all) persons are agreed.
If the account of human nature employed by the capabilities approach is now
understood as thoroughly ethically informed (that is, as an evaluative account that
distinguishes between human potentials on grounds of worth), then does Nussbaum still
think the capabilities list—more than other universal moral ideals—can serve as a shared
basis for cross-cultural moral reasoning? If so, is this because ethical ideals about human
nature are somehow less contentious than ethical ideals about other subjects? If not, then
what is the unique value of reasoning from an account of human nature and its potentials
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for flourishing? I am persuaded that Nussbaum is right to acknowledge that the theory of
the human nature employed in the capabilities approach is (and must be) an ethically
informed account. Being transparent about this is an essential part of dealing with
concerns about theoretical problems of representation. But, if this is the way we go, then
it seems one must also articulate a different account of the benefits and reasons for
advancing such a theory of human nature. Formerly, Nussbaum’s reasoning was that such
a theory of human nature could provide a neutral ground for moral reasoning upon which
many people are agreed. If the capabilities list is articulating a theory of human nature
that is thoroughly ethically informed, then it is implausible that the capabilities list should
still be thought to provide such a neutral ground for moral reasoning.
One might be concerned at this point that the conception of human nature
articulated by the capabilities approach does no more than give concrete and quite
articulated expression to Nussbaum’s own bias for liberal values. While the capabilities
list is an evaluative list thoroughly informed by one kind of liberal humanism, it does
more than simply re-express liberal values in a new sphere. Articulating the vision of
human nature that makes liberal values plausible and appropriate for the human condition
offers rational resource for a moral theory, and it makes the capabilities approach more
articulate about the sources of its fundamental commitments. This is an epistemic
advantage over other kinds of liberal political theories that presuppose the value of many
of the same capabilities114 but lack articulacy about their significance in terms of the
pursuit of flourishing.
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6. Conclusion
I have argued that what Nussbaum calls the “substantive-good approach”
incorporates various methods (such as the internalist-essential, literary, narrative, and
procedurally-constrained, informed-desire approach) in order to argue in a substantive
way about the nature of human fulfillment. On the basis of this integrationist
interpretation of Nussbaum’s arguments for the capabilities list, I believe the form of
intuitionism she offers makes the arguments in favor of these intuitions open to view and,
hence, rationally disputable in a way for which her critics do not give the approach credit.
Addressing the Problem of Representation that still plagues the capabilities approach
requires clarifying the underlying conception of nature in general to which the
capabilities approach is committed. Nussbaum has clarified that not all human
capabilities deserve our support and respect—only those that contribute to realizing an
end which she calls a “life with dignity.” This makes it clearer that she must be
committed to a teleological conception of human nature. I have argued that being
transparent about this is important for addressing the Problem of Representation. This
ethically informed and evaluative conception of human nature will need to be understood
as one aspect of the theory of flourishing to which it belongs. Nevertheless, the strength
of Nussbaum’s capabilities list is that it brings articulacy to the foundational, normative
commitments of her politically liberal vision of flourishing.
To this point, I have argued that a teleological conception of human nature is a
necessary resource for a flourishing-based ethical theory, and that it serves as a resource
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in a quite different capacity than what is commonly assumed. It is commonly assumed
that nature claims enter into a theory to ground the objective validity of normative claims
in non-normative facts. However, I have argued that some nature claims are already
normative and that these kinds of nature claims make clear a particularly important set of
reasons we have to comply with the normative claims of the theory. This is how
Nussbaum’s capabilities list needs to be understood. In articulating the capabilities as the
constitutive elements of a fully human, or “dignified,” life, Nussbaum makes clear the
reasons we have to protect and nourish these capacities. Her theory of human nature,
articulated through the capabilities list, makes clear the reasons it is good for agents to
live according to the liberal, feminist vision of flourishing she articulates.
In sum, I have argued (see chapter two) that flourishing-based ethics require a
concept of nature in general that is teleological in form. It is an important methodological
element in an adequately normative ethic of flourishing. On the basis of a normatively
flat, “empirical” conception of human nature, flourishing-based ethical theories suffer
from a serious kind of normative failure, failing to give agents adequate reasons to do or
live as the theory prescribes. In this and the previous chapter, I looked at two quite
different flourishing-based moral frameworks that I believe satisfy this basic requirement.
In the case of Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism, I argued that while
her appeal to human nature is properly situated within the theory, and Hursthouse
recognizes that our conception of human nature is normatively-saturated from the start
and shaped by an ethical perspective, the substantive conception of human nature
employed by Hursthouse is ultimately too “thin” to satisfy the needs of a feminist
eudaimonism. In the case of Martha Nussbaum’s flourishing-based capabilities approach,
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while the conception of human nature is adequately robust to sustain her politically
liberal vision of flourishing, Nussbaum fails to recognize the deep way in which the
conception of human nature to which she appeals is evaluative and shaped by the
politically liberal values to which she is committed. Because of this, Nussbaum at times
misconstrues the methodological role of human nature within a flourishing-based
framework and represents her account of human nature as though it were an empirically
discoverable matter of fact and something upon which we can expect broad agreement
independent of other disagreements over values and the proper ends of human life. This
ambiguity opens the capabilities approach to feminist criticism informed by an awareness
of theoretical problems of representation. I believe that addressing the Problem of
Representation as I’ve articulated it here depends upon an unambiguous
acknowledgement of the evaluative nature of the capabilities list, thereby making
transparent the nature and function of the appeal to nature within the flourishing-based
framework of the capabilities approach.
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CHAPTER 5

LISA TESSMAN’S BURDENED VIRTUES: HUMAN NATURE AS A CRITICAL
RESOURCE

1. Introduction
The relationship of this chapter to the argument as a whole is quite different than
the preceding. Lisa Tessman’s work in Burdened Virtues presents an implicit challenge to
the thesis defended here that a teleological conception of human nature is 1) necessary
and 2) can be a critical resource for naming and criticizing oppression within a
flourishing-based moral framework. While there are a number of feminist moral
philosophers appropriating the insights of Aristotelian eudaimonism for feminist use and
making inroads towards a distinctively feminist appropriation of a flourishing-based
moral framework, there are few engagements as sustained and novel Tessman’s. She
implies that one of the revisions feminists ought to make to Aristotle’s eudaimonism is to
avoid appealing to a theory of human nature to provide an account of flourishing. What
she substitutes instead is an account of flourishing implicit in the goals of liberatory
political communities. From this perspective, she argues, oppression inflicts a uniquely
moral harm on its victims by making necessary a set of “burdened virtues.” Substituting
the account of flourishing implicit in the goals of liberatory movements is an interesting
and provocative proposal, for it suggests a feminist flourishing-based framework might
avoid altogether contentious claims about human nature. However, as I will argue, it is
only given a specific conception of human nature that Tessman can defend her thesis that
the eudaimonist moral framework reveals a distinctively moral harm of oppression.
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Without the conception of human nature I identify as implicit in her perspective, Tessman
cannot defend the claim that oppression puts agents in the double-bind she claims to
name with the “burdened virtues.”
As I will demonstrate, Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues are “crosspressured,” susceptible to critique from two different directions. As such, her claims
about the burdened virtues sit in an unstable space, open to rejection on the grounds that
they are not truly “virtues” as well as on the grounds that they are not truly
“burdensome.” The conception of human nature I claim to find underlying the concept
makes it apparent why the burdened virtues are both “burdensome” and “virtues.” This is
important since if either claim falls, then so does Tessman’s argument that a eudaimonist
moral framework sheds light on the uniquely moral harms of oppression. Oppression
would still, of course, interfere with many external conditions of flourishing, but it would
not follow that oppression constitutes a unique harm to the moral, psychological
conditions of flourishing. In addition to defending her claims about the moral harms of
oppression, another benefit of embracing this conception of human nature is it would
enable Tessman to defend against the charge that her eudaimonism collapses into a form
of consequentialism. In this way, this chapter adds support to the argument of the
dissertation as a whole by showing what benefit a feminist eudaimonist gains from
endorsing a teleological conception of human nature.
My argument proceeds as follows: In section two, I lay out Tessman’s claim that
there are virtues unique to contexts of oppression. She calls these the “burdened virtues.”
Tessman has proposed revising Aristotle’s starting assumptions in order to make the
eudaimonism he articulates useful for feminist analysis, and I give these points special
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attention. In particular, I will show how she proposes to avoid reliance on controversial
claims about human nature to defend her conception of flourishing. In section three, I
explore the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X,
taking them as public spokespersons of the liberatory movement to which Tessman
appeals in order to have a working conception of flourishing. However, I argue there is
not sufficient unanimity about the concept of flourishing within this movement to
substantiate her claim that the character traits she calls “virtues” are genuine virtues. I
argue that the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm
X diverge in ways significant enough that Tessman must actually argue out the points
over which they differ in order to defend her claims about the burdened virtues.
Independent of the undefended assumptions about flourishing upon which she relies, the
character traits Tessman identifies as “burdened virtues” are either not “burdened”
because not psychologically damaging (Malcolm X’s position) or not “virtuous” because
not the ideal response (Martin Luther King’s position). In section four, I draw out the
significance of this argument, and show how embracing the conception of human nature
needed to sustain her claims about the burdened virtues strengthens Tessman’s case for
having identified an overlooked moral harm of oppression.

2. Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Oppression
In Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggle, Lisa Tessman brings
the eudaimonist perspective—that the acquisition of the virtues and the pursuit of the
good life are inseparable in human life—together with the moral demands of non-ideal
theory—that ethical theory must attend to and illuminate the experience of the
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oppressed.1 Tessman turns to the tradition of virtue ethics in order to provide a fuller
analysis of the moral states of selves under oppression, and she finds virtue ethics useful
for this task because it is agent-centered and foregrounds questions of character. Tessman
argues that by tying together the ideas of flourishing and moral goodness, a eudaimonist
perspective reveals oppression to be not only an impediment to freedom (which it often
is) but also an impediment to the attempt to become a morally good person, with the kind
of character that enables full human flourishing. If oppression can be shown to interfere
with good character, then eudaimonism will also provide a way of articulating the
uniquely moral harms of oppression. Tessman argues oppression does, in fact, disrupt the
relationship between virtue and flourishing by putting the agent in impossible situations
in which the best possible response (given the circumstances) is cultivating character
traits that undermine the psychological conditions of flourishing. She calls these traits
“burdened virtues.”
In this way, Tessman argues a eudaimonist moral framework reveals another
aspect of the “double-bind” oppression so characteristically entails. According to Marilyn
Frye, the most characteristic feature of oppression is its tendency to create a double-bind,
a situation in which “options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to
penalty, censure or deprivation.”2 As I will use the term—and I take this to be consistent
with Tessman’s usage as well—oppression names systemic injustice that affects
individuals, not as individuals per se, but as members of a group. As Marilyn Frye
1
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Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality (Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press, 1983), 2.
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observes in her classic analysis, “The root of the word ‘oppression’ is the element ‘press.’
. . . Something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers which
are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion
or mobility.”3 The experience of oppression is of “being caged in: all avenues, in every
direction, are blocked or booby trapped.”4 This speaks to the systemic nature of the harm,
but this systematic hemming in can come in a variety of forms. Iris Marion Young
identifies the five “faces” of oppression as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness,
cultural imperialism and violence. Though Young distinguishes oppression from
domination, which she defines as “institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people
from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions,”5
domination is often related to oppression, since it presses people into relationships in
which the constraints under which they act function to advantage and sustain undue
privilege accruing to another. While there are some commonalities amongst different
kinds of oppression (gender-based, race-based, class-based, etc.), it is useful to keep in
mind one need not experience, or experience the threat of, every “face” of oppression for
the category to apply.
The importance of character for responding to oppression and the possibility
character change is needed to overcome one’s own oppression has been recognized in
some feminist theory—particularly within the politics of personal transformation.6 Within
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the feminist movement, the politics of personal transformation seeks to understand and
correct for the ways women’s subordination is sustained and perpetuated through the
formation of women’s psychological dispositions to be, for example, reflexively
deferential,7 or to endorse sexist standards of femininity and beauty,8 or to be sexually
aroused by degrading images and sexual acts.9 It has been argued that one important
aspect of overcoming oppression requires rooting out sexist dispositions and cultivating
dispositions that align with feminist principles. This is important for two reasons. First,
being able to have emotional and attitudinal dispositions that align with one’s principles
is important for a kind of psychological integrity without which one’s psychological life
will be a jumble of warring desires and principles.10 Second, beyond the value of
psychological integrity for its own sake, psychological integrity has implications for
moral motivation. Having dispositions that conflict with one’s avowed principles will
present motivational obstacles to acting on one’s principles.11 On the other hand, having
dispositions consistent with one’s principles provides motivational support for acting in
accordance with one’s principles. Because of this, developing the kinds of psychological
traits that bring one’s dispositions into line with one’s principles is important for
empowering women to fight their own oppression.
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Tessman is one of a number of feminist theorists to have suggested that
eudaimonism may offer unique resources for providing an analysis of oppression.12 A
eudaimonist moral perspective brings attention to the kind of self one needs to be in order
to flourish. While this is present in the politics of personal transformation, Tessman
argues this movement has at times been too narrowly focused on changing dispositions
for the sake of motivating the kinds of actions needed to over-come oppression, and this
has obscured the harm the inculcation of the demanding traits and dispositions
recommended by this movement can do to the self who adopts them. Taking flourishing
lives as the ultimately goal of political resistance to oppression, what character traits
would we recommend either as instrumentally useful in surviving or fighting oppression
or constitutively necessary for realizing the kind of flourishing political resistance hopes
to achieve?
As a starting point for analyzing the moral state of selves confronting oppression,
Tessman favors Aristotle’s eudaimonism. She is attracted to the Aristotelian tradition of
virtue ethics precisely because it is eudaimonistic, maintaining that “the pursuit of
flourishing—qualified in certain ways and especially by the requirement that one develop
and maintain the virtues—is morally praiseworthy.”13 Furthermore, Aristotelian
eudaimonism acknowledges that although virtue is necessary for flourishing, virtue may
not be sufficient if the external conditions for flourishing are not present. Without
acknowledging the relevance of external conditions for flourishing, it is difficult to see
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how feminists would use a eudaimonist framework to give an analysis of the effects of
oppression.
Despite her optimism about the perspective afforded by a eudaimonist framework,
Tessman maintains that, for feminist purposes, there are a number of revisions to
Aristotle’s eudaimonism that are necessary. For one, traditional Aristotelian accounts of
the virtues assume agents are operating within a basically just social order. However, the
character traits that reliably promote human flourishing in a just social order may be
inadequate to deal with the struggles and challenges confronting agents in an unjust
social order.14 Therefore, a feminist eudaimonism should depart from Aristotle by
assuming non-ideal background conditions. If we assume a background social context
shaped by pervasive forms of systemic injustice, might there be other, non-standard
character traits we should consider to be “virtuous” in the pursuit of flourishing? Looking
to the politics of personal transformation, Tessman catalogues a number of traits that
have been identified by feminist and anti-racist theorists as virtues, useful for enabling
agents to either survive or resist their own oppression. These include courage, loyalty and
anger, among others. To the extent survival and resistance of oppression are necessary if
one is to have any hope of eventual flourishing, traits that would enable resistance and
survival have an important relationship to flourishing.
14
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To arrive at a table of virtues, Tessman proposes a feminist eudaimonism will
involve a methodological departure from Aristotle in working from a conception of
flourishing to a table of virtues, rather than as Aristotle does, beginning with a conception
of virtue and defining flourishing in its terms. As Tessman notes, “Flourishing, at least
for Aristotle, is defined in terms of virtue (NE 1098a16-17), which in turn is understood
as excellence of a specifically human function (NE 1097b22-1098a15).”15 At points, it
appears Aristotle actually starts from the beliefs of those who have been well-raised
about virtue and who the “virtuous” and “excellent” man is and what he does, and he
allows this to guide his judgment about the requirements of the best kind of life.16 While
he certainly conceptualizes flourishing in terms of the virtues, Aristotle also appeals to
human nature to support his account of flourishing, and the underlying idea is that we
must know what it is to be human in order to know what it is to live well as a human.
Aristotle appeals to the idea that there is a characteristically human function to forge this
link.17 In this way, excellent human functioning is constitutive of flourishing for
Aristotle. But whether argued for on the basis of common beliefs about the virtues, or by
appeal to human nature, the idea of flourishing for Aristotle is articulated through the
prior ideas of virtue and excellent functioning rather than the other way around.
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Methodologically, Tessman proposes to avoid “the sticky issue of a human
function”18 and to work in reverse: from a conception of human flourishing to a table of
the virtues instrumentally or constitutively necessary for achieving such a state. Tessman
acknowledges this methodology will be complicated and messy at points because of the
ways oppression disrupts the relationship between virtue and flourishing.19 Furthermore,
we will need a prior understanding of flourishing to get this method off the ground.
Tessman proposes a feminist eudaimonism might profitably take its conception of
flourishing from the implicit beliefs about flourishing found in the feminist and black
liberation movements of the 20th century. As she rightly observes,
Those fighting oppression must already hold certain implicit beliefs about
what a flourishing or good life is. Without some notion of what is a greater
18

Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 51. I interpret Tessman as pursuing, in the main, a strategy of avoidance
when it comes to questions of human nature. But because Tessman does not take an explicit stand on the
proper methodological role of human nature, it is difficult to see what her position is. (See also her remarks
at pg. 59, ftnt 8,) Interpreting her position is complicated by the fact that in her defense of the burdened
virtues Tessman actually does appeal to one very important claim about our nature: namely, that it is
fundamentally social. In Burdened Virtues, an appeal to human sociality is fundamental to Tessman’s
justification of other-regarding character traits as “virtues.” Following Aristotle’s lead, Tessman argues
flourishing is impossible without other-regarding virtues because as social beings, we are dependent on
others to achieve our own good. (For explicit recognition that this is the argumentative strategy in
Burdened Virtues, see her “Reply to Critics,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2008).)
We need at least a minimum of other-regarding virtues such as justice, generosity and loyalty to sustain our
collective social life. But Tessman thinks the needs of our social, interdependent nature can be fulfilled
without the other-regarding virtues being extended to all others. One might restrict the exercise of otherregarding virtues to members of one’s own “tribe” (however conceived), and thereby realize the flourishing
of an exclusive as opposed to an inclusive social collectivity. So, although Tessman is willing to take a
stand against the individualistic atomism that would make egoism a real strategy for human flourishing, she
must think that a more robustly evaluative conception of human nature as only capable of fulfillment in a
genuinely inclusive social order is indefensible. I suspect she is trying to avoid what she perceives as
“controversial” claims about human nature, and Aristotelian sociality—within certain intellectual circles—
is so widely accepted that she feels entitled to this assumption but not to anything more. Like Hursthouse,
what Tessman needs, but does not have, is a substantive conception of human nature. She is already
committed to a thin, teleological conception of human nature as only capable of having its needs met in an
exclusive social collectivity. My argument here is that her moral vision depends on going further.
19
In circumstances of institutionalized social injustice, flourishing may be completely out of reach. In this
case, the ideal is out of reach and the question becomes instead, “Given these circumstances, what is best?”
We look, then, not for the best traits, but for the second-best, and second-best might be something that
would never be choiceworthy, but for the circumstances. What is choiceworthy and desirable in an
oppressive social context might be akin to Aristotle’s “mixed actions,” (EN, Bk III, i) something no one
would choose but for the dire conditions. (See Tessman’s illuminating discussion of this in Burdened
Virtues, 109-114). Oppression disrupts the relationship between virtue and flourishing when the best traits
to cultivate, given the circumstances, still do not conduce to flourishing.

245
rather than a less degree of flourishing or, put differently, a better rather
than a worse sort of life, one would not have any basis for objecting to
oppression; one would not struggle for social changes if one did not
believe the changes to be for the good.20
One of the most important aspects of a flourishing life identified within these
movements, and one I will return to later, is psychological health. Implicit concern for
psychological health is shown through the persistent concern to understand and find ways
to protect against or remedy the psychological damage inflicted by oppression. Of
particular importance here is the concept of ‘psychological oppression’ where the
oppressed come to internalize judgments about their own inferiority.21 This can lead to
the belief that the unjust treatment they receive is justified. Tessman also lists as possible
indicators of psychic damage “a tendency to feel guilt or resignation instead of anger
when one is wronged, a disposition to feel persistent hopelessness, a habit of
manipulating or lying to others, a lack of self-confidence.”22
In contrast, at least part of what psychological health entails is an accurate
estimation of one’s own worth and dignity. In order to achieve such a state, one would
have to avoid internalizing dominant narratives that imply one’s own worthlessness or
general insignificance in comparison with others.23 Psychological health would also seem
to entail a certain degree of hope, or at least not despair. In manifesting a concern to
overcome psychic damage and realize a state of psychological health, activists and
theorists in both the feminist and black liberation movement have embraced
psychological health as an important aspect of the kind of life they are striving to make
possible.
20
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Finally, Tessman believes feminists will need to not only recognize the
insufficiency of virtue for flourishing, as Aristotle does, but they will need to emphasize
the ways virtue will be insufficient for flourishing in a context of oppression that is
constantly disrupting the relationship between virtue and flourishing.24
Following upon the changes to classical eudaimonism, what emerges from
Tessman’s analysis is disturbing to say the least. What emerges is a set of virtues that,
despite being either necessary for surviving oppression or praiseworthy in manifesting
moral opposition to oppression, are detrimental to the flourishing of their bearer. They
are detrimental primarily because they are incompatible with the psychological health
and well-being of their bearer. Tessman calls such virtues the “burdened virtues” to
signal the fact that, despite being praiseworthy in a certain respect and thus virtuous, they
come with a significant cost to their bearer.
How does Tessman arrive at this conclusion? Starting with an Aristotelian
conception of virtue as a character trait that either conduces to or is constitutive of the
flourishing of its bearer, Tessman argues that in a context of oppression, character traits
that contribute to the survival of their possessor (a minimum requirement of flourishing)
or to the resistance of oppression (and hence to eventual flourishing) will count as
virtues. A number of character traits have been recommended by feminist and critical
race theorists as useful for surviving or resisting oppression. Of particular note are
courage, loyalty and anger. Tessman gives extended attention to each of these as
paradigmatically “burdened virtues.”25 I will focus here just on anger.
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There are a number of feminist theorists who have developed an analysis of anger
as having a significant role to play in resisting oppression. According to Marilyn Frye,
anger disrupts the narrative framework of male supremacy that says women do not merit
respect outside of the sphere of concerns proper to womanhood. Anger is often
represented as unjustified if it is a woman’s anger on her own behalf in response to
denigrations or denials of her competence, rights, autonomy, or interests. Anger at
injustice can function as an assertion of one’s status in the face of the denial of that status
because anger “claims that one is in certain ways and dimensions respectable. One makes
claims upon respect.”26 Whether it gets uptake or not, anger registers at least the belief
one has a legitimate claim on respect that is being ignored. On a related note, Elizabeth
Spelman elucidates the insubordination inherent in some expressions of anger. A
woman’s anger expressed at a man in response to the perception of having been wronged
communicates that she regards herself as a legitimate judge of his conduct: “If he is in
other ways regarded as my superior, when I get angry at him I at least on that occasion
am regarding him as no more and no less than my equal. So my anger is in such a case an
act of insubordination. . . .”27 Understood this way, the failure to get angry when one has
been disrespected may itself be symptomatic of psychological oppression, indicating
either a failure to perceive oneself as valuable and worthy of respect or a failure to
recognize this kind of treatment as disrespectful.
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Anger may also be useful epistemically for gaining knowledge of oppression and
of its costs.28 Diana Tietjens Meyers develops the idea of “heterodox moral perception,”
which she believes can be facilitated through the experience of anger. Meyers does not
advise that women attempt to become chronically angry, but she does advocate that
oppositional groups attend carefully to people who already are: “If social groups were
organized to seize upon claims kindled by hypersensitivity, paranoia, anger, and
bitterness and to give them a good airing and a fair hearing, insightful moral perception
might be greatly increased and emancipation might be hastened.”29
On an Aristotelian understanding, the person who gets angry at injustice is
virtuous so long as his anger is directed “at the right things and with the right people, and
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought.”30 As Tessman observes,
feminist understandings (as articulated above) of the proper role of anger are compatible
in many ways with Aristotle’s understanding of anger. “Anger, for Aristotle, is a feeling
of pain at being unjustifiably harmed by another, especially if one is harmed by being
slighted, that is, denied the respect that one deserves. . . .”31 Additionally, Tessman thinks
the uses of anger mentioned above might be conformable to the thought that virtue is a
mean that avoids extremes. Tessman recounts the various ways in which feminists
advocating the importance of anger have cautioned against the danger of it being
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misdirected toward other subordinated persons,32 or of it being excessive and thereby
unjustified.33 It needs to be directed at the right person and in the right way.
But if there is a kind of anger that communicates a demand to be respected as one
ought to be, and this can be considered virtuous, there is another kind of anger Tessman
judges to be more problematic. This is the kind of anger María Lugones has called
“second-level anger.” The kind of anger discussed thus far she calls “first-level” anger.
The intent of first-level anger is communicative. Through it, subordinated peoples
attempt to “communicate their refusal to accept subordination and their demand of
respect for themselves as moral agents.”34 Lugones describes how second-level anger is
quite different, and when it expresses itself “the gestures are wild or extremely hieratic,
contained; the voice loud; the use of space extensive; the body flushed.”35 Second-level
anger does not aim to be communicative, in part, because it is a total rejection of the
“world of sense” within which the relations of subordination that have inspired this anger
exist. When anger is permitted to take on such huge proportions, Tessman calls it
“separatist anger,” and she maintains its radical potential lies in its “very refusal to be
toned down or moderated.”36 A form of anger like this is appropriately described as rage.
Such rage is imagined to exist, when it does, perpetually beneath the surface. It need not
always be manifest in the way Lugones described above, but the idea is that, everpresent, it could become manifest.
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If the purpose of such anger is not to communicate, what good or purpose is this
kind of anger supposed to achieve? Tessman suggests cultivating this kind of anger may
make one capable of sustaining a “refusal to extend any sympathy toward those whom
one must politically oppose.”37 Such a consistent and principled refusal to sympathize
with another human being will run counter to most people’s dispositions and will
therefore be very difficult to consistently sustain over and against the evidence of
humanity in one’s oppressors (particularly in the face of their vulnerability, pain, and
emotional suffering). But Tessman maintains this might be necessary in some
circumstances, and for this purpose rage might be considered a virtue, useful for resisting
oppression.38
It is harder to square such an extreme state with the Aristotelian understanding of
virtue being 1) a mean between extremes that 2) expresses the proper response on the part
of the agent. Of course, by a “mean,” Aristotle does not necessarily intend a moderate
state. He gives the example of Milo, the wrestler, who, by comparison with most people,
eats an incredibly large amount of food. However, the proper amount of food, not too
little and not too much, relative to the situation in which Milo finds himself—engaged in
rigorous, daily training—is an extremely large amount of food when compared to other
people not so situated. The mean for Milo is quite a bit more than would be healthy for
other people not in his situation.39
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Where oppression names injustice that is systematic and institutionally enforced
and therefore pervasive, what does the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean prescribe?
Tessman points out, “It can be confusing to evaluate anger of enormous proportions, for
under conditions of unrelenting injustice, such anger can be characterized (surprisingly)
as a deficiency even as it appears as an excess; there may be no moderate state that
allows one to be angry all the times one ought to be.”40 Given the magnitude and
pervasiveness of the oppressive forces, anything but a proportional and unrelenting anger
can seem inadequate, since with anything less one is not being angry at all the times one
ought. On the other hand, an unrelenting anger is likely to be excessive when evaluated in
relationship to the psychological well-being and capacity of the agent to bear such anger.
Thus, even though “proper anger,” given the circumstances, might be something like
rage, it is highly probable this is going to be excessive and harmful for the person who is
so angry.
Thinking again about Milo, Tessman wryly observes, “While Milo presumably is
able to metabolize his supersized meals—so that the food is actually good for his
health—it is far from likely that raging political resisters can metabolize their anger.”41 If
systemic injustice calls for an all-pervasive rage that habituates the oppressed into the
ability to refuse sympathy to their oppressors, it is hard to see how such anger would not
be corrosive to the person who embodies it.
Tessman maintains that such an extreme kind of anger is preferable to worse
states, such as resignation or depression, but it is difficult to imagine such a seething rage
figuring in a full, flourishing human life. Thus, rage is a paradigmatically “burdened
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virtue,” a “morally praiseworthy trait that is at the same time bad for its bearer,
disconnected from its bearer’s well-being.”42 “Burdened virtues” emerge from within
circumstances that require the oppressed to develop character traits necessary either for
survival or well-being in the present (for example, a lack of anger would seem to imply
an acceptance of one’s own inferiority or that one deserves the treatment received) or for
helping their possessor to fight to overcome the injustices they face (for example, anger
might be useful for motivating on-going resistance or for maintaining an unsympathetic
resolve). But “burdened virtues” are, in another respect, disjoined from their bearer’s
flourishing because they harm a person’s psychological capacity for flourishing. The kind
of person one becomes in the course of inculcating these traits is a kind of person for
whom full human flourishing will be out of reach. Furthermore, because we are
imagining the inculcation of stable psychological dispositions that affect one’s
perceptive, affective and cognitive responsivity to the world, we are imagining changing
the self in ways that will not be easily “undone” or easily repaired. Having sensitized
oneself to injustice to the point that one is capable of sustaining a chronic state of anger,
one may not be able to “turn it off.” To call rage a “virtue” implies it is the best response
possible given the situation, but—as this analysis suggests—the best that is possible may
not be very good. For Tessman, rage is a candidate for virtue because it manifests a noble
opposition to oppression and because it is useful for political resistance, but it is a
character trait she also thinks is psychologically damaging. Because the burdened virtues,
such as rage, harm a person’s psychological capacity for flourishing, burdened virtues
might also be considered a form of moral damage.
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In light of this, Tessman argues that a critical virtue ethics, which is attentive to
the dynamics of oppression and operating out of a eudaimonist perspective, gives rise to a
powerful argument demonstrating an overlooked moral harm of oppression. If the
requirements of flourishing in a given social context demand that certain people cultivate
burdened virtues as a way of surviving and resisting their own oppression, then
oppression constitutes not only an external barrier to flourishing but an internal barrier as
well, since the selves politically resistant, oppressed peoples are required to become are
selves that are incapable of full human flourishing.43
To summarize: Rage, on Tessman’s account is a ‘virtue’ because it is
praiseworthy in manifesting a noble opposition to one’s own oppression but
‘burdensome’ from a eudaimonist perspective because it interferes with the psychological
conditions of personal flourishing. Insofar as the purpose of the virtues is to enable
flourishing lives and the character traits required by a context of oppression work against
flourishing, the agent is doubly harmed by oppression: both the internal and the external
conditions of flourishing are disrupted.
How should we evaluate Tessman’s claim to identify a set of character traits,
praiseworthy in contexts of oppression and therefore deserving of our approbation and
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yet constituting a form of damage to their bearers? The burdened virtues are neither
desirable nor choiceworthy from the perspective of the ideal world that politically
resistant selves hope to realize in the fight for justice and equality, free from the overt
domination or covert coercion that are so pervasive in our world. And so, from the
perspective of flourishing, it can seem positively anti-eudaimonist to call these traits
“virtues.” The burdened virtues may be instrumentally valuable for promoting or securing
good states of affairs, but they create internal barriers to flourishing. Recognizing this and
yet recommending them raises the question of what work the eudaimonic perspective is
really doing.44 It appears that the burdened virtues are regarded as virtues rather than
vices on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis where the eventual benefits to be realized in
terms of good states of affairs are judged to outweigh the harms imposed by the burdened
virtues themselves. This would seem to be a consequentialist analysis of virtue. As
Tessman presents it, the category of a “burdened virtue” seems to threaten to collapse a
eudaimonist analysis of the virtues into a consequentialist analysis.
Additionally, accepting Tessman’s conclusion means embracing a deeply tragic
view of the world, since the situation of the oppressed is much worse than is generally
recognized. The double-bind with which the oppressed are faced on Tessman’s account is
deeply disturbing. The burdened virtues are both the best that is possible and
psychologically damaging. Given the conception of flourishing implicit in the liberatory
movements to which she points, are these traits the best that is possible? It is this claim
especially that merits careful scrutiny.
First, to call these traits “virtues” is to recommend them. One might make this
recommendation with the recognition that they are something to be regretted, but
44
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nevertheless see them as the best that is possible, given the horrors with which a person
must cope. All of this acknowledged, to call the “burdened virtues,” “virtues” is to
recommend them.45
Second, endorsing the idea of a ‘burdened virtue’ and recommending them for
contexts of oppression is potentially perilous. The claim these troublesome traits are the
best that is possible depends upon the claim there are no other better alternatives
available. For if there are other alternatives that we have overlooked, and some people
take us at our word, voluntarily adopting the traits we are recommending as the “best
possible,” then we who have recommended them will be morally responsible for the
burdens they incur. Our blindness to alternatives will be partly responsible for their
consequent inability to flourish. Acknowledging this should not distract us from the fact
that the root of the problem is the systems of oppression that put agents in situations
where it is so difficult to know how to properly respond. But I do say this to bring the full
gravity of the situation to the fore. The burdened virtues are supposed to provide trait
guidance, and recommending a morally damaging course of character formation is
dangerous.
This raises the question: Are there alternative characterological responses to
oppression that have been overlooked? Are there alternative visions of flourishing in light
of which these alternative responses would be deemed the “appropriate” or “best”
response possible? While not challenging Tessman’s choice to take her conception of
flourishing from the goals implicit in the liberatory movements of the 20th century, I do
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want to examine “the goals” of this movement more carefully. The goals of various
factions of this movement were not in fact monolithic or even potentially harmonious and
this suggests there were different, even competing, visions of flourishing internal to the
liberatory movement Tessman takes as the cornerstone of her analysis. In the next
section, I will compare the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Malcolm X, taking them as spokespersons who were uniquely articulate about the
goals and purposes of two important factions of the black liberation movement in the
United States.46 While Martin and Malcolm shared many things in common (that often
went unrecognized), the differences in their views about black liberation and
flourishing—and hence the goals they set—were not inconsequential. I will argue
Tessman’s own view is identical to neither. This suggests she must be working with her
own conception of flourishing. Furthermore, maintaining her own position against Martin
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and Malcolm presupposes a certain view of human nature, a view that I will argue is not
shared by either Martin or Malcolm.47
In the conclusion, I’ll suggest what I think this view of human nature must be. If
Tessman is willing to embrace this, two consequences follow: the status of the burdened
virtues as both burdensome and virtues can be more clearly articulated and defended,
and, in the course of doing so, we see what resources Tessman has to avoid the charge
that introducing the category of “burdened virtues” threatens to collapse her eudaimonist
perspective into a consequentialist one. Once we see the way Tessman’s claims about the
burdened virtues depend upon a certain account of human nature, we can also see how
human nature serves as a resource for defending claims about the damage inflicted by
oppression. In this way, this chapter provides further support to the central thesis of this
dissertation, that within a flourishing-based moral framework, human nature is a critical
resource for articulating and defending feminist claims about the moral harms of
oppression.

3. Malcolm and Martin: Two Visions of Flourishing
The twentieth-century black freedom movement in the United States was powered
by a variety of different (and sometimes competing) intellectual commitments,
commitments that were philosophical, religious, cultural and historical in nature. These
commitments found expression predominantly in two political philosophies:
integrationism and separatism (otherwise known as nationalism). We can take Martin
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Luther King, Jr. as representative of the integrationist branch and Malcolm X as
representative of the separatist branch of the black freedom movement, since both were
widely recognized as public spokespersons for these two philosophies.
Martin and Malcolm were often depicted as standing in diametrical opposition to
one another (especially by the white media), so it is important to recognize at the outset
of any discussion of these two figures that they ultimately came to share much in
common. About their differences, Malcolm said:
All of our people have the same goals, the same objective. That objective
is freedom, justice and equality. All of us want recognition and respect as
human beings. We don’t want to be integrationists. Nor do we want to be
separationists. We want to be human beings.48
Martin and Malcolm gave their lives to the black freedom struggle, and the way Malcolm
ultimately came to see their differences and disagreements is significant. James H. Cone,
Lewis V. Baldwin, and other scholars who emphasize the complementarity of Malcolm
and Martin are probably correct to insist that what we have to learn about freedom and
the quest for human dignity from these two leaders will come from synthesizing their
insights rather than blindly following one and rejecting the other.49 However, while what
Malcolm said (quoted above) is true, to cast their relationship as a mere disagreement
over means papers over significant differences in the ways Malcolm and Martin thought
about the world that could realize meaningful freedom, equality, justice, and respect for
black persons given their history in America and the ongoing reality of entrenched racial
prejudice. These terms are not totally empty, and there are real ways Martin and

48

Malcolm X, Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements, ed. George Breitman (New York:
Pathfinder, 1965; repr., 1989), 51.
49
James H. Cone, Martin & Malcolm & America: a Dream or a Nightmare (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
1991); Lewis V. Baldwin and Amiri Yasin Al-Hadid, Between Cross and Crescent: Christian and Muslim
Perspectives on Malcolm and Martin (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002).

259
Malcolm’s positions converged at the end of their lives,50 but what I want to stress is at
the height of their influence, they gave voice to quite different visions of black liberation,
and these differing visions imply significantly different character traits as virtues in the
struggle. In particular, I will focus on their different conceptions of psychological health
and damage. When it comes to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of these
competing visions of liberation, and the traits their visions called for, understanding the
underlying convictions about human nature are crucial for making a reasonable judgment.
As James H. Cone has described, Martin’s vision centered on integration, insisted
on nonviolence and idealized agape love—even to the point of love of enemy—as the
basis of self-respect. Malcolm’s vision, by contrast, centered on separation, insisted on
the right of every person to self-defense, and idealized self-love as the basis of selfrespect.51
I will discuss Martin’s vision first, then Malcolm’s in order to show that they do
not share a single concept of flourishing.
Martin’s liberatory vision centered on the goal of an ‘integrated society,’ which
he often called ‘the beloved community.’ His ideal of integration went beyond mere
desegregation, and its realization depended on “the welcome acceptance of Negroes into
the total range of human activities.”52 Desegregation without integration would represent
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a society in which “elbows are together and hearts are apart.”53 Integration’s goal was
redemption, reconciliation, friendship and understanding between whites and blacks.54 As
such, integration expressed the ideal of true community between persons, and its
realization depended on the recognition of the worth and dignity of every person.
Nonviolence was the nonnegotiable means to this end.
Martin believed it would be totally impossible to achieve the beloved community
through violent means. Directed at oppressors, it would not bring about repentance, only
further bitterness and hatred; thus, violence would only continue the cycle of hatredviolence-hatred, further preventing reconciliation, which was what was truly needed to
bring about the beloved community. Second, Martin believed that the discipline of
nonviolence makes public the dignity and courage of the resister, thus inspiring selfrespect and commanding respect from others.
The nonviolence approach does not immediately change the heart of the
oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those
committed to it. It gives them self-respect; it calls up resources of strength
and courage that they did not know they had. Finally it reaches the
opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality.
I suggest this approach because I think it is the only way to reestablish the
broken community.55
Martin speaks of nonviolence as “thwarting the growth of bitterness” even as it gives an
avenue of positive action to “long-repressed feelings of anger and frustration.”56 While
violence directed at persons is a pragmatic denial of their value, nonviolence “exalts the
personality of the segregator as well as the segregated.”57
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The realization of the beloved community, nonviolent resistance, and the respect
for persons upon which these were predicated, were intimately connected for Martin to
the ideal of agape love—the love of God for all human beings operating in the human
heart—which enables us to love even our enemies. Love of one’s enemies in this case
meant love of white segregationists and white supremacists who were behind the
bombing of churches, the terrorizing of black communities, and the mistreatment of
nonviolent demonstrators. Martin tried to distinguish agape love from sentimental liking
or affectionate emotion. “It would be nonsense to ask men to love their oppressors in an
affectionate sense,” said Martin. What I am talking about “means understanding,
redeeming good will for all men, an ever-owing love which seeks nothing in return. . . . It
is the love of God operating in the human heart.”58
Martin taught that this kind of love was fully consistent with “loving the person
who does the evil deed, while hating the deed that the person does.”59 This kind of love
did not require liking, but it did require resisting hatred. Hatred, Martin said, “is as
injurious to the hater as it is to the hated. It distorts the personality and scars the soul.”60
The beauty of nonviolence was that it provided a creative channel not only for the
sort of anger at injustice that was appropriate—Martin called such anger “sound and
healthy”61—but also for the active opposition to injustice that was morally necessitated,
since he saw doing nothing to oppose injustice as itself a form of evil-doing.62 The
challenge lay in keeping appropriate anger at injustice from boiling over into anger at and
hatred of the person committing the injustice. Martin always associates hatred with the
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desire to see others suffer and the willingness to do violence, but since he believed
violence could only end in more violence and could never bring about the true justice and
true peace, which were the foundation of the beloved community, hatred had to be
avoided.
Rooted in the Christian tradition, his antidote to hatred was love—even to the
point of love of one’s enemies—and for Martin this implied that one must be willing to
accept suffering rather than to inflict suffering on others. Speaking on this point, Martin
said,
To suffer in a righteous cause is to grow to our humanity’s full stature. If
only to save himself from bitterness, the Negro needs the vision to see the
ordeals of this generation as the opportunity to transfigure himself and
American society.63
Martin’s belief that unearned suffering could be redemptive may be the hardest aspect of
his philosophy to follow. Malcolm certainly could not.
Whereas Martin’s liberatory vision of black flourishing involved integration,
nonviolent resistance to injustice and love of one’s enemies, Malcolm’s vision of
flourishing called for the separation of blacks from whites, an absolute commitment to
the right of self-defense and the principle of black self-love.
Malcolm believed separation from whites and unity between blacks was a precondition to any (possible, eventual) integration with whites.64 Separatism was, in his
mind, essential for black people to learn to love and respect themselves and to stop

63

Washington, A Testament of Hope, 487.
Cone, Martin & Malcolm & America, 109. According to James Cone, Malcolm “contended that there
could be no unity among the different races based on equality until there was first a unity of particular races
among their own kind. . . . Integration with whites, therefore, could only mean disunity among blacks. It
could only mean black people wanting to be like and with white people and not like and with themselves”
(109).
64

263
accepting a value hierarchy that placed black lives at “the bottom of the pile.” According
to James H. Cone,
Malcolm totally disagreed with Martin’s identification of freedom with
integration. Integration meant begging whites to accept blacks. . . . Insofar
as Martin equated freedom with the recognition of the dignity and worth
of black people as human beings, Malcolm regarded him as an ally. They
parted company when Martin advocated that integration with whites
would bring about self-respect for blacks. Malcolm regarded that belief as
nonsense. Black people, he contended, would never be regarded as human
beings as long as that regard was dependent upon their association with
white people. If whites can be human without being integrated with
blacks, then blacks can be human without associating with whites.65
As Malcolm understood it, the desire to integrate was itself a sign of self-hatred and
symptomatic of a damaged black psyche.66 “Any Negro trying to integrate is actually
admitting his inferiority, because he is admitting that he wants to become a part of a
‘superior’ society,” Malcolm said.67
For Malcolm, a righteous rage at injustice and at those who perpetrated it was a
genuinely indispensable weapon in the fight to overcome oppression. First, he saw it as
the only appropriate response to the blatant disregard for black life that suffused white
society. He “could not understand how anyone could be a human being and not be angry
about what white people had done to black people in America.”68 And, second, he saw
black rage as a necessary catalyst for psychic transformation. According to Cornel West,
“Malcolm X’s notion of psychic conversion depends on the idea that black spaces, in
which black community, humanity, love, care, concern, and support flourish, will emerge
from a boiling black rage.”69 Through his rhetoric Malcolm sought to inspire the black
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rage that would re-kindle the embers of black self-love and bring about a psychic
transformation leading to self-respect. Malcolm was proud to be known as the “angriest
Negro in America.”70
Malcolm became most critical of Martin when Martin called on blacks to exhibit
love by “turning the other cheek” and rejecting violence, even violence in self-defense.71
Malcolm believed that, as a person, one had a moral right to defend one’s life, by any
means necessary. “He did not believe that one could be a person without defending his or
her life.”72 Hence, to deny a person this right was to make them a non-person. Malcolm
saw Martin’s teaching of non-violent resistance in a context of overt white hostility as
essentially an attack on the personhood of blacks. Malcolm went so far as to call this
teaching “a crime.”73 One of the major obstacles to Malcolm’s joining with Martin in the
civil rights coalition was his principled commitment to the right of self-defense. Many
others were willing to commit to nonviolent resistance as a practical tool, even though
they were not committed in principle to nonviolence, the way Martin was. On principle,
Malcolm would not. This makes sense if Malcolm saw non-violence as an attack on
personhood and not just an ineffective means.
Now, let me put a point on the differences we’ve seen. When we look at the
visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, we see their
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disagreements were not just over means to an agreed-upon end. It is true they both sought
human freedom and dignity and respect for black people as human beings, but they had
substantively different conceptions of what it was to be fully human and, hence, of what
is was to flourish as a human being. Thus, they had different ideas of what would realize
meaningful freedom, dignity and respect. What Martin saw as a condition of healing for
the black psyche, Malcolm saw as pathological. For example, Martin pursued integration
because he thought the self-respect of black people in America depended (at least in part)
on their being accepted as full, participating members of society. Malcolm saw the desire
to integrate into white society as itself symptomatic of black self-hatred, and therefore a
sign of psychic damage.
On the other hand, what Malcolm saw as an assertion of one’s humanity, Martin
saw as an indication of the true depth of one’s despair. This is exemplified in their
attitudes toward violence in self-defense. Malcolm held that in the nature of what it is to
be a person—a human being with moral standing—is the right to freedom and selfdefense. He thought the call to repudiate violence was dehumanizing. Malcolm was no
philosopher, but it is revealing that he called blacks who endorsed Martin’s teaching in
this regard “subhuman.”74 Malcolm believed that, as a person, one had a moral right to
defend one’s life and freedom, by any means necessary. Martin, on the other hand, held
that the nobility of our humanity was revealed precisely in the refusal of violence. To
voluntarily “suffer in a righteous cause is to grow to our humanity’s full stature,”75 he
said. And while anger at the injustice was most certainly appropriate, one had to resist
hatred for the person and instead (somehow) maintain an attitude of “redeeming good
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will”76 toward the oppressor in the face of injustice. To be violent was a symptom of true
despair.
It is difficult to see how one could judge between these two different visions
without taking some stand on the questions that underlie Malcolm and Martin’s
differences: questions of human fulfillment, the requirements of psychological health,
and what it is to be fully human—in short, on questions of human nature. While one
might have gut-instincts about which of these is better, or why neither is acceptable,
giving an account of this requires sifting the sorts of considerations that gave the
psychologist Kenneth Clark—a friend of both Martin and Malcolm—pause over
endorsing either.
‘On the surface, King’s philosophy appears to reflect health and stability,
while the black nationalists betray pathology and instability. A deeper
analysis, however, might reveal that there is also an unrealistic, if not
pathological, basis in King’s doctrine. It is questionable whether the
masses of an oppressed group can in fact “love” their oppressor. The
natural reactions to injustice, oppression, and humiliation are bitterness
and resentment. The form which such bitterness takes need not be overtly
violent but the corrosion of the human spirit which is involved seems
inevitable. It would seem, then, that any demand that the victims of
oppression be required to love those who oppress them places an
additional and probably intolerable psychological burden upon these
victims.77
Clark suspects that Martin’s call to love one’s enemies is an unrealistic ideal, given
human nature. Clark does not appear to believe it is totally unrealistic to think some
human beings could be capable of understanding and healthfully implementing the kind
of love Martin calls for, but whether the majority could is another question. Clark was
particularly concerned that without a pretty high degree of philosophical sophistication to
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distinguish between the agape love Martin called for and the emotion popularly
associated with the word “love,” the suffering of the masses under Martin’s moral
influence would be compounded as they condemned themselves for their moral failure to
“love their enemies.”78
If love is not a realistic ideal, the psychologically healthy response to oppression
might rather be akin to what the psychologists William Grier and Price Cobbs describe in
Black Rage: anger manifests the will of the oppressed to overcome. Grier and Cobbs
describe anger as healthy in so far as it represents a move beyond a state of depression or
dejected resignation. “When the mourner lashes out in anger, it is a relief to those who
love him, for they know he has now returned to health.”79 This suggests that those
advocating rage as a virtue of resistance do not see it as psychologically harmful. It may
actually be a sign of psychological health. This seems to be how Malcolm regarded
anger.

4. Conclusion
The disagreements between Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X rest not only
on differing judgments about the best means to achieve their ends, but different
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judgments about human nature and human flourishing—particularly the features of a
healthy black psychology. Recognizing this is significant, since Tessman’s claims about
the burdened virtues depend on the claim that they are both ideal for us and
psychologically damaging for us. Tessman is making two distinct claims when she argues
that rage—particularly the type that could propel the separatist movement championed by
Malcolm X—is a burdened virtue. First, anger of this magnitude is a morally
praiseworthy response to oppression and injustice, and given the circumstances, it is the
ideal response. Second, this kind of anger is psychologically unhealthy and incompatible
with full human flourishing. The thought that anger of this order would be
psychologically damaging is intuitively plausible, and I think Martin Luther King, Jr.
would agree, but of course, he would not accept that rage is a virtue. Malcolm X would
accept that rage can be a virtue, but contrary to Tessman, he does not see it as
psychologically harmful. He thinks it is a sign of psychological health. So in Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s view rage is psychologically damaging but not a virtue, while in
Malcolm X’s view rage is a virtue but not intrinsically damaging. In Tessman’s view,
rage is a virtue, and it is psychologically damaging. This suggests that Tessman is not
simply adopting the vision of flourishing implicit in the liberatory movement of which
Martin and Malcolm were both a part, but that she, like them, has her own conception of
flourishing. This allows her to judge—contrary to both of them—that anger is both (1)
the best response possible, given the circumstances, and (2) psychologically damaging.
This is the point at which underlying claims about human nature are inescapable,
and being clear about these claims is important for defending one’s conception of
flourishing and sustaining claims about oppression and the harm it causes. On the one
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hand, inculcating the burdened virtue of rage can only be the best possible response in
these very bad circumstances if Martin Luther King, Jr. is wrong in at least one respect.
He must be wrong to think there is a better alternative response available in love. For he
thinks oppression can be overcome through love, and if this is true, then there is an
alternative response that is better than anger because it enables the agent to resist
oppression—and thereby do what is morally praiseworthy—without incurring the terrible
consequences that rage entails. On the other hand, in order for Tessman’s account of rage
as a psychologically damaging “burden” to hold up, Malcolm X must also be wrong in at
least one respect. He must be wrong to think rage is a sign of psychological health.
For the burdened virtues to hold up, it needs to be the case that rage really is
psychologically damaging for human beings, and yet it is the best possible response in
these situations. This could be true if Martin’s ideal of love is psychologically unrealistic
for most people and setting love of enemy as the ideal is going to backfire by, for
example, inducing an excessive and damaging form of guilt when we inevitably fail or
else by introducing or depending upon some other kind of pathology. This is, essentially,
the worry Clark raises. For the category of a “burdened virtue” to hold up under scrutiny,
human nature must be such that no better response is possible (all the other alternative
being either unrealistic or introducing even more devastating consequences), and yet the
best that is possible is very bad, given our psychological constitution, and how it will
affect us.
One who is generally sympathetic to the idea that rage is the appropriate and
virtuous response to gross systemic injustice, many want to hold on to the idea that the
kind of anger called for in these circumstances is an anger the effects of which can be
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mitigated. Wouldn’t it be possible to be appropriately angry, but self-monitor and
disengage when needed for the purpose of self-care? In this way, anger could be endorsed
as a virtue, and yet the worst effects on the self might be mitigated. Suggestions like this
can be understood as a variant on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s position. He takes a certain
kind of anger at injustice to be appropriate and virtuous—there is an anger he calls
“sound and healthy.” However, one’s anger must be managed so that it is directed at acts
of injustice rather than at persons. On Martin’s view, one avoids the corrosive effects of
anger by maintaining love and a redeeming good will for the person who commits the
injustice. Notice that both of these positions present anger as virtuous, but this kind of
anger is not a burdened virtue because it lies in a space that is not psychologically
damaging.
Tessman’s claim to have identified in the burdened virtues a uniquely moral harm
of oppression depends upon the claim that the best possible response to oppression lies in
a space that involves deep psychological harm. Any response, akin to the above, that
would suggest the best response to oppression is one that (somehow or other) mitigates
the psychological harms of the response is actually a denial of Tessman’s claim that the
situation of the oppressed is one of tragedy where the best possible response is also
deeply damaging. If the best possible response is not in fact so damaging, the oppressed
are still harmed by oppression in manifold other ways, but their situation vis-à-vis
character formation is not as dire as Tessman’s analysis implies.
Thus, Tessman’s analysis of the burdened virtues depends upon accepting a
certain interpretation of our nature, one that situates human beings in an intermediate
space of possibility in which the best that it is possible for us to achieve, given our
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constitution, is also deeply damaging, given our constitution. How we understand the
nature and extent of the double-bind(s) that oppression so characteristically creates
depends in no small measure on a prior set of judgments about our nature, on what we
take to be our limits and capabilities, and hence, on what is desirable and attainable for
beings such as we are.
When it comes to theorizing, making one’s understanding of human nature
explicit may help to resolve some disagreements about the nature and extent of
oppression, but it may have little effect on others. In the latter kinds of cases, making
these issues about human nature explicit will only make explicit another source of
disagreement between the parties. Given alternative understandings of our nature, of our
possibilities and limitations, different alternatives will present themselves as both
possible and desirable.
A certain interpretation of our nature is indispensable for defending Tessman’s
claim that there exist a set of character traits that are at once desirable and ideal for
responding to oppression and regretfully damaging to the selves who cultivate them.
Once we see how central such an interpretation of our nature is to Tessman’s claim about
the burdened virtues, we also see a path forward for responding to the worry that
Tessman’s eudaimonist perspective, in admitting such a morally troublesome set of
character traits as “virtues,” has collapsed into a form of consequentialism. Macalester
Bell raises this concern and suggests the only thing separating “burdened virtues” from
“vices” is that the benefits outweigh the costs.80 Unlinked from the flourishing of their
bearer, they are only virtues because of the valuable states of affairs they help to realize.
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Still, Tessman herself suggests the cost-benefit analysis when she says, “the idea
of a burden attached to a trait is that there is some level of cost that is to be weighed
against what is otherwise excellent about the trait. But somewhere on this continuum, a
burden becomes so great that it no longer makes sense to assess the trait as good.”81 If
this is all that distinguishes virtue from vice, it is hard to see how this is not a
consequentialist analysis, and then it is far from clear that the appeal to eudaimonism is
adding anything significant to our understanding of virtue in contexts of oppression.
There may be one way in which this charge is improperly leveled. Tessman’s
analysis does not dub the burdened virtues unqualifiedly good simply because the
benefits outweigh the harms; they are only virtues in the sense that they name the best
that is possible, given the (terrible) circumstances. There is, in a sense, an asterisk
attached to the appellation, and Tessman maintains that the virtuous person who bears up
under them will do so with regret, recognizing that these traits are only choiceworthy
given the bad circumstances.
However, I do not believe that Tessman’s analysis of the burdened virtues can be
reduced to a form of cost-benefit consequentialism. With the implicit claim about human
nature made explicit and placed firmly in view, we can see Tessman’s analysis is not, in
fact, reducible to a cost-benefit analysis. It is not simply that the benefits achieved by the
burdened virtues outweigh the costs associated with them. The burdened virtues are
“virtues” because they are the best that is possible, given our nature. No matter what the
cost of these traits is, they are still the best that is possible. What is good is often very
difficult to achieve, and striving toward the ideal may be exceedingly demanding. In
contexts of oppression there are even greater obstacles to realizing what is good.
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Tessman’s eudaimonist framework shows us often overlooked psychological costs to
cultivating the best kind of traits possible. Her view is eudaimonist because it continues
to foreground and prioritize the well-being of the person. It does not justify sacrificing
the well-being of the person for the sake of achieving some good state of affairs,
independent of the agent. Rather, it attends to the costs incurred by the individual even
when they realize the best traits that are possible for them. Her view is ultimately tragic
because, given her understanding of our nature, in a context of oppression, the best that is
possible is not very good.
At the end of the day, whether we think Martin Luther King, Jr. or Malcolm X or
Lisa Tessman has authentic insight into the ideals that will best promote flourishing, our
judgment depends in part on an assessment of human nature, on what is realistic and what
is ideal—what is healthy and what is pathological—for beings such as we are.
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CHAPTER 6

HUMAN NATURE: FROM OBSTACLE TO RESOURCE

1. Confronting the Problem of Human Nature
A number of feminist moral philosophers have proposed appropriating a
flourishing-based ethical perspective as the basis of a feminist moral theory. Aristotle’s
eudaimonist virtue ethics has been one of the principle models and sources of inspiration
in this project. However, significant questions remain about what exactly a feminist
flourishing-based ethical theory is going to look like. While Aristotle has been a principle
inspiration here, making the moral philosophy developed by Aristotle compatible with
feminist principles presents a number of challenges. One of the main challenges of
Aristotle’s eudaimonism from a feminist perspective is the role played by a theory of
human nature. Feminist philosophers are generally skeptical of appeals to human nature
because of the way theories of human nature have functioned to legitimize and maintain
the social and legal subordination of women.
Against this backdrop, I have argued that a theory of human nature can be a
critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing. First, theories of human nature can
articulate the reasons agents have to live as the theory prescribes by making clear why
this account of flourishing is good for the agent, given the human condition. As such,
theories of human nature articulate a particularly important set of reasons agents have for
making sense of a flourishing-based ethical theory’s answer to the question “How should
I live?” Second, theories of human nature can support a flourishing-based analysis of
oppression, making clear the ways oppression constitutes a harm. While it is widely

275
believed that feminist objections to appeals to nature are rooted in opposition to the
essentialist metaphysics implied by a theory of human nature, I have argued that
metaphysical essentialism is not really the root problem for feminism, since both
essentialist and anti-essentialist theoretical frameworks are subject to the criticisms that
have been leveled under the guise of rooting out “essentialism.” The root of the problem
is really the Problem of Representation and the exclusionary political effects arising from
this. The Problem of Representation identified here names two problematic phenomena.
First, there are occasions when, in the course of offering philosophical analysis of ethical
or political subjects, normative ideals are advanced under the guise of neutral description.
Second, the ideals thus disguised very typically reflect the social position and form of life
of the theorizer, thus reinforcing the norms and values of the one doing the theorizing as
the norm of what it is to be the kind of thing or subject in question.
When it comes to ethics and the appeal to human nature, the appeal to a
supposedly value-neutral description of what it is to be human colludes with the
assumption that the purpose of a theory of human nature is to ground ethical claims in
uncontroversial matters of fact. But, as I have argued, this is not the role a theory of
human nature plays in a flourishing-based ethic. A flourishing-based ethic requires a
theory of human nature which is teleological, encoding evaluative judgments about the
proper ends of human development. I believe that effectively addressing the Problem of
Representation means being transparent about the kind of theory of human nature
required by an ethic of flourishing. A certain kind of theory of human nature can then be
a critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing.
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My case for this conclusion has unfolded gradually. In approaching the problem
human nature (at least on its face) poses for a feminist ethic of flourishing, my first goal
was to gain a clearer understanding of the methodological role a theory of human nature
has, historically, been accorded in a flourishing-based ethical theory. Here, the
motivating thought was that understanding the role played by human nature would make
it more clear how essential or dispensable a conception of human nature is to such a
moral perspective. This I took up in chapter two. My second goal was to evaluate
contemporary flourishing-based ethical theories that appeared promising as the basis of
feminist ethic of flourishing in order to assess their prospects and potential to serve in this
capacity, which I did in chapters three, four, and five.
The conclusion I drew in chapter two is that a certain conception of human nature,
as teleological, plays an inescapable role in substantiating the normative authority of
moral judgments in a flourishing-based ethical theory. In order to make this case, I
distinguished two conceptual aspects of a theory of human nature: the “substantive
conception of human nature” and the “concept of nature in general.” I described the
concept of nature in general as “framing” the content or substance of one’s conception of
human nature. Or, using Aristotle’s form/matter distinction as an analogy, the concept of
nature in general is like the “form,” shaping the “matter” of one’s theory. Through an
analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx, I argued that there are two broad ways of
conceiving of nature in general. In Aristotle and the early Marx, we have a “teleological”
concept of nature in general. In Hume and the later Marx, we find an “empirical” concept
of nature in general.
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A teleological concept of nature in general involves evaluative judgments about
the proper endpoints of human development and relies on this to make judgments about
what makes for fulfillment or frustration in human life. As such a teleological concept of
nature is explicitly normative, distinguishing between those capacities and tendencies that
will contribute to human good and those that will thwart it. A teleological concept of
nature in general carries significant normative weight because it articulates what is good
for us.
An empirical concept of nature in general draws no such distinctions. It aims to
offer a descriptive account of human nature as the totality of characteristics, capacities,
and tendencies universally exhibited by members of the human species. On an empirical
conception of our nature, tendencies and capacities that undermine or work against
human fulfillment are no less a part of human nature than those that promote it. On the
empirical view of nature in general, what is “natural” simply signifies the way things
stand with us—what we commonly find to be the case in human life. “Natural” in this
sense means “usual” or “common,” and human nature encompasses everything which is
universally common to members of the human species.
A teleological conception of human nature is a necessary element of any
adequately normative flourishing-based moral theory, because such a theory needs to be
able to explain why the ideals it advances as constitutive of human flourishing are good
for us. Because it distinguishes between the many possible ends of human life—marking
off those that are forms of fulfillment from those that are not—a teleological theory of
human nature articulates important reasons agents have to live as the theory prescribes.
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For example, Marx’s condemnation of capitalism depends on a teleological
conception of human nature and the proper end of human life. This allows him to
distinguish real needs from false needs based on whether they contribute to human
fulfillment. In the early Marx, we find, in no uncertain terms, an indictment of the
capitalist mode of production. Capitalism is bad for human beings because the way
production is organized in a capitalist economy alienates the worker from her labor, from
the product of her labor, from her community, and ultimately, from herself. What fulfills
and creates for a fully human life, by contrast, is the person’s ability to engage in praxis,
that is, conscious, free, social, and productive activity. For the early Marx, we are
essentially working beings, beings whose needs—not only physical, but psychic and
social as well—are met through the exercise of our capacity for conscious, free, social,
and productive labor. Only in a context where praxis is properly supported can we truly
flourish.
Marx’s moral critique of capitalism depends on his ability to substantiate the
claim that capitalism harms individuals by failing to meet their needs. However, in his
later “scientific” writings, Marx abandons the theory of human nature advanced in his
early humanistic writings and substitutes an empirical concept of human nature,
according to which human nature (and its essential needs) are contingently constituted by
the given social mode of production. According to the later Marx, human needs are
constituted by the mode of production. Capitalism creates ever new and more expansive
needs and then meets them in order to augment the value of capital. In doing so, human
nature itself is transformed: as our needs change, so does our nature. But if these new
needs created by capitalism are our true needs, then it is not clear that capitalism is
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harming us or that our needs are not being met. Given that Marx sees human nature as
constituted by human need and that our needs are a product of the capitalist mode of
production, it is unclear on what grounds Marx in his later works can criticize capitalism.
The teleological conception of human nature turns out to be essential for Marx’s
normative critique of capitalism. Without it, there is little reason to work toward or strive
for the socialist vision of flourishing because it is not clear that capitalism is bad for us or
that socialism is better. Whether or not Marx’s conception of human nature is true or his
critique of capitalism justified, the point, methodologically, is that the normative force of
his critique depends upon a teleological conception of human nature. Through the
analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx I argued that a normatively adequate ethic of
flourishing requires the conceptual resources of a teleological conception of human
nature.
Turning to the second task, in chapter three, I examined the flourishing-based
virtue ethics developed by Rosalind Hursthouse and the prospect that her unique form of
neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism can serve as the basis for a feminist ethic of
flourishing. Using the conceptual categories developed in chapter two, I argued that the
teleological concept of nature to which Hursthouse appeals gives human nature the right
methodological role in support of the account of flourishing. She rightly recognizes that
the appeal to nature is not an appeal to a normatively flat, empirical conception of human
nature, but rather to an evaluative, ethically informed conception of human nature. Her
account of human nature as properly ordered by the five naturalistic ends clearly shows
the goods to be achieved and the reasons we have to develop the virtues. However,
Hursthouse’s substantive conception of human nature is not sufficiently robust to draw
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the necessary moral distinctions between feminist and patriarchal understandings of the
virtues. Feminists interested in the neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism developed by
Hursthouse will require a more substantive account of human nature, one which is not
restricted to the ends the biological sciences can license. I concluded that a feminist ethic
of flourishing working on the basis of a neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism will need a
thicker account of the ends of human nature to defend a feminist moral perspective on the
virtues.
In chapter four, I turned to the ethic of flourishing articulated and defended by
Martha Nussbaum in the capabilities approach. The chapter brings together two central
themes of the dissertation: first, an analysis of the methodological role played by a theory
of human nature in the capabilities approach and, second, feminist objections to an ethic
grounded in a substantive conception of human nature related to what I called in chapter
one the Problem of Representation. The capabilities approach seeks to provide a theory of
social justice uniquely suited to addressing the harms women face by articulating and
defending a list of human capabilities. The capabilities approach argues that each person
has a right to choose to exercise certain fundamental human capabilities on the grounds
that the capability to function in the areas named by the capabilities list is constitutive of
a life with dignity. To be denied these central capabilities is to be denied the flourishing
to which each and every person has a legitimate claim in virtue of their standing as a
human being. Again, using the conceptual categories developed in chapter two, I
examined the methodological role played by human nature. Again, I distinguished the
concept of nature in general from the substantive content of the account. In the case of
Nussbaum, I argued that while Nussbaum’s substantive account of the capabilities is
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“thick” enough to defend a liberal vision of flourishing, Nussbaum is ambiguous about
the concept of nature in general and, hence, ambiguous about the methodological role of
appeals to human nature. To the extent that she claims the capabilities list is based on an
empirical investigation into human nature, she misconstrues the role of a theory of human
nature. If the capabilities list is based on an empirical conception of human nature, then it
will not be able to play the normative role the capabilities approach requires. On the other
hand, if the capabilities list is the product of an evaluative judgment about which
capabilities—amongst the many human beings possess—are most significant for human
fulfillment, then the capabilities approach is implicitly relying on a teleological
conception of human nature. Acknowledging this means acknowledging the contentious
status of the capabilities list, but it has the virtue of making clear why these capabilities
and not others are given the privileged status they are. Because Nussbaum has been
ambiguous about the status of the capabilities list, a number of feminist moral
philosophers have been quite critical of the capabilities approach. I argued that being
transparent about the status of these claims is an important part of responding to these
criticisms.
Finally, chapter five brings the argument of the previous chapters to bear on Lisa
Tessman’s Burdened Virtues, in which she develops a feminist eudaimonism for the
purpose of bringing to light the uniquely moral harms suffered by members of oppressed
groups who are committed to resisting their own oppression through character
transformation. Tessman argues that there is a set of virtues that are both morally
requisite for resisting oppression and harmful to their bearer. She calls such traits
“burdened virtues,” because even though they are praiseworthy in helping their bearer
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either survive or resist oppression, they are psychologically damaging because they are
destructive of the psychological traits needed for leading a truly good life. If this is true,
Tessman’s analysis reveals an overlooked moral harm of oppression. Oppression
constitutes a moral harm to victims by making character traits which undermine the
psychological capacity of a person to flourish necessary for surviving or resisting
oppression. Thereby, the burdened virtues name a double-bind of oppression by which
the oppressed are kept from flourishing whether they resist their own oppression or not.
While Tessman tries to sidestep controversial questions about human nature, I
have argued that embracing a teleological conception of human nature would give her
theory additional resources for defending her claims about the burdened virtues and the
moral harm that oppression inflicts on the oppressed. Without denying that oppression
harms the oppressed in other ways, one might deny that oppression causes the uniquely
moral harm Tessman claims to have identified through the concept of a burdened virtue.
For her thesis to hold up, there must be a set of character traits that are both the best
possible for us in these circumstances and, at the same time, psychologically damaging. If
either of these claims fall, then so does Tessman’s claim to have identified a uniquely
moral harm of oppression.
In order to show the significance of a theory of human nature for defending
Tessman’s claim, I examined a single instance of a burdened virtue—rage—and three
distinct attitudes toward rage as a character trait useful for resisting oppression. Tessman
believes rage is both a virtue and ultimately psychologically damaging because corrosive
to its bearer. She argues that such a view of rage is consistent with the implicit beliefs
about flourishing held by members of liberatory activist communities. She cites
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especially the beliefs held by feminist and civil rights leaders. I question whether there is
a consistent vision of flourishing implicit in these liberatory activist communities and
whether the claim that rage is a burdened virtue can be sustained by looking more closely
at the visions for black liberation articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X. I
conclude that on neither view can it be maintained that rage is a burdened virtue. For
Malcolm, rage is a virtue, but he does not judge it to be psychologically damaging. The
kind of rage he judges a virtue he also maintains is a sign of psychological health. On the
other hand, Martin Luther King, Jr. seems to agree with Tessman’s assessment that rage
is psychologically damaging, but he does not regard it as a virtue. Martin sees an
alternative response to oppression in love and judges that love is the ideal character trait
to cultivate, not rage. For the burdened virtues to be both the best traits possible for us
and at the same time harmful for us, human nature must be such that there is no better
alternative trait we can realistically cultivate while, at the same time, the trait called for in
this circumstance must be psychologically unmanageable and damaging. Our nature must
be such that no alternative response is attainable and yet the response open to us is
damaging. This tragic understanding of our capacities and limitations is ultimately what
can sustain Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues. Equally, it is this view of our
nature that makes sense of the thought that, despite being difficult—to the point of
inflicting psychological damage—this is the course we ought to take, since this is the best
that is possible for us given the terrible circumstances.
Thus, I argue that implicit in Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues is a
view of our nature as well-realized and suited to certain psychological states but damaged
by others, and damaged in ways so deep that they maim our basic capacity to flourish in a
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fully human way. Tessman does not acknowledge the theory’s dependence on a certain
understanding of our nature, but acknowledging this and being articulate about it would
give Tessman’s theory resources to defend the claim that the burdened virtues are
character traits that are at once the best that is possible for us, given the circumstances,
and yet deeply damaging. Thus, having this account would enable her to more fully
defend the claim that oppression constitutes a moral harm to the oppressed. In this way, a
certain kind of theory of human nature plays an important role in analyzing oppression
and substantiating claims about the harms of oppression in light of a vision of full human
flourishing. A certain conception of human nature enables us to articulate both the harms
that oppression inflicts and the virtues agents have good reason to cultivate.

2. A New Perspective on an Old Dilemma
I have argued that a theory of human nature plays an indispensable
methodological role in a flourishing-based moral framework. It is indispensable because
a theory of human nature articulates a particularly important set of reasons we have for
living as the theory prescribes. Without this, we lack a major resource which can clarify
the reasons agents should act in accordance with the ideals articulated by the theory. As
such, a theory of human nature is an important normative resource for a theory of
flourishing. But, recognizing that not just any theory of human nature can fulfill this
function, I have argued that the theory must be teleological in form: it must draw
evaluative distinctions among the possible ends of human life, distinguishing those which
are fulfillments from those which are not.
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In contrast, if a theory of human nature is reduced to a description of the
characteristics and tendencies we can empirically document as universally exhibited in
the human species, a theory of human nature will not imply anything about what we have
reason to do or how we have reason to live. For example, I take it that we are
sympathetically constituted in the sense Hume described, and this means we have an
innate tendency to experience pleasure at the pleasure of others and pain at their pain. We
are also self-interested, meaning we have a tendency to pursue that which we perceive to
be beneficial and to avoid that which we perceive to be harmful. Similarly, unless an
individual is affected by a physical or mental disability, human beings characteristically
possess all of the capabilities on the capabilities list formulated by Martha Nussbaum.
However, human beings also characteristically possess capabilities for deception,
exploitation, unimaginable forms of cruelty, and revenge, among other less savory
capabilities. From these kinds of facts about ourselves, nothing follows about what we
ought to do or how we ought to live. In such a description of human nature,
indistinguishably lumped together are intractable characteristics that we could not change
if we wanted, or that we could only change at an exceedingly high cost, and others which
are malleable, susceptible to development in a number of ways, where the outcome
depends in large part upon the environment and the support or barriers one encounters.
From such a list, nothing follows about whether these human universals ought to be
supported and respected, begrudgingly accepted and accommodated, or resisted and
repressed.
Teleological conceptions of human nature articulate evaluative understandings of
human life, distinguishing amongst the possible ends of human life those which are
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fulfillments and realizations of a human form of life from those which are not. However
flourishing is understood, it must be possible to interpret it as a condition in which human
beings are fulfilled—made capable of “wholeness” and psychological integrity—at a
minimum, in other words, able to be psychologically, emotionally, socially, and
biologically “healthy.” There are undoubtedly other characterizations we could draw on
to describe a “fully human life.” But, in any case, whatever flourishing is taken to consist
of, it cannot be a condition that can be characterized as a kind of alienation,
“brokenness,” perpetual frustration of our aspirations and capacities, or psychological
damage, nor can it constitute a “maiming” of the capacities that make for a full human
life. Teleological conceptions of our nature can express these distinctions in a number of
different ways—contrasting states of health and unhealth, fulfillment and alienation, and
so on. In doing so, they articulate possible goods to be achieved through different courses
of action, and thereby serve to articulate reasons we can draw on to answer the question
“How should I live?” Empirical conceptions of human nature expressly avoid drawing
any such distinctions and, by that very fact, fail to be reason-giving.
Here a difficult question arises: without already accepting the evaluative
interpretation of human life expressed by a teleological conception of human nature, in
what sense can any such account be persuasive to agents who wonder if they really ought
to live as a theory of flourishing prescribes?
We are, in a sense, back to the concerns Louise Antony raised when she argued
that no conception of human nature can, ultimately, play the role it is called upon to play.
As Antony understands it, “the trick in constructing a rhetorically effective argument
from nature is to make . . . what is ‘true by nature’ seem a matter of simple observation or

287
an uncontroversial finding from a neutral science—while at the same time preserving the
modal or normative import that the term ‘nature’ frequently carries.”1
I have argued that the normative adequacy of a flourishing-based ethical theory
depends on a teleological conception of human nature. Furthermore, a feminist ethic of
flourishing will need to endorse a rather robust account of our nature. A “thin”
teleological account of the sort Hursthouse endorses will not be adequate to substantiate
feminist evaluations of virtues such as ‘patriarchal benevolence.’ The kind of account of
human nature that will be robust enough to make sense of feminist rejections of such
“virtues” will also be contentious enough to be disputable.
I have essentially argued that the indispensable kind of nature claims that inform
moral reasoning in a flourishing-based ethical theory are not a “matter of simple
observation or an uncontroversial finding from a neutral science.” They are evaluative
interpretations of our form of life and what is important for us for the purpose of living
well. Teleological conceptions of human nature are based on evaluative judgments about
the proper ends of human development. But if this is true, then can reasoning tied to
considerations of human nature be “rhetorically effective”? Can it really persuade?
In one sense, I believe yes, it can. Teleological conceptions of human nature
persuade in the way that any interpretation of a complex phenomenon persuades: by
convincing us that it makes the best sense out of the most important features of the
phenomenon. I have been focused on what a flourishing-based theory needs in order to
motivate the agent to act or live as the theory prescribes, and for this purpose a
teleological conception of human nature is indispensable. By contrast, empirical
conceptions of our nature are clearly inadequate for this purpose.
1

Louise M. Antony, "Natures and Norms," Ethics 111, no. 1 (2000): 13.
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From the first-person perspective, having accepted a certain interpretation of our
nature, I think it is clear that a teleological conception of human nature can, in fact, be
persuasive in motivating an agent to act as the theory prescribes. It does so by giving her
reasons that this form of life or course of action is good for her. Thinking again about the
case for Tessman’s burdened virtues, if we accept the view of human nature I argued her
account really needs, it seems clear we should cultivate the burdened virtue of rage.
Despite the difficulties and steep consequences, this is the best that is possible for us,
given the circumstances, and given human nature.2
But in another sense, it is not so clear whether a teleological conception of human
nature will be able to persuade. To be “rhetorically effective,” Antony clearly believes a
theory of human nature must settle the question of ethical objectivity. A theory of human
nature, she is thinking, must settle whether these moral judgments are objectively valid
because true. There is a question over the accuracy or adequacy of a particular claim,
(e.g., a moral judgment or a theory of human flourishing). Facts about human nature, it is
assumed, must persuade us that this claim is true (or show us that it is false). However,
the appeal to human nature can only do this effectively if it is an appeal to a fact that is
uncontroversially true. I believe it is this line of reasoning that has led many—not just
Antony—to conclude that the attempt to draw human nature into moral reasoning is a
complete dead end, or at best it does not take us very far. The only claims about human
2

Recall that her theory of the burdened virtues entails both that rage is psychologically unhealthy because
it is corrosive, but also that human nature cannot sustain any alternative response to the persistent
disrespect that oppressed peoples confront that would be better. Love of enemy, for instance, as advocated
by Martin Luther King, Jr. has to be judged unrealistic (probably because it is too demanding), while the
response that is available and realistic for us is, tragically, not good for us. So, the response that it is
realistic to expect (given human nature) is one that has tragic consequences (given human nature). While it
is difficult to know who is right and what is (generally) to be regarded as a realistic possibility, if we judge
that the love Martin Luther King, Jr. called for is not a psychologically realistic alternative, the reason we
should adopt the burdened virtue of rage is clear. Despite the difficulties and steep consequences, this is the
best that is possible for us.
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nature that would be uncontroversial would be embedded in an empirical conception of
human nature, but from facts like this about our nature, without other controversial
premises to do the real lifting, nothing follows. On this approach, human nature is being
expected to play the role of an uncontroversial, value-neutral foundation from which
normative judgments can be objectively justified.
If this approach should be successful in bridging the ‘is/ought gap,’ it will be
because in the “neutral description” of what it is to be human, someone has smuggled in
normatively loaded concepts which make this conception of what it is to be human
significant for ethical thinking and give it weight in considerations of how we should live
and what we should do. Thinking in light of the insights of feminist theory, it will be
unsurprising if the ideals being passed off as “uncontroversial description” reflect the
social position and ideals of the person behind the theory. In short, it will be unsurprising
if this approach comes to grief over the Problem of Representation.
The way I have proposed a feminist flourishing-based ethic ought to avoid this
pitfall is to be transparent about both the proper role of a theory of human nature in the
wider context of a theory of flourishing, and to be clear that the kind of theory of human
nature employed in moral reasoning is strongly evaluative, making no pretensions
otherwise.
This move shifts the conceptual model for how a theory of human nature relates
to an ethic of flourishing. Teleological theories of human nature give reasons that support
the account of flourishing, but these reasons are themselves ethically informed. The
relation of support is probably best understood as making transparent (or testing, as the
case may be) the coherence of our conception of human nature—especially surrounding
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what we take to be the boundaries of what is possible—in light of the ideals embodied in
our conception of flourishing. Successfully making these elements cohere is no guarantee
of truth, but their failure to cohere can be a symptom of falsehood. This picture of the
relationship between a theory of human nature and an ethic of flourishing abandons the
aspiration to ground value judgments about flourishing in a realm of indisputable facts
about “how human beings are.” To the extent that the reasons given by a teleological
conception of human nature “justify” the moral judgments of a flourishing-based ethical
theory, they do not justify in this way.
The methodological role for human nature and the structure of the theory that I
am proposing as a viable path forward for a feminist flourishing-based ethic is one which
is broadly consistent with the proposals of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists such as
Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse—though as discussed in chapter three, Hursthouse
stakes out a teleological conception of human nature which continues to aspire to be
uncontroversial.3 One of the major meta-ethical questions facing neo-Aristotelian ethical
naturalism is whether human nature can provide the right sort of normativity. I have
argued that a teleological conception of human nature is an indispensable source of
normativity for a flourishing-based ethic, and this is the role often given to human nature
by those advancing a form of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. But whether one can,
from human nature, establish a strong form of moral normativity or only a weak form of
prudential normativity based on the perceived interests of the agent is a serious question.
I have argued that a teleological conception of human nature is reason-giving and so
capable of making a flourishing-based ethical theory adequately normative, but I think a

3

Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Rosalind
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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question lingers over whether these are the right kind of reasons. This raises the
possibility that a theory of human nature is necessary, but it is not sufficient. If this turns
out to be the case, then the claim I have defended here will need to be revisited. It might
rather be the case that a teleological conception of human nature provides a “minimally
adequate” normativity, but not a “truly adequate” normativity for a flourishing-based
ethical theory.

3. Further Avenues for Research
One possible avenue for future research lies in the direction of epistemological
methods and arguments that can be offered in support of the teleological conceptions of
human nature that flourishing-based ethical theories require. Prior to pursuing the
arguments, it is impossible to know what the outcomes will be, but it seems exceedingly
unlikely that the kinds of arguments and considerations available in favor of any
teleological account of human nature will be arguments that put its truth beyond question.
But if this is true, why is it true? A theory of human nature should give an account of the
essential features of human beings, and it is not immediately evident why this should be
so difficult or why it should entail such controversy. W.B. Gallie has argued that there are
some concepts which are “essentially contested.” According to Gallie, “There are
concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”4 What Gallie
intended by this and how it might help us to think about theories of human nature as they
inform our ethical thought I cannot develop here, but Gallie’s idea of essentially

4

W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 176.
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contested concepts is provocative when applied to the question of human nature because
his concern was precisely with how a concept could entail endless dispute necessarily, by
virtue of the very concept it is, and yet those disputes could in some sense be both
‘objective’ and ‘reasonable.’
Much of this study has been devoted to methodological questions concerning
flourishing-based ethical theories. Flourishing-based ethical theories are, in general,
consequentialist in character, but a concern was raised in chapter five that Lisa Tessman’s
analysis of the burdened virtues might not be eudaimonistic because it simply reduces to
a form of simple consequentialism. If eudaimonism is, as this study has assumed, one
kind of flourishing-based ethical theory, and flourishing-based ethical theories are
consequentialist, this raises the puzzle of why it should be thought that there is a
distinction between eudaimonism and consequentialism. The degree to which a
eudaimonist moral theory is distinct from simple consequentialist moral theory is
interesting, and the analysis given in chapter five suggests it may have to do with the
unique role played by a robust theory of human nature. Substantiating this suggestion is
another area for further research.
With respect to employing a flourishing-based ethical theory to define the
feminist alternative to oppression, a flourishing-based account may be able to provide a
much more robust account of the antithesis to oppression. A cursory review of literature
on oppression suggests that the most common conception of oppression’s antithesis is a
thin conception of freedom.5 Feminist theorists have recognized the inadequacies of

5

See the literature reviews of two recent dissertations on oppression: Kira Tomsons, “Oppression: A
Conceptual Analysis” (Ph.D., Dalhousie University (Canada), 2006); Daniel M. Silvermint, “Oppression
and Victim Agency” (Ph.D., The University of Arizona, 2012).
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purely negative conceptions of freedom,6 but have understandable reservations with
positive conceptions of freedom.7 A flourishing-based ethical framework with the
resources of a robust conception of human nature may provide resources for such a task.

4. Cultivating the Resource
On the model advanced here, human nature is an indispensable conceptual
resource because of the role it plays in answering normative questions in a flourishingbased ethical theory (e.g., “How should I live?” and “What reasons do I have to live this
way?”). Feminist moral philosophy needs a moral theory with adequate normative
authority because (the vast majority of?) feminist moral insights challenge the status quo
privileges of the powerful. One needs to be able to provide oneself (and others) with
sufficiently good reasons to do what one morally ought to do, even if it is hard or painful
or against one’s interests in some way. Absent gaining power and changing the status quo
by force, the success of feminist political and social goals depends on the moral authority
of the cause, so having a moral theory with reasons that can be compelling to those who
need to sacrifice privilege in order to do what morality requires is crucial.
Furthermore, an articulated conception of human nature is a necessary normative
resource even if questions remain about the objectivity of the account. And a teleological
conception of human nature is necessary even if questions of ethical objectivity are more
complicated with a teleological conception of human nature than with an empirical
conception of human nature.

6

Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
“Negative” and “positive” in the sense defined by Isaiah Berlin in his classic 1958 essay republished in
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
7
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The truth of the teleological conception of human nature which a flourishingbased ethical theory invokes is an important question, and some account needs to be
given, but it is unlikely that the account given is going to satisfy the demand that it be
“uncontroversially true.” Teleological conceptions of human nature give reasons, but they
are not uncontroversial reasons. Rather than see a teleological conception of human
nature as the uncontroversial set of facts upon which an ethic of flourishing is grounded,
it is more plausible to construe a theory of human nature as one part of the ethical theory
itself. A theory of human nature is not outside the ethical theory, but an aspect of the
theory that (ideally) coheres with and makes sense of the other elements within the
theory.
The kind of teleological theory of human nature that supports an ethics of
flourishing is liable to challenge and contestation, but developing such an account is
important for being able to explain why it is good to live as the theory prescribes.
Without such, our ethical beliefs about flourishing are less intelligible, and we have fewer
normative resources to draw upon to explain—both to ourselves and to others—what is
harmful and what is beneficial, what should be avoided and what should be pursued for
the sake of a good human life. For this reason, cultivating an articulated account of
human nature and offering reasoned justification for it is an important task for any ethic
of flourishing. If we neglect to articulate an intellectual understanding of the meaning and
significant of human life—with its distinctive set of capacities and limitations, longings
and aspirations—we lose an important resource for intellectually supporting and making
sense of the kind of life we might otherwise aspire to realize. The resource can become a
wasteland if we refuse to make such evaluative judgments. Failing to recognize the
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evaluative nature of the account creates other problems. But with adequate care and
attention, human nature is a conceptual resource that can nourish and sustain the ethics of
flourishing and provide necessary resources for articulating and defending a feminist
vision of flourishing.
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